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ABSTRACT 
This study consists of two parts: the first part is 
the establishment of a theoretical model of moral develop-
ment and the second part is an empirical study which includes 
the construction of a new psychological test called The 
Moral Development Test (MDT). 
The proposed theory postulates the following three 
parameters to explain the fundamental nature of moral 
development: Basic Psychological Needs (Parameter N), Human 
Relationships (R) and Structures of Judgmeht (J). Different 
current theories are applied in the elaboration of the above 
three parameters: Humanistic Psychology particularly 
Maslow's Theory for N, Sociobiological Theory of Kinship for 
R and Cognitive-developmental theory for J. The theory is 
a 7-stage model. In addition, an attempt is made to employ 
the Chinese Tao Philosophy in the primitive establishment 
of a theoretical basis for the Ultimate Stage of Human 
Development i.e. Stage 7 in the theory. The derivation of 
the theory is mathematically oriented. 
The MDT is constructed mainly for validating the 
above theoretical model. Each form of the MDT consists of 
five or six hypothetical dilemmas. 
	 The questions for 
each dilemma are divided into two parts. Part I is used 
to test the Parameters N and R and Part II the Parameter J. 
It was found that the test-retest and internal con-
sistency reliabilities of the major MDT indices (labelled 
as NRRJ and WNRRJ indices) were usually in the 0.80s to 
0.90s. The face validity, convergent-divergent validity 
and the construct validity have been demonstrated to be 
good. In addition, results of cross-cultural analyses 
using the English (London) and Chinese (Hong Kong) samples 
also support the cultural universal hypothesis of the present 
theoretical model. Nevertheless, the MDT only explores 
features of moral development up to the fifth stage of the 
present 7-stage model. 
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1. The Psychology of Moral Development: An Introductory  
Overview' 
The study of morality has long been a most important 
topic in philosophy. 
	 However, the systematic study of 
moral development in psychology only started in the past 
few decades, with rapid improvements in the past twenty 
years or so. In some sense, 	 moral psychology is only 
in its stage of childhood at the present time. 
The main objective of this chapter is to outline some 
of the common concepts of morality in psychology and to 
present an introductory overview of the current theories 
of moral development. 
1.1. Some Common Concepts of Morality in Psychology  
The concept of morality has been extensively studied 
by both Eastern and Western philosophers throughout history. 
Western philosophers such as Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, 
Kant, Bentham, Mill, etc. and Chinese philosophers such as 
Confucius, Mencius and many others have dealt with the 
concept of morality in detail and have given us many 
insights into the complexities of the problems involved. 
*A substantial part of this Chapter is based on Chapters 
1 and 2 of the author's M.A. dissertation (Ma, 1980). 
Chapter 2 of the author's M.A. dissertation appears as 
Appendix 1(A) in this thesis. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a 
presentation of the philosophers' concept of morality. 
This study is predominantly a psychological one, therefore, 
it will focus more on the interpretation of the concepts 
of morality given by psychologists, although the work of 
the sociologist , Durkheim, will be considered because of 
his influence on cognitive developmental psychologists. 
In the following paragraphs, some common concepts of 
morality will be discussed briefly. 
	
They will be 
elaborated in further detail in either Appendix 1(A) or 
Chapter 2. 
(1) Psychoanalysts tend to define morality as a force 
that is negative to life and love; a force that causes 
mental illness and death.Gilligan (1976, p.145) defines 
morality as: 
"action and thought motivated by a sense of compulsion 
or obligation rather than by love (spontaneous 
inclination or wish), and by a negative wish to avoid 
painful feelings (shame or guilt) rather than by a 
positive wish to express feelings of love". 
(2) Behaviourists tend to link morality with social condi-
tioning or social conformity. Eysenck (1976) defines 
conscience as a "conditioned reflex" in his Biological 
explanation of morality. He argues that: 
"by calling a variety of actions bad, evil, or naughty, 
we encourage the child to identify them all in one 
category, and to react in the future with anxiety to 
everything thus labelled." (Eysenck, 1976, p.109) 
(3) The concept of morality in the Cognitive Developmental 
Approach is elaborated in detail by Kohlberg (1981, 
1971, 1969). Basically speaking, the concept is 
constructed 	 on Kant's moral philosophy and Rawl's 
(1971) theory of justice. 	 A detailed explanation of 
this concept is given in Section 2.3.3. 
(4) Morality can also be defined in terms of altruism 
and social norms or moral rules. 
	
Wright (1971) 
writes: 
"moral rules are foundational in the sense that they 
are concerned with the maintenance of, for instance, 
trust, mutual help and justice in human relationship. 
.... Moral rules form the yardstick against which we 
evaluate the rules of any particular activity". 
(p.13). 
It follows that 
"moral behaviour consists of all the various things 
people do in connection with moral rules." (p.15) 
A more detailed elaboration of the concept of morality 
in terms of empathy, altruism and social norms is given 
in Section 2.2. 
(4) Durkheim (1925) argues that there are three elements 
of morality: (i) discipline - a spirit shared generally 
by members of the group (ii) attachment to those social 
groups of which one is a member and (iii) autonomy or 
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self-determination. 	 He elaborates the last element 
as follows: 
"We must have knowledge, as clear and complete as 
awareness as possible of the reasons for our conduct. 
This consciousness confers on our behaviour the 
autonomy that the public conscience from now on 
requires of every genuinely and completely moral 
being". (Durkheim, 1925, p.120) 
In other words, such moral behaviour "must be 
freely desired, that is to say, freely accepted (p.120). 
1.2. An Overview of Current Theories which have a bearing  
on Moral Development.  
The term 'theory' is used loosely here; any fairly 
systematic thoughts on moral development is regarded as a 
'theory'. 
18 current theories which have a bearing on Moral 
development are discussed in this thesis. Some of them 
are elaborated in Chapter 2 and some in Appendices 1(A) 
and 1(B). These theories are grouped in Figure 1.1 in 
three categories: (1) Feeling or Emotional aspect 
(2) Behavioural aspect and (3) Cognitive aspect. It is 
important to note that: 
(i) the list is by no means exhaustive, the criterion for 
selection is basically a subjective one 
(ii)Not all the theories in the list deal with moral 
development directly and explicitly. Some of them 
are placed here mainly because of their strong relevance 
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to the study of moral development. 
(iii)The categorization of the theories is not entirely 
rigorous because of the complexity of the topic and 
the preliminary nature of development of some of the 
theories. 
The following figure is constructed mainly to present 
a very rough and simple picture of the current theories 
listed in Table 1.1. The lines indicate the relationships 
between the various theories and the three'basic aspects 
of moral development. 
The present study seeks to establish relationships 
between parameters derived for the three fundamental 
aspects. 	 The parameters are: 
(i) Psychological Needs (labelled as Parameter N), 
(ii) Human Relationships (Parameter R) and 
(iii)Structures of Judgment (Parameter J) (See Chapter 3). 
These parameters are placed within a theoretical model 
(labelled as *TMD in Figure 1.1) which is tested in the 
empirical part of this study, 
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TABLE 1.1 
The 18 Current Theories 
TITLE 	 OF THE THEORY SOME MAJOR REFERENCES 
1. Psychoanalytic Theory Gilligan 	 (1976) 
L.. Behaviouristic Theory Eysenck 	 (1976) 
3. Cognitive Developmental Piaget 	 (1932);Kohlberg 
Theory (1969,1971,1976,1981) 
4 (a)  Social Learning Theory Bandura(1977),Bandura & 
Walters "(1963) 
4 (b)  Cognitive Social 	 Learn- 
ing Theory 
Mischel 	 & Mischel 	 (1976) 
5.  Theory of Empathy and Hoffman 	 (1976,1978,1979) 
Altruistic Motivation 
6.  NormatiVe Theory of Berkowitz 	 (1972); 
Altruism Schwartz 	 (1977) 
7.  Sociobiological Theory Wilson(1975) ;Trivers(1970; 
of Kinship and Altruism Hamilton(1964) 
8.  Typological Theory of Bronfenbrenner 	 (1962; 
Moral Judgment and Garbarino & Bronfenbrenner 
Socialization (1976) 
9.  Bull: Moral Judgment Bull 	 (1969) 
Theory 
10. Selman: 	 Social Perspec- 
tive Taking 
Selman 	 (1976) 
Theory 
11.  Simpson: Holistic Theory Simpson 	 (1976) 
12.  Socioanalytic Theory Hogan 	 et. 	 al. 	 (1978) 
13.  Dialectic Theory Baumrind 	 (1978),. Meacham 
(1975) 
14.  Cybernetic Theory Pugh 	 (1977) 
15, Loevinger: 	 Ego Develop- 
ment Theory 
Loevinger 	 (1966,1976) 
16.  Erikson: 	 Psychosocial Erikson 	 (1963) 
Development 
Theory 
17.  Social Exchange Theory Blau(1964);Homans(1961, 
1968)Thibaut 	 & 	 Kelly(1959) 
18.  Maslow's Theory of Maslow(1968,1970,1971) 
Human Motivation 
Notes: 
(1) Theories 3,5,6,7,14,17 and 18 are elaborated in Chapter 2; Theories 
1,2,4,8,10,11 and 16 in Appendix 1(A); and theories 9,12,13 and 15 
in Appendix 1(B). 
13 
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Moral Development: Its Nature and Measurement. 
While the first chapter provides an overview of 
the major current theories of Moral Development, this 
chapter gives a more detailed review of the literature 
directly relevant to this study. The first three sections 
(2.1 - 2.3) give a background literature review for the 
theoretical model constructed in the next chapter. Section 
2.1.describes the Humanistic Approach in the study of 
Psychological Needs, in particular, Maslow's theory 
of Human Motivation and the concept of self-actualization 
will be elaborated in detail . Section 2.2 gives a 
brief description of the concepts and origins of altruism 
and human relationships. Some emphasis 
	 is placed 
on the Evolutionary and Sociobiological Theories. In 
Section 2.3, the Cognitive Developmental Theory of 
Morality is reviewed in detail . 
A primitive attempt to introduce Tao Philosophy 
in the study of the Ultimate Stage of Human Development 
is carried out in Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5 
outlines the details of the Moral Judgement and Decision 
System of Man as a Value-driven system, which has a 
genetic origin. 
15 
2.1 Psychological Needs  
Psychological studies of instincts, drives and 
needs have led to the establishment of a large number 
of theories of motivation (see,eg Weiner, 1980; Bolles, 
1975; Madsen, 1974). However, the objective of this 
section is to provide the background literature review 
for the theory established in Chapter 3 and therefore 
the discussion will be limited to Maslow's theory of 
Human Motivation and his concept of self-actualization. 
The existential philosophy and phenomenological 
approach in sociology influenced a group of psycholo-
gists in America in the 1950s. These psychologists were 
_highly critical of Freud's negative view of human nature 
which was based mainly on his clinical studies of neuro-
tic and psychotic subjects. On the contrary, they 
postulated that human nature is basically good or 
neutral (Maslow,-1965, p.308-309) and that the study 
of those mentally ill is limiting. They argued that 
there should be an emphasis on the importance of studying 
mentally healthy people. Maslow, a major proponent 
of this approach, did this in his study of those people 
considered to be extremely mentally healthy and proposed 
a theory which includes the concepts of self-actualization, 
B-cognition, Metamotivation and Transcendence (Maslow, 
1968, 1970, 1971). 
Under the influence of the writings of K. Goldstein, 
K. Homey, E. Fromm, G.W. Allport, A. Maslow, C. Rogers 
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and many others, a "third force" in psychology, which is 
often called Humanistic Psychology was established. The 
humanistic psychologists usually take a 'holistic' app-
roach in developing their theories and their research 
interests are probably best described by the statement 
of purpose of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology, which 
states that 
"topics of special interest 
are authenticity, encounter, 
consciousness, self-actualization, 
self-transcendence, search 
for meaning, creativity, 
personal growth, humanistic 
psychotherapy, confluent 
education, values, identity 
and love." 
2.1.1 Maslow's Theory of Human Motivation 
I. Propositions  
Maslow (1970, Chapter 3) puts forward 16 proposi-
tions for his theory of motivation. Some of these propo-
sitions are better regarded as scientific attitudes or 
arguments rather than as scientific propositions. In the 
following discussion, an attempt is made to rearrange 13 
of Maslow's propositions into 5 general postulates. In 
order to simplify referencing, P1 to P16 are used to 
represent Maslow's 16 propositions in the order of his 
presentation (Maslow, 1970) Appendix 2.1(A) gives the 
full title of each proposition. 
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1. Gestalt Postulate of Individual (P1, P12) 
In general, the individual is assumed to be an 
integrated, organized whole. However, Maslow is also 
aware of the fact that an individual sometimes does not 
behave as an integrated whole. He writes, 
"Apparently the organism is 
most unified in its integ-
ration when it is successfully 
facing either a great joy or 
creative moment or else a 
major problem or a threat 
or emergency. But when the 
threat is overwhelming or 
when the organism is too weak 
or helpless to manage it, 
it tends to disintegrate." 
(Maslow, 1970, p.30) 
2. Universality of Ultimate Needs (P3, P4, P9) 
The unconscious ultimate needs or desires of human 
being are universal, that-is, similar in all people. 
These ultimate needs form a sound fundamental base 
for the classification of motivational life. 
3. Fundamental Nature of Motivation (P5, P6, P13) 
Not all human behaviours are motivated. For those 
motivated behaviours, the underlying motivations are 
always multiple, fluctuating and complex. 
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4. Hierarchy of Needs and Drives (P7, P8) 
Human needs are arranged in a hierarchy of prepo-
tency. Similarly, drives are arranged in a hierarchy 
of specificity. 
5. Environmental Influences on Motivation (P11, P14, P15) 
Human motivation is actualized in behaviour under 
the influence of environment. For instance, people have 
been taught by experience to be realistic, that is, to 
"yearn consciously for that which might conceivably be 
actually attained" (Maslow, 1970, p.31). It is also 
postulated that reality exerts an influence on the 
unconscious impulses or motivations. 
In addition, three of Maslow's propositions (P2, P10, 
and P16) described below are regarded as scientific 
attitudes or arguments rather than as scientific postulates: 
(i) P2: 
	 The choice of hunger as a paradigm for all 
other motivational states is regarded as prob-
lematic. One main reason is that hunger is 
"different from other motivations in that it 
has a known somatic base, which is unusual for 
motivational states" (Maslow, 1970, p.20). In 
other words, the hunger drive is atypical rather 
than typical in human motivation. 
(ii) P10: "Motivation theory must be anthropocentric 
rather than animalcentric" (P.27). That is, 
HIGHEST 
LOWEST 
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the use of animal data as a base for theorizing 
human nature is debatable. 
(iii) P16:The highest capacities of the healthy and 
strong people should be studied in parallel 
with those psychologically abnormal ones. 
II. The Theory 
1. Maslow's Hierarchy of Basic Needs 
Maslow (1970) hypothesizes a hierarchy of Basic 
Needs as follows: 
Degree of Pre otency 
Physiological Needs 
Safety Needs 
Belongingness and 
Love Needs 
Esteem Needs 
Self-actualization 
Needs 
Lower Needs 
Higher Needs 
A detailed description of the above basic needs 
by Maslow (1970) is given in Appendix 2.1(B). 
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Cognitive and Aesthetic Needs  
In addition to the above five basic needs, Maslow 
(1970) also hypothesizes two other needs, namely, cogni-
tive needs and aesthetic needs, of which he says that 
little knowledge is known. Cognitive needs refer to the 
desires "to satisfy curiosity, to know, to explain, and 
to understand" (p.38). He also argues that cognitive 
needs are similar to the above basic needs 	 the sense 
that they are themselves conative. Similarly, the aes-
thetic needs refer to the needs for beauty. He further 
elaborates: "The needs for order, for symmetry, for 
closure, for completion of the act, for system, and for 
structure may be indiscriminately assigned to either 
cognitive, conative, or aesthetic, or even to neurotic 
needs." (p.51) 
2. The Emergence of New Needs 
According to Maslow (1970) , if all the basic needs 
are unsatisfied and the organism is dominated by physio-
logical needs, then all the other needs are suppressed. 
On the other hand, if the lower needs are satisfied, 
higher needs will emerge. In other words, the above five basic 
needs are arranged in a hierarchy of relative prepotency. 
However, this does not mean that a need must be "1000 
satisfied" before another need emerges. 
	 (See Section 3.2). 
Maslow argues thatpeople generally have a higher percentage 
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of satisfaction in lower needs and a lower percentage of 
satisfaction in higher needs. He also asserts that the 
hierarchy of Basic Needs is not necessarily a fixed order 
for all people. Exceptional cases are possible and 
"explainable" by other supplementary arguments. For 
example, some people may value 'self-esteem' as more 
important than 'love'. Maslow argues that such people 
are often strong, powerful, self-confident or aggressive. 
they "seek high esteem and its behaviour expressions 
more as a means to an end than for its own sake; they 
seek self-assertion for the sake of love rather than for 
self-esteem itself." (P.52) 
3. The origin of Basic Needs 
According to Maslow (1970) , all basic needs are 
supposed to be instinctoid and innately given. That is, 
they "are in some sense, and to some appreciable degree, 
constitutional or hereditary in their determination". 
(P.88).  
4. Universality of Basic Needs 
Maslow argues that basic needs are "more ultimate, 
more universal, more basic than the superficial conscious 
desires, and makes a closer approach to common human 
characteristics" (p.54-55). 
	 In short, Maslow does not 
claim that basic needs are universal for all cultures 
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and that the order of the hierarchy of basic needs is 
the same for all persons. Instead, he argues that the 
extent of such universalities is probably the highest 
in the field of motivational studies. 
5. Higher and Lower Needs 
The basic needs are divided into two categories: 
Growth Needs and Deficiency Needs. Growth,needs refer 
to self-actualization needs and deficiency needs to all 
the others. In addition, Maslow calls those needs with 
a higher degree of prepotency in the hierarchy as lower 
needs (e.g. physiological and safety needs) and those 
with lower degree of prepotency higher needs (e.g. esteem 
needs and self-actualization needs.) He hypothesizes 16 
propositions regarding the differences between higher and 
lower needs (Maslow, 1970, p.98-100). Only the first 
two of them are mentioned here, as they are concerned 
with the developmental aspects of basic needs. First of 
all, it is argued that the basic needs form a progressive 
evolutionary developmental pattern. The lower needs pre-
cede the higher needs in phyletic or evolutionary deve-
lopment. Maslow (1970) argues that "the higher the need 
the more specificially human it is" (p.98). Secondly, 
the basic needs form an ontogenetic developmental pattern 
is, 
with the lower needs developing first. That lower needs 
will develop in infancy and childhood; higher needs 
usually appear at a later age. 
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2.1.2 The Concept of Self-actualization 
The concept of self-actualization is one of the cen-
tral themes of Humanistic Psychology. Broadly speaking, 
self-actualization means one's desire or tendency to 
actualize or fulfill one's potential. K. Goldstein (1939) 
refers one's potential or capacities as one's "nature". 
He argues that the tendency "to actualize 'itself', is 
the basic drive, the only drive by which the life of the 
organism is determined" (p.196). An example of self-
actualization given by Goldstein (1939) is the need to 
complete incomplete actions and the urge to perfection. 
Goldstein uses the terms "perfection" and "imperfection" 
in a very broad sense. He argues that the driving force 
underlying self-actualization "is given in the experience 
of imperfection - be it thirst, hunger or experience of 
being able to fulfill any performance which seems to be 
within our capacities - the goal is the fulfillment of 
the task". 	 (Goldstein, 1939, p.205) 
Inspired by Goldstein's work, Maslow develops a 
theory of self-actualization, which is the focus of dis-
cussion in this section. 
Characteristics of Self-actualizing People  
Maslow (1970, Chapter 11) proposes 15 character-
istics of self-actualizing people. After extensive 
psycho historical investigation, he comn0Q-s 2 14-' - 
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public and historical figures that can be regarded as 
self-actualizers. Among the list of self-actualizers, 
there are "2 fairly sure historical figures (Lincoln in 
his last years and Thomas Jefferson)" and "7 highly 
probable public and historical figures (Einstein, Eleanor 
Roosevelt, James Addams, William James, Schweitzer, 
Aldous Huxley and Spinoza)" (Maslow, 1970, p.152). 
In the following paragraphs, Maslow's 15 charac-
teristics of self-actualizing people are summarized-into 
6 general features. 
	 (See also Appendix 2.1(C)) 
(Abbreviation used: SAP = Self-actualizing Person) 
1. SAP as a social being (S1, S2, S5, S10, S13) 
SAPs tend to have superior and efficient perception 
of reality, they have "an unusual ability to detect the 
spurious, the fake, and the dishonest in personality, 
and in general to judge people correctly and efficiently" 
(p.153). In addition, they can accept themselves and 
others "in the stoic style, with all its shortcomings, 
with all its discrepancies from the ideal image without 
feeling real concern." (p.155) 
In general, they have deeper and more profound in-
terpersonal relationships with others than non-SAPs. They 
show more concerns, greater love and more perfect iden-
tification. They also have a philosophical, unhostile 
or positive sense of humour. On the other hand, SAPs 
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tend to have a need for privacy, a need for detachment, 
a need for being alone and solitary without causing 
harm or discomfort to others. 
2. SAP as a moral and democratic being (Sll, S12) 
SAPs are fair, democratic people who always know 
how to discriminate clearly between means and ends, and 
between good and evil. 
3. SAP as a broad-minded humanistic being (S4, S6, S9, 
S15) 
SAPs tend to show a deeper identification with 
human species as a whole. They have some mission 
in life; some tasks that "they must do or want to do". 
Their missions and tasks are largely concerned with the 
good of mankind in general. They tend to be more inde-
pendent of the physical and social environment,. that is, 
more independent of their cultural influences or show 
a higher degree of autonomy in thought and behaviour. 
4. SAP as a creative being (S14) 
ALL SAPs are highly creative in one way or the other, 
for example, in science, music, art, philosophy etc. 
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5. SAP as a child-hearted being (S3, S7) 
SAPs always behave with a high degree of spontan-
eity, simplicity and naturalness, which are common in 
young children's behaviour. They have also "the wonder-
ful capacity to appreciate again and again, freshly and 
naively, the basic goods of life, with awe, pleasure, 
wonder and even ecstasy ...." (p.163) 
6. SAP as a peak experiencer (S8) 
Peak experience - moments of self-actualization, 
states of being or transcendence of the self, is one of 
the important concepts in Maslow's theory. 
Peak experience can be defined as moments during 
which most of the characteristics described above are 
experienced more fully. In other words, one feels more 
open, more creative, more humorous and more ego-
transcending during such episodes. In Maslow's words, 
the SAP "becomes in these episodes more truly himself, 
more perfectly actualizing his potentialities, closer 
to the core of his being, more fully human." (Maslow, 
1968, p.97). In general, SAPs show a much higher fre-
quency of peak experience than non-SAPs. 
According to Maslow, there are two types of SAPs: 
Transcending and non-Transcending ones. For further 
discussion, see Section 2.4.1. 
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FInally, it should be emphasized that SAPs are not 
entirely perfect people, there are moments during which 
SAPs are "boring, irritating, petulant, selfish, angry, 
or depressed." 	 (Maslow, 1970, p.176). 
Self-actualization as a Process of Psychological Growth  
As mentioned before, the self-actualization need 
can be regarded as a growth need and the process of self-
actualization is a process of psychological growth. But 
how does growth take place? Maslow (1968) argues. 
'"Growth takes place when the 
net step forward is subjec-
tively more delightful, more 
joyous, more intrinsically 
satisfying than the previous 
gratification with which 
we have become familiar and 
even bored...." (p.45) 
That is to say, growth occurs simply because we 
subjectively like it to occur or we prefer the next step 
to the present one. In short, "the new experience vali-
dates itself rather than by any outside criterion. It 
is self-justifying, self-validating." (Maslow, 1968, p.45) 
2.13 Empirical Studies of Maslow's Theory 
I. Maslow's Hierarchy of Basic Needs. 
An early review by Cofer and Appley (1964) concludes 
that only the two lower levels of Maslow's Hierarchy, 
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that is the Physiological and Safety Needs, are clearly 
supported by empirical evidence (p.684). More recently, 
in a review of ten factor-analytic and three ranking 
studies testing Maslow's Hierarchy, Wahba and Bridwell 
(1976) write, 
"This literature review shows 
that Maslow's Need Hierarchy 
Theory has received little 
clear or consistant support 
from the available research 
findings. Some of Maslow's 
propositions are totally re-
jected, while other receive 
mixed and questionable sup- 
port at best." 
	
(p.2.33) 
Indeed, there are very few empirical studies which 
lend support to the whole ofMaslow's Hierarchy. Very often, 
experimental psychologists find difficulties in operation-
alizing Maslow's five basic needs and tend to regroup them 
into four or less categories. For example, Graham and 
Balloun (1973) grouped Maslow's five' Basic Needs into 4 
categories: Physiological, Security, Social and Self-
actualization needs and used three different methods of 
data collection in their study. They found that data 
collected by two of the three methods used supported 
Maslow's theory. Studies by Mathes and Edwards (1978) 
and Mathes (1981) suggest that Maslow's Hierarchy should 
be reduced to two or three levels or categories. Mathes 
(1981) suggests that Maslow's Hierarchy should be re-
vised to "contain only three levels - physiological, 
belongingness, and self-actualization - with security and 
esteem as superfluous." (p.71) This suggestion is similar 
to Alderfer's (1972). As a result of little empirical 
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support for Maslow's Hierarchy, Alderfer (1972) proposes 
a hierarchy of three needs only: Existence, Relatedness 
and Growth needs. The theory is called E.R.G. theory. 
Alderfer (1972) argues that his theory is better than 
Maslow's theory on empirical grounds (p.53). 
More recently, Goebel and Brown (1981) studied 
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs by constructing a test called the 
Life Motivation Scale, which requires subjects to rank 
statements representing Maslow's five needs (Physiolo-
gical, Security, Love, Self-esteem and Self-actualization 
needs). A sample of 111 subjects, aged 9 to 80 years old 
was used. Dividing the subjects into five age groups 
(children, adolescents, young adults,.middle-aged adults, 
old adults) , an analysis of variance (AGE x SEX) was 
performed. It was found that there were significant age 
differences for four needs. On the other hand, the re-
sults are said to give limited support to Maslow's 
Hierarchy as a developmental sequence because they do not 
show clear-cut and consistent developmental trends. 
II. Maslow's concept of self-actualization 
Apart from Maslow's own empirical work (see e.g. 
Maslow, 1970, Chapter 11; 1968, Chapter 6), the other 
important empirical study of self-actualization is 
probably Shostrom's (1964) Personal Orientation Inventory 
(POI). The POI consists of 150 two choice comparative 
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value judgements. Items were constructed based on the 
theoretical work of Maslow, Rogers, Fromm, Horney and 
many others. There are 12 scoring categories or dimen-
sions, which include, for example, (i) Self-actualizing 
value: "Measures affirmation of a primary value of self-
actualizing people" (Shostrom, 1964, p.209) (ii) Self-
regard: "Measures affirmation of self because of worth 
or strength" (p.209) (iii) Self-acceptance. (Measures 
affirmation or acceptance of self in spite•of weakness 
or deficiencies." (p.209) The measure is claimed to 
discriminate effectively self-actualizing subjects from 
non-self-actualizing ones. A large number of researches 
have been done using this test (See Shostrom, 1980). 
One major defect of the POI as a measure of 
Maslow's concept of self-actualization is that it misses 
a number of important concepts in Maslow's theory. 
"For example, the POI fails to sample the ethical compo-
nent of self-actualization or to reflect some of Maslow's 
five distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate 
(or realistic and unrealistic) forms of guilt, spontaneity, 
nonconformity, disregard for others and the expression of 
hostility" (Oakland et. al., 1978, p.76). Thus, it is 
difficult to say to what extent the POI measures Maslow's 
concept or in technical terms, the construct validity of 
the POI as a measure of Maslow's concept of self-actuali-
zation is probably low. 
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2.1.4. A Critical Discussion of Maslow's Theory 
There are two major defects in Maslow's system: 
(i) Vague Concepts 
Many important concepts in Maslow's theory are 
vaguely or loosely defined or constructed. For example, 
the concept of need itself. Wahba and Bridwell (1976) 
write, 
"It is not clear what is 
meant by the concept of need. 
Does need have a psycholo-
gical and/or physiological 
base? Does a need come to 
existence because of defi-
ciency only or does need 
always exist even if it is 
gratified? How can we iden-
tify, isolate and measure 
different needs?" 
(p.234) 
Another example is the concept of self-actualization. 
Maslow likes to use lots of adjectives or loosely defined 
terms to elaborate a point or to describe a situation. 
This does not help other psychologists to understand or 
operationalize his concepts. It sometimes misleads them. 
Therefore, Cofer and Appley (1964) urge that the pre-
requisite for further development of the concept of 
self-actualization "is the formulation of the important 
ideas in language that is relatively precise." (p.692) 
(ii) Problemetic empirical methodology 
Though Maslow elaborates his concepts in very re-
fined detail , he has not established a scientific 
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empirical system to test or validate his theory. Very 
often, the data collected by him act as a source of 
stimulation for constructing theories rather than as 
a source of empirical facts testing his theory. This 
practice leads him to ignore occasionally the scientific 
strictness of empirical methodology. For example, (i) In 
a study of peak experience, Maslow (1968) writes, "No one 
subject reported the full syndrome. I have added together 
all the partial responses to make a 'perfect' composite 
syndrome" (p.71). 	 (ii) Maslow's study of self-actualization 
using a group of historical and public figures as subjects is 
criticized for selecting a sample of people he admired 
and "eliminated people with gross pathology - the 
Dostoyevskis and Van Gogh" (Smith, 1973, p.24). This 
implies that Maslow's "empirical definition of psycholo-
gical health or self-actualization thus rests, at root, 
on his own implicit values that underlie this global 
judgement." 	 (Smith, 1973, p.24). 	 In other words, the 
systematic biases in the sampling of his self-actualizing 
subjects in principle damages the universality of his 
concepts of self-actualization. 
Unless the methodology is greatly improved, it is 
difficult to construct a scientific theory of man based 
on Humanistic Psychology in general and Maslow's Theory 
in particular. 
Despite the above shortcomings, Maslow's theory is 
worthy of intensive study. It is highly original and it 
helps bridge the gap between philosophy and psychology; 
ideology and reality. Its influence on current psycholo-
gists is broad and profound. 
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2.2 Human Relationships and Altrusim. 
The objective of this section is limited to the 
exploration of a base for the construction of a heirarchy 
of Human Relationships in terms of altruism. In addition, 
an overview of different theoretical studies of altruism 
is also given. 
Consider a person A interacting with another person 
B in a social situation S. It is argued that the moral 
behaviour of A depends on the relationship between A and 
B. For example, the probability of carrying out an al-
truistic act by A to B is much higher if B is the parent 
of A than if B is a stranger to A in similar social 
situation S. In other words, some people are more import-
ant to A than others. The problem is: who are important 
and who are not? Why is this so? 
2.2.1 The Biological Basis of Human Relationships and  
Altruism. 
Evolutionary theorists and Sociobiologists attempt 
to answer the problem in terms of natural selection.* 
Sociobiology, as defined by Wilson (1975), is "the 
systematic study of the biological basis of all 
* The following key terms relevant to the discussion in 
this section are explained briefly in Appendix 2.2 : 
Altruism, Genetic Fitness, Genotype, Inclusive Fitness, 
Natural Selection, Phenotype, Social Evolution. 
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social behaviour."(P.4) Its central theoretical problem 
is "how can altruism, which by definition reduced personal 
fitness, possibly evolve by natural selection?" (Wilson, 
1975, p.3) The answer provided by sociobiologists is 
kinship. In general, sociobiologists argue that 
"When any behaviour under 
study reflects some com-
ponent of genotype; animals 
should behave so as to 
maximize their inclusive 
fitness. In most cases this 
is achieved by maximizing 
the production of success-
ful offspring." 
(Barash, 1977, p.63) 
The above quoted statements are tentatively called 
the.Central Theorem of Sociobiology by Barash. More ex-
plicitly, the evolution of altruism is explained in terms 
of group selection, kin selection, parental manipulation 
and the development of reciprocal altruism. 
(1) Group Selection and Kin Selection 
The concepts of group selection and kin selection 
were originated by Charles Darwin in "The Origin of 
Species" for the explanation of the evolution of sterile 
workers castes of insect societies. If the sterile in-
sects contribute significantly to the welfare of the 
fertile insects, then natural selection at the group 
level is possible and probably inevitable. If the group 
is a family, the selection is called kin selection. The 
concept of kin selection is often regarded as a more accep-
table view than that of group selection "because of the 
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greater commonality of genetic makeup among close rela-
tives" (Staub, 1978, p.27). According to Wilson (1978), 
"the closer the genetic relationship of the members of 
a group, the more stable and intricate the social bonds 
of its members." (p.73) In addition, sociobiologists also 
argue that the concept of kinship can be applied to all 
species. (Barash, 1977, p.85) 
A central concept of kin selection is established 
by Hamilton (1964). 
Consider a person A carrying out an altruistic 
act to another person B. 
Define 
Recipient B's benefit  
Altruist A's cost 
r = Coefficient of relationship between 
altruist A and recipient B, summed for 
all recipients 
= Proportion of genes in A and B that 
are identical because of common descent. 
(For further explanation of r, see e.g., Wilson (1975) 
p.74-75; Barash (1977), p.85-87). 
Hamilton argues that the genes for altruistic be- 
haviour will be selected if 	 k >  1  
r. 
Suppose B is a brother of A, that is r = 2 	 ' 
half of B's genes are identical to A by common descent, 
k 
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and therefore k >2. Suppose in extreme case the altruis-
tic act causes A to leave no offspring but the act "more 
than doubles the brother's personal representation in the 
next generation, it will ipso facto increase the one-half 
of the genes identical to those in the altruist, and the 
altruist will actually have gained representation in the 
next generation." (Wilson, 1975, p.118) In other words, 
the genes of the altruist A is selected at family level. 
That is, altruistic behaviour in such cases is favoured 
in terms of natural selection because the inclusive fit-
ness is increased rather than decreased. 
The following table 2(A) is constructed based on Hardin 
(1977, p.13) and Barash (1977, p.316). 
(2) Parental Manipulation 
Consider an example given by Ruse (1979, p.47). 
A parent has five children; it is impossible for all of 
them to survive. However, if the parent tries to mani-
pulate one of the children to act as an altruist who will 
eventually be self-sacrificed for the benefit of the other 
four children, then all the other four will survive. 
Sociobiologists claim that genes causing such parental 
manipulation are strongly favourdd by natural selection. 
(see e.g., Barash, 1977, p.95; Alexander, 1974). 
Kin Selection and Parental Manipulation are similar, 
however, there is a major difference between them. In Kin 
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TABLE 2(A): Genetic Basis of Kin Altruism. 
(Sources: Hardin (1977) and Barash (1977) 
Social Relation-
ships in Primi-
tive Human 
Cultures Relationships 
1 
r 
Household 
Identified 	 ? 
Relatives 
Village mem- 
bers. 
Tribe members 
Different tribes 
Self; identical twins, 
members of same clone 
Parent and 
	 child; 
full sibs 
Grandparent and child; 
half sibs; uncle and 
nephew; aunt & niece; 
double first cousins 
First cousins 
"Unrelated" members 
of the same species 
Members of different 
species 
1 
1 
. 
i 4 
1 
A 
--, i Less than 
i l and 
slightly 
i greater 
-' than 	 0 
Nearly 0 
0 
GREATER 
*Genetic rela-
tedness 
*Likelihood of 
reciprocation 
*Power of 
group and/or 
kin selection 
, 
1 
	
, 	 1 
, 
	
,s-J 	 L_7 
-. 
-.. 
LESS 
Notes: 
1. r is the coefficient of relationship mentioned above. It 
is also referred as "Genetic kinship" by Hardin (1977,p.13). 
2. It is obvious that no two members in the same species "can 
be absolutely unrelated", therefore the value of r for 
"unrelated" members of the same species is nearly but 
not exactly zero. 
	 (Barash, 1977, p.85) 
3. Clone is defined as "A population of individuals all 
derived asexually from the same single parent". (Wilson, 
1975, p.581) 
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Selection, a person A helps another person B because they 
are related, that is, B will pass on to the next generation 
the genes identical to those of A. On the other hand, in 
Parental Manipulation, A helps B because A is manipulated 
by his/her parent C to do so. 
(3) Reciprocal Altruism 
According to Trivers (1971), reciprocal altruism 
can be selected even when the recipient is not closely 
related with the altruist. That is, Kin Selection is not 
applicable in this case. In addition, sociobiologists 
argue that reciprocal altruism can operate between members 
of different species. Reciprocal altruism is selected 
if the performance of altruistic behaviour results in "a 
return of altruistic behaviour towards the original al-
truist such that the ultimate benefit in units of inclusive 
fitness is greater than the cost." (Barash, 1977, p.94) 
Consider a hypothetical example given by Trivers (1971, 
p.190): 
A person X is drowning and another person Y is 
going to rescue X. 
Chance of X being drowned to death = 1/2 
Chance of Y being drowned to death if he tries to 
rescue X = 1/20 
Suppose, in the later time, Y is drowning and X 
reciprocates, and suppose the risks of drowning 
remain the same, then it will benefit both of them 
if they play the role of rescuers because, with 
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reciprocal altruism, each of them reduces the chance 
of being drowned to death from 1/2 to 1/20 x 2 = 1/10. 
"A population at large that enters into a series 
of such moral obligations, that is, reciprocally altruis- 
tic acts will be a population of individuals with general-
ly increased genetic fitness." (Wilson, 1975, p.120) 
Similarly, the concept of reciprocal altruism can 
also be applied to explain one's general tendency to like 
others and to form friendships with those one likes. 
Trivers (1971) also argues, "Selection will favour liking 
those who are themselves altruistic" (p.213) 
Strictly speaking, reciprocal altruism cannot be 
regarded as a kind of altruism similar to that involved 
in Kin Selection and Parental Manipulation because it is 
basically selfish. 
The Debate of Sociobiology 
As usual, any study of man is controversial 
Sociobiology is no exception. There are numerous criticisms 
of sociobiology by anthropologists, psychologists and philo- 
sophers of different schools of thought. 
	 (see e.g., 
Montagu (Ed.) (1980, particularly the introduction by 
Montagu, p.3-14); Campbell (1975); Ruse (1979, particular-
ly Chapter 9: Sociobiology and Ethics); Freedman (1979, 
particularly the first and last chapters); Caplan (Ed.) 
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(1978, particularly the debate between Marxists and 
Wilson, p.259-269 and p.280-303, and Ruse's paper, p. 
355-375); Wilson (1975, particularly chapter 27: Man: 
From Sociobiology to Sociology); Wilson (1978)). 
The debate (nature vs nurture or biology vs culture) 
is complex. In the following paragraphs, the claim of 
sociobiologists and the objections given by Montagu (1980) 
and Campbell are discussed briefly. 
Sociobiologists claim that human social behaviour 
is genetically determined. (Wilson, 1978, p.19). Wilson 
(1978) writes: 
"Can the cultural evolution 
of higher ethical values gain 
a direction and momentum 
of its own and completely 
replace genetic evolution? 
I (E.O. Wilson) think not. 
The genes hold culture on 
a leash. THe leash is very 
long, but inevitably values 
will be constrained in 
accordance with their 
effects on the human gene 
pool." 	 (p.167) 
Higher ethical values refer to, for example, Kohlberg's 
Stage 6 thinking. In short, Wilson (1975) argues that 
it is the right time to attempt to biologicize ethics now. 
(p.562) 
Many anthropologists (see e.g., Montagu (Ed.)(1980); 
Sahlin, 1976; Cohen, 1972) disagree strongly wih the socio-
biologists' claim. Montagu (1980) argues that it is true 
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that human social behaviour has a genetic base but this 
does not mean that such behaviour is genetically deter-
mined. He also argues that the behaviour of an organism 
is developed through the interaction between the organism 
and environment and not between the genes and environment. 
"In short, it is the action of the environment upon the 
organism that influences and makes possible the functional 
expression of the genes." (Montagu, 1980, p.11) 
In a study of intergroup conflict and altruistic 
behaviour, psychologist Campbell (1965) argued that an 
external threat to a society increases its ingroup soli-
darity and individuals' "ethnocentric self-sacrificial 
loyalty" and that the origins of altruism are based on 
_both biological and sociocultural evolution. Later on, 
Campbell (1972, 1975) changed his original argument and 
proposed that human social behaviour is culturally det-
ermined rather than biologically determined. He argues 
that sociobiology explains altruism in humankind at a 
level which is "below the biosocial optimum, the level 
functionally adequate for society." (Staub, 1978, p.32) 
Campbell (1975) writes: 
"Social evolution has had 
to counter individual 
selfish tendencies which 
biological evolution has 
continued to select as a 
result of the genetic 
competition among the 
cooperators." 
(p.1115) 
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On the other hand, a number of researchers (see e.g. 
Durham, 1978; Freedman, 1979) propose that human social 
behaviour is both biologically and culturally determined. 
In other words, they believe that the base of altruism is 
both biological (or genetic) evolution and social (or 
cultural or sociocultural) evolution. 
2.2.2 The Psychological Study of Altruism and Human 
Relationships. 
The study of altruism in psychology is quite exten-
sive (see e.g., Wispe, Rosenhan and Bryan (Ed.), 1972; 
Macaulay and Berkowitz (Ed.), 1970; Krebs, 1970; Staub, 
1978, 1979; Bar-Tal, 1976). 
The psychoanalytic theorists attempt to explain 
altruistic behaviour in terms of attachment. It is 
argued that man has a strong tendency to form "deep and 
long-lasting attachments" (Wright, 1971, p.129) which 
greatly intensify altruistic tendencies. On the other 
hand, behaviourists argue that altruism is a habit or a 
product of social conformity, which is learned by condi-
tioning process. Social leaning theorists (Aronfreed, 
1968, 1969; Rosenhan, 1969; Rosenhan and London, 1968) 
explain altruistic acts in terms of modelling, positive 
experience and observational learning. 
Recent works include the study of the development 
of empathy and altruistic motivation (Hoffman, 1976, 1977, 
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1978, 1979; see also reviews in Deutsch and Madle, 1975; 
Shantz, 1975). On the other hand, empirical psychologi-
cal studies testing part of or the whole of the theory 
of Human Relationships or kin altruism (see Table 2(A)) 
as postulated by sociobiologists are not many. In general 
these studies deal with a small part of the hierarchy 
(see e.g., Sawyer, 1966; Ma, 1980; reports in Freedman, 
1979). 
I. Theoretical Studies of Altruism 
Basically, there are four major theoretical approach-
es in the study of altruism: (1) The origins of altruism: 
Biology vs Culture (see Section 2.2.1) (2) Social Exchange 
Theory. (3) Normative Approach (4) Emotional or Empathic 
Approach. The following discussion gives an overview of 
the last three approaches. 
Social Exchange Theory  
Social exchange is defined by Blau (1964) to be the 
"voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by 
the returns they are expected to bring and typically do 
in fact bring from others." (p.91) Exchange theorists 
(Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961, 1968; Thibaut and Kelley, 
1959) argue that when people interact, they tend to recip-
rocate with one another in a way so as to maximize rewards 
and minimize costs. In other words, altruism is a means 
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for future rewards or it is a type of "social investment." 
On the other hand, Homans (1961) argues that if altruism 
forms part of one's value, one may gain self-satisfaction 
by acting altruistically. In this case, the reward is 
self-satisfaction and the cost is self-sacrifice or loss 
in the altruistic act. Homans (1961) writes, "so long 
as men's values are altruistic, they can take a profit 
in altruism too" (p.79). 
It can be argued that the social exchange theory 
in psychology and Trivers' theory of reciprocal altruism 
in sociobiology are quite similar in basic concepts; or 
to put it in another way, Trivers' theory can be said to 
form a genetic or biological basis for the Social Exchange 
theory. 
Normative Approach  
Social norms can be defined as "a set of expecta-
tions members of a group hold concerning how one ought 
to behave". 	 (Bar-Tal, 1976, p.42) Psychologist and 
sociologists have attempted to explain prosocial and al-
truistic behaviour by different social norms. Some of 
the major ones are briefly described as follows: 
(1) Norm of Reciprocity 
Gouldner (1960) argues that there is a norm of 
reciprocity which is universal and can be found in all 
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value systems. The norm of reciprocity is generally 
postulated to be: "(1) people should help those who have 
helped them, and (2) people should not injure those who 
have helped them." (Gouldner, 1960, p.171). In an ex-
perimental study, Wilke and Lanzetta (1970) found 
that "The amount of reciprocated help is a monotonic 
increasing function of the amount of prior help", which 
supports Gouldner (1960) and exchange theorists' models. 
(2) Norm of Giving 
In contrast with Gouldner's norm of reciprocity, 
Leeds (1963) proposes a norm of giving which takes into 
account of those people who may not be able to reciprocate, 
for example, "the very young, the very old and the 
very sick" (p.229). The norm of giving is a norm of al-
truism. According to Leeds (1963), it consists of three 
criteria (See also Appendix 2.2(A)) (i) The giver must 
treat the act of giving as an end in itself. That is, 
the giver must not expect rewards in future, (ii) The 
act is a voluntary one, (iii) The act "is doing good" 
(p.230-231). 
(3) Norm of Social Responsibility  
A major proponent of the Normative Approach is 
Berkowitz (1972; Berkowitz and Daniels, 1963, 1964)) who 
suggests that there exists a norm of social responsibility 
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which prescribe people "to aid those who are dependent 
upon them" (Berkowitz, 1972, p.68) 	 In addition, people 
help others "not for tangible gains or social approval, 
but supposedly primarily for approval from themselves". 
(p.68) 	 In other words, if they do not offer the help„ 
they would have a feeling of guilty and dissonance because 
they violate the norms of social responsibility which is 
supposed to be part of their own moral code. 
(4) Personal Norms 
Schwartz (1973, 1977) proposes a theory of personal 
norms. The term "personal norms" refers to "the self-
expectations for specific action in particular situations 
that are constructed by the individual". (Schwartz, 1977, 
p.227) 	 The personal norms are closely related to the self- 
concept. If one acts against one's personal norms, one 
would feel self-depreciated and of course guilty too. 
According to Schwartz's theory, whether one would act 
altruistically in some specific situations would depend 
on"the intensity of moral (personal) obligation" 
(Schwartz, 1977, p.227). The feelings of such moral ob-
ligation may be generated "by the activation of the indi-
vidual's cognitive structure of norms and values". Or "may 
be neutralized prior to overt action by defenses against 
the relevance or appropriateness of the obligation" (p.227) 
A strong criticism of the Normative Approach is 
made by Darley and Latane (1970). According to this 
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critique, one major defect of the Normative approach is 
that it attempts to explain social behaviour by a number 
of different norms; "this diversity of norms seriously 
weakens their explanatory usefulness" (Darley and Latane, 
1970, p.85) because almost any kind of behaviour can be 
regarded as normative - if it does not fit norm A, it 
would fit Norm B or some other norm. Another difficulty 
is that some norms appear to contradict one another and 
are often vague. (p.85-87) In addition, empirical 
studies do not always support the Normative Theory. 
In short, it is argued that altruistic or prosocial be-
haviour "is too complexly determined by situational factors 
to be accounted for by norms." (p.99) 
Schwartz theory of personal norms can be said to 
be an attempt to overcome some of the major difficulties 
described by Darley and Latane. Further study is re-
quired for justification of Schwartz's approach. 
Emotional or Empathic Approach  
The emotional aspect of altruistic behaviour has 
generated lots of interests among psychologists (see e.g., 
review in Deutsch and Madle, 1975; Shantz, 1975; Hoffman, 
1976). On the other hand, very few psychologists attempt 
to present a developmental theory of empathy. M.L.Hoffman 
(1976, 1978, 1979) is an exception.. Hoffman's develop-
mental theory postulates four hypothetical levels of 
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empathic response based on the cognitive development of 
a sense of the other by the child. According to Hoffman 
(1976), empathy is defined as "the involuntary, at times 
forceful, experiencing of another person's emotional 
state". (p.126) The following table 2(B) summarizes the essen-
tial points of Hoffman's theory. Selman's Social Perspective 
Stages are included for reference. 
Very few empirical researches testing directly 
Hoffman's theory have been carried out. Thompson and 
Hoffman (1980) using semiprojective stories in the study 
of the development of guilt in children report that their 
results provide modest support for Hoffman's theory. On 
the other hand, Hoffman is regarded as having taken "a 
giant stride" in integrating the cognitive and affective 
aspects of empathy and altruism into a theoretical model. 
(Lickona, 1976, p.20) 
II. Sex and Age Differences in Empathy and Altruism 
Apart from the cognitive factor studies in, for 
example, Hoffman's theory of Empathy and Schwartz's 
theory of Personal Norms, individual differences in 
empathy and altruism can also be accounted for by sex, 
age, social class, personality etc. (see e.g. Krebs, 1970) 
In the following paragraphs, we describe briefly the sex 
and age differences. 
49 
TABLE 2 (B) 
Hoffman's Theory of Empathy 
Stage 
Approxima- 
to age 
range 
Development of 
a sense of the 
other (social 
role-taking) 
Development 
of Empathy 
Illustrative 
Examples 
0-1 year Unable to dif- Unclear who is "an 11-month- 
ferentiate actually in old girl, 	 on 
between self distress; 
	 be- seeing a 
and other have as tholigh 
"what is hap- 
pening to the 
other is hap- 
pening to 
them" 
(Hoffman, 	 1978, 
p.182) 
child fall 
and cry, 
looked like 
she was 
about to cry 
herself and 
then put her 
thumb in her 
. mouth and 
buried her 
head in her 
mother's 	 lap, 
which is what 
she does when 
she is hurt". 
(Hoffman, 
1979, 	 p.962- 
963. 
2 1-2 year Person- aware that it "an 18-month- 
Permanance : is the other old boy fetch- 
able to dis- person and not ed his own 
tinguish the self is in mother to com- 
other as a distress, 	 how- fort a crying 
physical ever, no 	 aware-friend, al- 
entity ness of the 
other person 
though the 
friend's 
mother was 
also present 
(Hoffman, 
1979, 	 p.963) 
3. 2 years to aware that aware that the "By about 4 
middle other person's real world may years most 
childhood thought and be different children res- 
feeling may from their per -pond with 
be different ception and appropriate 
from the that other's affect and 
self ' s ; 	 the inner states can recognize 
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Stage Approxima- 
to age 
range 
Development of 
a sense of the 
other (social 
role-taking) 
Development 
of Empathy 
Illustrative 
Examples 
4 Middle- 
child- 
hood to 
Late 
child- 
hood 
early stage of 
role-taking 
(Approximately 
Selman's 	 stage 
0 	 & 	 1*) 
aware of self 
and others 
being differ- 
ent persons 
with their own 
histories 	 and 
identities 
(Approximately 
Selman's Stage 
2 	 & 	 3) 
are indepen- 
dent of theirs; 
able to pro- 
ject 	 their 
feelings to 
others or to 
imagine them- 
selves -in 	 the 
other's 
position. 	 - 
able to "res- 
pond empathi- 
cally not only 
to others' 
transitory, 
situation- 
specific dis- 
tress but also 
to what they 
imagine to be 
other's gen- 
eral condition" 
(Hoffman, 	 1978, 
p.184) 
signs of hap-
piness or sad- 
ness 	 in others 
in simple 
situations" 
(Hoffman, 
1978, 	 p.183) 
Children at 
this stage 
may show more 
intensified 
empathic res-
ponse to the 
chronic ra-
ther than 
transitory 
distress of 
another 
person. 
*See Appendix 1(A) 
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(1) Sex differences 
According to a review by Krebs (1970), most of the 
studies found no sex differences in altruism. Among the 
12 studies which did find sex differences in altruism, as 
reviewed by Krebs, 5 of them favoured males and 7 of them 
favoured females. Similarly, Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) 
in a review of about 30 studies conclude that their "survey 
of research on attachment, affiliation, and positive 
interactions of all kinds has shown surprisingly little 
sex differentiation". 	 (p.225) However, Hoffman (1977) 
in a review of a studies on sex differences in empathy 
(vicarious affective arousal) found that all of them 
showed sex differences in favour of females. Hoffman 
(1977) suggests that this may due to the fact that fe-
males show greater tendency to imagine themselves in 
other's position while the males tend "to act rather than 
feel, even in the situations that call for feeling". 
(p.720). In addition, Hoffman and Levine (1976) argue that 
most of the studies reviewed by Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) 
used measures which are predominantly cognitive, for 
example, "judgements of other's feelings in different 
situations; communicative egocentrism" (p.558) They 
found that studies using affective empathy index did show 
sex differences in favour of girls. 
6 Age (years) 
Incidence of 
altruism 
(%) 
I 00 - 
80 
60 
4.0 
ZO 
4 
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Banc:Lion & Gross (1958) 
Staub & Feagari (1969) 
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(2) Age Differences 
According to Krebs' (1970) review, studies compar-
ing the incidence of altruism in children showed age 
differences. Because different studies used different 
tasks; explored different dependent variables and did 
not base their studies on a general school of thought, 
comparisons of different studies are often difficult and 
problematic. Nevertheless, most of these studies showed 
that older children tended to exhibit a larger number of 
incidences of altruism than the younger one. 
Based on Krebs' (1970) review, we attempt to plot 
the results of three of the studies on the following 
graph: 
Figure 2.1. Age Differences in Altruism 
In addition, as mentioned before, Thompson and 
Hoffman (1980) found some developmental changes in 
children!s reasons for guilt. They reported that "older 
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children exhibited more concern for the victim's welfare" 
(p.156) and more frequent use of internal justice principle 
whereas younger children paid more attention to detec-
tion and punishment. 
III. Empirical Studies of Human Relationships or Kin  
Altruism. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, there 
are very few psychological studies testing sociobiologists' 
theory of Human Relationships or kin altruism. We propose 
to call sociobiologists' theory, the theory of Human 
Relationships, because with Trivers' theory of reciprocal 
altruism, sociobiologists' theory can be generalized to 
deal with all human social interaction and hence involves 
all human relationships in general, kin altruism in 
particular. 
In the following paragraphs, three relevant empiri-
cal studies of human relationships are described, two of 
them are unpublished. 
(1) Sawyer (1966) 
Sawyer (1966) established an altruism scale which 
"assesses the value one places upon the welfare of another 
in relation to his own". (p.407) He used two hypotheti-
cal situations and asked the subjects either to rank 
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their preferences for various outcomes for themselves and 
for the other or to estimate its value on a scale from 
-1.0 to +1.0 or both. 
One hypothetical situation is to ask the subject 
to imagine that he/she and another student were attending 
a university course for credit. The assessment of the 
course is in terms of the grades A, B or C. The subject 
is asked (i) to indicate his/her preference for each of 
the combinations of grades for himself/herself and the 
other student (i.e. both A; self A, other B; self A, 
other C etc) and (ii) to estimate a value from -1.0 to +1.0 
by tenths (e.g. +1.0: "I am equally interested in how good 
his grade is and in how good my grade is"; +0.5: "I am 
half as interested in how good his grade is as I am in 
how good my grade is" (p.412) etc.). The first measure 
is called preference Ranking and the second one the 
direct Scale Estimation. The Other Person is first sup- 
posed to be one of the subject's best friends; and then is 
altered to be a stranger and finally an antagonist. 
Using a formula hypothesized by him, Sawyer calcula-
ted an index "a", which he called the measure of relative 
altruism (ranging from -1.0 to +1.0), from the subject's 
preference rankings. Multiplying "a" by 100 will give the 
"altruism value" of the subject by preference ranking 
method. Similarly, multiplying the value obtained by the 
Direct Scale Estimationwill give another "altruism value" 
of the subject. An average of these two altruism values 
is called the "mean altruism" of the subject. Using 3 
SS 
college groups (N = 122), Sawyer found that the mean al-
truism toward friend, stranger and antagonist is as 
follows: Friend (45); Stranger (12); and antagonist 
(-18). 
Thus the result provides some support to the 
Sociobiologists' claim. 
(2) Sebastian (1973) 
In a study examining Trivers' theory of kin and 
non kin altruistic behaviour, Sebastian (1973; reported 
in Freedman, 1979, p.114-115 and p.208) used one of 
Kohlberg's story: "Heinz and the drug" with an alternation 
of the relationship between Heinz and the woman from 
Husband-Wife to (i) father-daughter and (ii) friends. 
33 eighth grade children were tested. 790 of the subjects 
justified the stealing for case (i) and only SSo for case 
(ii). In addition it was found that subjects "felt 
stealing a lifesaving drug for a relative was morally 
justified, whereas a similar theft for a nonrelative was 
morally wrong" (reported in Freedman, 1979, p.114). It is 
argued that "with kin, the primary issue was saving a 
life; with nonkin, more often the issue was stealing" 
(In Freedman, 1979, p.208). 
It is worthwhile to remark here that Freedman (1979, 
p.113-115; p.208-210 (Study No.46, 47 and 49) reported 
a number of unpublished studies done by university students 
on kinship and human relationships. Almost all these 
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studies provide substantial support for sociobiologists' 
claim of kin altruism. 
(3) Ma (1980) 
Ma (1980) attempted to study the differences bet-
ween the first-person (self) and third-person (other) 
views of moral judgment by constructing a Moral Consistency 
Test based on five of the Kohlberg's Moral .Dilemmas. The 
test consists of 23 questions, two of them are relevant 
to our discussion here. The questions are concerned with 
the story "Heinz (Philip) and the Drug" (For the content 
of the story, see Appendix 5(D)) 	 (In Ma's study, the 
name Heinz was changed to Philip for the English Sample) 
and are as follows: 
1. Suppose you were Philip. Would you break into 
the shop to steal the drug for your wife? 
2. Suppose you were Philip and it was not your wife 
who was dying of cancer but it was someone listed 
below, would you break into the shop to steal the 
drug? 
(i) Your father/mother 
(ii) Your best friend 
(iii) A stranger. 
Subjects are asked to rate on a 7-point scale ranging 
from Difinitely YES to Definitely NO. 
78 Chinese students in Hong Kong and 213 English 
students in London participated in the study. All of 
them were either fourth formers or sixth formers. Assuming 
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1 = Definitely YES, 2 = Strongly YES, 3 = Moderately YES, 
4 = Can't Decide, 	 5 = Moderately NO, 	 6 = Strongly NO, 
7 = Definitely NO, the results are as follows: 
TABLE 2 ( C) 
Item No. Relation- 
ship 
Chinese 
Mean 
(N = 78) 
Standard - 
Deviation 
English 
Mean 
(N = 213) 
Standard 
Deviation 
t-test 
between 
means 	 ' 
(signif.) 
1 Wife 2.026 1.571 2.155 1.616 
2(i) Father/ 
mother 1.949 1.115 2.061 1.614 
2(ii) Best 
friend 2.923 1.689 3.075 1.800 
2(iii) Stranger 5.654 1.634 5.089 1.821 *. 
*Significant at 5% level. 
Average rating 
6 	
b Chinese 
English 
4 
3 
Relationship 
wife father/ best stranger 
mother 	 friend 
Figure 2.2. A Cross-cultural Study of Human Relationships 
The results provide :quite strong support for sociobiologists' 
claims of kin altruism. 
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2.3. Structure of Moral Judgment* 
The study of moral judgment is probably the most popular 
research topic in the field of moral development. 	 A 
number of theories have been proposed (see e.g., Piaget 
(1923), Kohlberg (1958, 1969, 1971, 1976, 1980), Bull 
(1969), Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner (1976)). The study 
of social cognition is also relevant in this case, see 
e.g., Damon (ed.) (1978b),Selman (1975, 197'6), Lewis and 
Brooks-Gunn (1979). 
The major objective of this section is to review 
the Cognitive Developmental Theory of Morality, which 
forMs a basis of the theory established in the next 
_Chapter. 	 Thus, the discussion here is mainly concerned 
with Piaget, Kohlberg and Rest's work. 
Although the major influence on the Cognitive 
Developmental Approach has been the early work of Piaget 
(1932) , this approach has roots in the work of the theorists 
Durkheim (1925), M. Paul Fauconnet and M. Pierre Bovet 
(See Piaget. 1932, Chapter 4). Also, J. Dewey (1930, 1932) 
with his theory of conduct and experience, G.H. Mead 
(1934) with his theory of role-taking, J. Loevinger (1966) 
with her theory of ego development and J. Rawls (1971) 
* This section is an extensively revised version of Chapter 
3 of the writer's M.A. dissertation (Ma, 1980). Some long 
paragraphs which are slightly revised are put in 
Appendix 2.3 in order to save space here. 
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with his theory of justice have influenced more recent 
theoretical development by Kohlberg (1976, 1980) and 
Rest (1979b, in press). A forgotten pioneer in this 
field is Baldwin (1906a, 1906b) whose theory of genetic 
epistemology is fundamental and significant (see also 
Russell, 1978). 
Other psychologists using the concept of stage in 
the study of moral development and behaviour are e.g. 
Hobhouse (1906), McDougall (1908), Peck and 
Havighurst (1960) and Kay (1970). 
2.3.1 Basic Assumptions. 
I. Basic Assumptions of Piaget's Theory  
Piaget's theory of cognitive development forms a 
basic foundation for the Cognitive Developmental Theory 
of Morality. It is fair to say that the former is the 
mother-theory of the latter one. 
	 A set of assumptions of 
Piaget's theory of Cognitive Development is given in 
Appendix 2.3(A). 	 Further details of Piaget's assumptions 
can be found in Brainerd (1978, Chapter 2), Flavell (1963„ 
Chapter 1 & 2) and Piaget (1953, Chapters 1-3; 1971). A 
review of some major arguments on Piaget's basic assump-
tions is presented in Vuyk (1981, Chapters 12 and 23). 
A recent elaborated critique of Piaget's theory is 
given by Broughton (1981) in a series of five articles. 
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II. The Concept of Stage 
The stage concept is one of the core concept in 
Cognitive Developmental Approach. The characteristics of 
cognitive stages are summarized in Appendix 2.3(B). 
Further details can be found in Piaget (1971, p.16-18), 
and Kohlberg (1976, p.47). 
In addition, there are two other important features 
of Piaget's concept of stage: (1) Preparation and 
achievement periods and (2) Horizontal and Vertical 
decalages (See e.g. Flavell, 1963, p.21-23; Brainerd, 
1978, p.34-37). 
Simply speaking, in the preparation period of any 
stage, the structures and content characteristics defining 
that stage are in the process of formation and organization 
and therefore are unstable. 	 In the achievement period, 
these structures are developed fully and exist as the 
stable structure d'ensemble. 
According to Brainerd (1978), 
"in its most basic sense, decalage is simply 
a name for any invariant sequence between 
cognitive contents such that one content 
always appears earlier than the other" (p.36) 
Horizontal decalages occur within stages and vertical 
decalages occur between stages. 
	
Specifically speaking, 
horizontal decalages "refer to invariant sequences in 
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two or more versions of a single cognitive content" and 
vertical decalages refer to "an invariant sequence between 
two different contents and the contents belong to different 
stages". (Brainerd, 1978, p.36). 	 In general, different 
cognitive contents usually correspond to different levels 
of cognitive functionings. An example of horizontal 
decalage is the series of concepts of conservation. It 
is found that children tend to attain the concept of 
conservation of mass before conservation of weight (See 
e.g. Flavell, 1963, p.298-299). 
	 An example of vertical 
decalage is given by Flavell 0963, p.23) as follows: 
a child late in the sensory-motor period can move effi-
ciently from A to B to C and then back to A, but it will 
be several years later before he can represent the above 
spatial relationships symbolically. 
	
In the two cases, 
namely the motor action and symbolic representation of 
the immediate surrounding, "thereare clear similarities 
in the reality content and in the formal cognitive 
organization" (Flavell, 1963, p.23) but they are developed 
in different ages and stages. 
III. Basic Assumptions of Cognitive Developmental Theory  
of Morality. 
According to Kohlberg, moral judgment develops stage 
by stage. 
	 All the basic features of cognitive stage 
mentioned above also apply to moral stages. In addition, 
Kohlberg also postulates the following assumptions (Colby 
et al. 1979(I) p.2-3; Kohlberg, 1969, p.348-349; Kohlberg, 
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1976, p.48): 
(1) Cognitive judgment is a component of moral action. 
(2) Affective and cognitive aspects of moral development 
are parallel and inter-related. 	 "They represent 
different perspectives and contexts in defining 
structural change" (Kohlberg, 1969, p.349) 
(3) The basic motivation for moral development is a 
motivation for self-actualization, rather than for 
satisfying biological and safe needs. 
(4) Major aspects of moral development are the same for 
all persons and cultures, "because all cultures have 
common sources of social interaction, role taking, 
and social conflict, which require moral integration". 
(Kohlberg, 1976, p.48). 
(5) There exists a fundamental whole of personality 
organisation and ego or self development. 
	
"While 
there are various strands of social development 
(psychosexual development, moral development, etc.), 
these strands are united by their common reference 
to a single concept of self in a single social 
world'.'. 	 (Colby, et al. 1979(I), p.2) 
(6) The formation of moral structures arises through one's 
experiences of role-taking or social interaction. 
Moral stage is characterised by the structures of 
interaction between the self and others. 
(7) Environmental influences refer to the general 
pattern of cognitive and social stimulations 
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available to the child over the whole period of 
his development, rather than some specific experi-
ences with his parents or other persons. 
(8) Social or ego development is directed toward "an 
equilibrium or reciprocity between the self's 
actions and those of others toward the self". 
(Colby et al. 1979(1), p.3). 	 The most stable form 
of equilibrium is characterised by Kohlberg's stage six 
that is, the principle of justice. 
IV. Two Stage Models of Moral. Judgment  
The following discussion attempts to outline the 
main features of the two stage models of Moral Judgment 
proposed by Rest (1979, Chapter 3). 
	 In order to simplify 
the following discussion, mathematical expressions are 
used as far as possible. 
Let (1) Si  (i=1,2,3,...n) represent a set of 
theoretical stages or types of moral judg-
ment hypothesized. Sn represents the highest 
stage defined. 
(2) Pi (i=1,2,3,...n) represent the probability 
(or percentage, if multiplied by 100) of 
using Si  by a subject. Thus 0 	 Pi 	 1 for 
all i. 
(3) Tk  (k=1,2,3,... )represent the age (in years), 
or the mean age of a certain time period 
under consideration, of the subject, and 
Tk+l > Tk. 
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(A) Simple Stage Model 
Using the above notation, Rest's (1979b, p.52-54) 
notion of the Simple Stage Model can be described as 
follows: 
The developmental assessment (D) of a person's level 
of moral judgment is given by either Pi or (Pi, Pi+i). 
That is, for a person of Tk years old, 
D (Tk) = Pi Si + Pi+1 Si+1  
with (i) 1 i (n-1) 
(ii) Pi 	 Pi+1 = 1  
(iii) 0 	 P. 	 1 
(iv) Si  varies linearly with Tk 
(i.e. Si  increases linearly with, or 
is constant of, or decreases linearly 
withTK as k increases) 
A graphic representation of the Simple Stage Model 
given by Rest (1979b, Figure 3.1) is reproduced in 
Appendix 2.3(C). 
It is argued that Kohlberg's measurement is based 
on this Simple Stage Model and that a number of empirical 
inconsistencies are found, for example, subject fluctuation. 
Rest (1979b) argues that although the test-retest relia-
bility of Kohlberg's new scoring system: Standard Issue 
Scoring System (See Colby et. al., 1979) is extraordinary 
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high (0.90s) (See also Colby et. al, in press, Table 7), 
about 300 of the subjects show changes in their major/ 
minor stage scores over a two-week period. 	 He 
concludes that "subjects are not simply "in" one moral 
stage or another, but fluctuate within a developmental 
range". (p.55). For details of other kinds of empirical 
inconsistencies, see Rest (1979b, p.55-63). 
(B) Complex Stage Model  
The "all or none" view or "the step by step develop-
ment through the stages" argument of the Simple Stage Model 
is criticized as being inadequate and sometimes incon-
sistent on account of the evidence from empirical data. 
Rest (1979b) writes, 
"The question of developmental assessment should 
not be, "what stage is a persoh in?" but rather, 
"To what extent and under what conditions does 
a person manifest the various types of organisations 
of thinking?"" (p.63) 
In other words, developmental assessment should be 
probabilistic. This is exactly the main feature of the 
Complex Stage Model proposed by Rest (1979b, p.63-67). 
Without loss of generality, assume that there are 
five theoretical stages which are called 'Types' by Rest 
(1979b, p.65), Si to S. 
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The developmental assessment of a subject's level 
of moral judgment is given by 
5 
D(Tk) = PIS, + P2S2 + P3S3 + P4S4 + PsSs = 
with (i) P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 + P5 = 1 
(ii) 	 0 ,< Pi 	 1 	 for all i 
(III) Si  varies non-linearly with Tk as k 
increases. 
An illustrative graphic representation of the Complex 
Stage Model given by Rest (1979b, Figure 3.2) is reproduced 
in Appendix 2.3(C). 
It is oMious that the Complex Stage Model gives 
more precise and detailed information about a subject's 
level of moral judgment and Rest's DIT research is based 
on this model. 	 Simply speaking, the Complex Stage Model 
tends to sketch out the refined details of a subject's 
whole pattern of moral judgment while the Simple Stage 
Model only deals with a subject's dominating stage or 
type of moral judgment. 	 More research is required in order 
to justify the efficient and useful application of the 
Complex Stage Model in the field of Moral Development. 
(It is noted here that the theoretical stages or 
types of moral judgment, Si used in Rest's (1979b) dis-
cussion are explicitly and implicitly assumed to vary 
with Tk or D(Tk) or 'Development' in Rest's figures. 
This is indeed a major drawback of the Complex Stage 
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Model because it means that the Si curves shown in Rest 
(1979b, Figure 3.2) are dependent on the characteristics 
of the sample used, or broadly speaking on the general 
social, cultural and educational background of the 
sample used.) 
2.3.2 Piaget's Theory of Moral Judgment. 
An early influential work in the field of moral 
development is Piaget's (1932) book: The Moral Judgment  
of the Child. In his book, Piaget set up a research pa-
radigm in the study of children's structure of moral 
judgment. 	 As usual, Piaget employed the clinical inter- 
view technique in this empirical study. 	 Children 
were first read a story or a pair of stories about moral 
events involving other children and then were asked a 
few questions based on the stories. 
According to Piaget, two major stages of moral 
judgment can be identified. 	 The earlier stage which 
occurs before the age of seven or eight is called 
Heteronomy, Moral realism, or a morality of constraints. 
The later stage is called Autonomy or a morality of co-
operation. 
The studies of Piaget generated a great deal of 
research on moral judgment, which led to the establish-
ment of the cognitive developmental theory of morality. 
On the other hand, his research also receive criticism. 
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One major criticism is that Piaget ignores the affective 
or non-cognitive aspects of moral development. This 
major defect of Piaget's theory was, however, explicitly 
acknowledged by him in the foreword of his book (1932): 
"Readers will find in this book no direct 
analysis of child morality as it is practised 
in homeand school life or in children's societies. 
It is the moral judgment that we propose to 
investigate, not moral behaviour or sentiments". 
Generally speaking, most psychologists (e.g. Bull, 
1969, p.151; Bloom, 1959, p.11; Wright, 1971, p.153) 
agree that Piaget's contribution is significant and 
outstanding. 
For a complete and elaborated discussion of Piaget's 
theory of moral judgment and criticisms on Piaget's theory, 
see Appendix 2.3(D). 
2.3.3 Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development. 
I. A Six-stage Theory of Moral Judgment  
Based on Piaget's work, Kohlberg constructs an 
elaborated and well-known theory of moral development. 
Me postulates a sequence of six distinct moral stages, 
which is invariant for all persons and cultures. Although, 
Kohlberg's theory is widely referred to as a theory of 
moral development, "it is more properly a description 
of the development of moral judgment". 
	 (Hersh, et al, 
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1979, p.45). 
The following overview of Kholberg's three levels 
and six stages of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1969, 1976) 
should be read in parallel with Appendix: 2.3(E) 
Three Moral Levels 
(1) Preconventional Level (Stages 1 and 2) 
Most children are at this level. 	 The individual 
is not concerned with the conventional or societal rules 
and expectations but only with the concrete or physical 
consequence of action. 
	
In other words, the individual 
takes a concrete individual perspective, in which "rules 
and social expectations are something external to the 
self'. (Kohlberg, 1976, p.33). 
(2) Conventional Level (Stage 3 and 4) 
Most adolescents and adults are at this level. 
The individual conforms to conventional rules or 
expectations, or authorities. 	 He takes a member-of- 
society perspective, in which "the self is identified 
with or has internalized the rules and expectations of 
others, especially those of authority 	 (p.33) 
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(3) Postconventional Level (Stage 5 and 6) 
Only a minority of adults, usually above 20 years old, 
reaches this level. The individual, in general, accepts 
conventional or societal rules on the ground that he 
understands and agrees with the moral principle underlying 
these rules. 	 In cases where the moral principle is in 
conflict with the societal rules, he would stick to his 
self-chosen moral principles rather than obeying the 
rules. That is to say, he holds a prior-to-society 
perspective. 
The three moral levels are subdivided into six moral 
stages. 	 Each level consists of two stages, the second 
is a more advanced and organised form of moral reasoning 
within each level. 
Since the contents of stages 1 to 4 are explicitly 
and clearly expressed in Appendix 2.3(E), the following 
discussion concentrates on the elaborations of the higher 
stages. 
The Stage 4 perspective is basically an authority 
oriented one, it is less autonomous and less basic 
principle oriented than the perspective of the Stage 5 
and 6 because 
"(a) it defines no clear obligations to persons 
outside the order (for example, the nation-state) 
or to persons who do not recognize the rules of 
one's own order; and (b) it provides no rational 
guides to social change, to the creation of new 
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norms of laws" (Kohlberg, 1971, p.200) 
In the elaboration of 	 Stage 5, Kohlberg (1971) 
refers 	 Constitutional Democracy and argues that it 
makes social law more attractive to a rational person 
because it puts one's basic rights prior to law and 
society. 	 Generally speaking, 	 Stage 5 can be seen as an 
outgrowth of the relativist perspective: all values, 
norms and morals are arbitrary and relative. 	 The 
emphasis is on the principle of social contract. "The 
contract usually represents a compromise, but it allows 
each man to pursue his own interest without unduly 
interfering with the other's rights to pursue his interest". 
(Hersh, et al., 1979, p.78) 	 In addition, contracts are 
neutral. 
	
It is regarded as morally invalid or bad only 
when it involves an abrogation of basic human right such as 
life and liberty. 
	 Apart from such human rights, a contract 
can be anything which is mutually agreed by members of 
your group. The laws and duties are based on "rational 
calculation of overall utility, 'the greatest good for the 
greatest number.'" 	 (Kohlberg, 1976, p.35) 
However, above this principle of social contract, 
there is a more fundamental, universal and prescriptive 
moral principle: the principle of justice which is the 
central theme of the Stage six. 
	
Kohlberg applies exten- 
sively Kant's moral philosophy and Rawl's theory of 
justice (1971) in the elaboration of his stage six. 	 The 
major features of 	 Stage six can be summarized as 
follows: 
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(1) Principle of Respect for Personality 
Persons are regarded as ends and not means. They 
are of unconditional values. 
(2) Principle of Justice 
This principle defines 	 individual justice as "the 
right of every person to an equal consideration of his 
claims in every situation, not just those codified into 
law" (Kohlberg, 1971, p.210) 
(3) Universalistic Principle of Role-taking 
This principle guides an actor in a dilemma situa-
tion to act and play a role in a way that "any rational 
agent in a similar situation" should do (p.211). 	 It is 
argued that decisions governed by this principle are 
universalistic and reversible. 	 According to Kohlberg 
(1971, p.213), 
"a universalizable decision is a decision acceptable 
to any man involved in the situation who must play 
one of the roles affected by the decision, but does 
not know which role he will play". 
The three principles defining the Stage 6 can be 
said to be content-free,.self-chosen, and non-contigent 
upon any prior agreement or contract. 
	 The only assump- 
tion is that it applies to all human beings. 	 In other 
words, in 
	 Stage 6 reasoning, all persons are treated 
as morally equal, and commutative justice is regarded as 
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reciprocity, contract and trust. Kohlberg argues that 
this principle of justice satisfies the formalist's 
requirement that "rational moral judgments must be 
reversible, consistent and universalizable." (19731?,p.639) 
In addition, he claims that "no principle other than 
justice has been shown to meet the formal conception of a 
universal prescriptive principle." (1971, p.221) and that 
no other concept of morality is "stronger" and "more 
positive" than this one. 
Since his first work (Kohlberg,1958), Kohlberg 
has improved his theory and methodology a great deall Kohlberg 
(1973) reports that two of his longitudinal subjects 
retrogress from stage 4 or 5 to stage 2. He argues that, 
since both of these two subjects eventually reached Stage 
5, there should exist an intermediate transitional stage 
between stages 4 and 5. He calls it 	 Stage 41 and 
defines it as "a no -man's land between rejection of 
conventional morality and the formulation of non-
conventional or universal moral principles". (Kohlberg, 
1976, p.43). In short, the stage 41 person views matters 
from a personal, subjective, arbitrary and outside-of-
society perspective. 
More recently, Colby et. al. (in press, p.63), in 
the longitudinal study of Kohlberg's data using Standard 
Issue Scoring Method, still count the above two stage 41 
cases as a violation of the sequence of Kohlber's six 
stages. 
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In addition, each stage can further be subdivided 
into two substages: A and B. The social perspectives of 
both substages are the same and they are therefore said to 
belong to the same stage. 	 On the other hand, "judgments 
at substage B are more equilibrated and reversible than 
their A counterparts" (Colby, et. al., 1979(1), p.71). 
A judgment is said to be reversible if it can be applied 
equally to any character in a moral situation. In other 
words, 
"Type A makes judgments more descriptively and 
predictively, in terms of the given 'out there'. 
Type B makes judgments more prescriptively, in terms 
of what ought to be, of what is internally accepted 
by the self". (Kohlberg, 1976, p.40) 
It is thus argued that the substage B is more 
natural, balanced, internal and universalistic than the 
substage A. 
Kohlberg (1973a,1974,1981)also postulates a "Stage 7" 
which is beyond Stage 6, with a perspective on life's 
ultimate meaning. Further details are given in Section 
2.4.1. 
II. Methodology in Assessing Moral Judgment  
Kohlberg uses a set of hypothetical moral dilemmas 
as a research instrument for testing his theory. The 
instrument is called Moral Judgment Instrument (MJI) 
There are three forms of the MJI. A copy of the MJI 
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Form A is given in Appendix 5(D). The MJI employs a 
person to person interview format. However, it is 
possible to modify the MJI into a written questionnaire 
so that it may be administered to a group of subjects 
simultaneously. 
The original formulation of the hypothetical moral 
dilemmas was done in 1958. Since then, the scoring method 
has been improved.. 	 The old scoring method is called 
the Aspect-Scoring system and the new one the Issue-
Scoring system. 
(1) The Aspect-Scoring System  
A system of 25 "aspects" grouped into 9 major sets: 
"rules, conscience, welfare of others, self's welfare, 
sense of duty, role taking, punitive 
justice, positive justice, and motives" is the basis for 
scoring. (Kohlberg, 1976, p.41; 1969; 1958). Each 
statement of a subject's response is scored by using a 
list of prototypical sentences on each aspect in each of 
the dilemma stories. Another method is to score each 
aspect of a subject's total response to a story by a 
story rating manual. In other words, the first method is 
sentence scoring by aspect and stage, and the second one 
is story rating also by aspect and stage. According 
to Kohlberg (1976, p.43-44) "the sentence unit had 
proven too large for analytic, as opposed to ideal, 
typological scoring'.'. This disadvantage of the aspect 
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scoring system led to a radical change in the scoring 
method in early 1970s. 
(2) Intuitive Issue Scoring  
The term 'issue' is defined as "what the individual 
is valuing, judging or appealing to, rather than his mode 
of reasoning' (Kohlberg, 1976, p.43). Kohlberg constructs 
the following list of issues found in every society and 
culture: (1) Laws and rules (2) Conscience (3) Personal 
roles of affection (4) Authority (5) Civil rights (6) Contract, 
trust, and justice in exchange (7) punishment and justice 
(8) Value of life (9) Property rights and values (10) 
Truth (11) Sex and sexual love" (Kohlberg 1976, p.43). 
Each content issue may consist of a number of moral aspects. 
For example, the issue "laws and rules" involves moral 
aspects like role taking, duty, fairness, etc. The sub-
ject's whole idea about an issue in a story is regarded as 
a unit for scoring. A list of prototypical arguments for 
each issue at each stage is given in a scoring manual. 
This scoring method is called the Intuitive Issue Scoring 
and "is theoretically the most valid method of scoring, 
since it is instrument free, that is, applicable to any 
moral dilemmas". (Kohlberg, 1976, p.45) 
(3) Standardized Issue Scoring 
Since it is only possible for those thoroughly 
trained to achieve a high inter-rater reliability of 0.9 
or above in Intuitive Issue Scoring, Kohlberg and his 
77 
associates have developed a scoring manual for standardized 
issue scoring (Colby, et al., 1979). 	 For each dilemma, 
the standard manual focuses on the scoring of two dominant 
issues. For example, in the story: "Philip (or Heinz) and 
the drug";  the life issue is an issue "pro" stealing while 
the law issue is one that"con" (against) stealing. 	 Within 
each issue, a set of values used by the subject is called 
"norm" or moral norm. Each norm is further differentiated 
into a set of "elements". 
A long list (more than 900 pages) of standardised 
statements called "Criterion Judgment"appears in the-
Standard Manual (1979). According to the manual, 
"criterion judgment represents the intersection of one 
norm and element as applied to a standard issue on a 
dilemma construed at a particular moral judgment stage". 
(Colby, et al 1979 (I) , p.47). 
In general, the procedures for Standard Issue 
Scoring consist of: (Colby, et al, 1979 (I-IV); 
(1) To determine which of the two standard issues is 
the subject's chosen issue. 
(2) Read through all the subject's responses to the 
dilemma being scored. 	 Differentiate the material 
in each response according to whether it falls 
under the chosen issue or the non-chosen issue. 
(3) Make an initial guess of the likely stage of the 
material by comparing the subject's responses with 
the global issue stage description. 
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(4) Within each chosen issue, separate the material 
according to norm and element. 
(5) Determine the stage of each moral judgment by match- 
ing to criterion judgments in the standard scoring 
manual. 
(6) If clear and marginal matches in step (5) is not 
possible, try to guess the stage from the responses 
obtained. 
(7) Repeat steps (4) to (6) for the non-chosen issue 
in the dilemma. 
Based on the issue scores obtained for each of the 
dilemmas, the moral maturity score (MMS) can be calculated. 
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III. A Critical Discussion 
(A) Theoretical Issues  
(1) The Structure of Kohlberg's Six Stages 
According to Kohlberg (1969, 1971, 1973, 1976), the 
following assumptions are made on the structure of the 
six-stage sequence: 
(a) Structured wholeness 
Following Piaget's conception of stage, Kohlberg 
postulates that each of his six stages forms a structured 
whole. 
	
This assumption is claimed to be empirically 
supported in two main aspects: 
(i) The internal consistency reliability for the Standard 
Issue Scoring of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument 
is very high. According to Colby et. al (in press, p. 
30), is 0.92 for Form A, 0.96 for Form B and 0.94 for 
Form C. Similarly, the alternate form reliability 
is also very high. 	 It ranges from 0.82 to 0.95 (p.28). 
(ii) Factor analysis of the correlations among stage scores 
on each of the issues across the dilemmas leads to a 
conclusion that "moral judgment as measured by the 
Interview Forms A, B, and C and scored using the 
Standard Form Scoring Manual, is a single, general 
domain". (Colby, et. al., in press, p.41) 
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It seems that the new empirical findings using the 
Standard Issue Scoring are good enough to clear much of 
the criticism given by philosophers and psychologists 
(see e.g. Locke, 1979, p.171-172; Bergling, 1981, p.20). 
Nevertheless, Rest (in press, p.77-78; 1979b, p.56-63) 
argues that Kohlberg's Simple Stage Model (See also 
Section 2.3.1 (IV)) is inadequate for accounting for 
subject's moral thinking. 	 He also points out that 
"the consistency of scores in Kohlberg's data is 
not a strong test of stage consistency in a person's 
moral thinking. 	 Various scoring rules have been 
devised to weed out stage mixture and so the procedure 
is biased towards stage consistency." (Rest, 
in press, p.77) 
(b) A Sequence with Cognitive and Moral Adequacy 
Kohlberg (1971) claims that there is an inner logical 
order in the sequence of his six stages. 	 That is, "a 
higher moral stage entails a lower moral stage, at least 
partly, because it involves a higher logical structure 
entailing a lower logical structure" (p.186). Kohlberg 
(1973b) also claims that a higher moral stage is more 
adequate than a lower moral stage according to certain 
moral criteria. 	 These claims of cognitive and moral 
adequacy, particularly the latter one, have been criticized 
by many philosophers or critics (See e.g. Peters, 1971, 
1978; Locke, 1979; Carter, 1980; Flanagan, 1982). All of 
them regard Kohlberg's claims of adequacy as unsound or 
unsatisfactory. 
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(c) Invariant Developmental Sequence 
Kohlberg's assumptions of cognitive and moral ade-
quacy are fundamentally developmental in nature. From a 
strict empirical point of view, the developmental sequence 
of Kohlberg's stage structures should be better studied 
by following subjects longitudinally. 
Based on the analysis of his longitudinal data, 
Kohlberg and his colleagues claim that the six moral stages 
form an invariant sequence (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969; 
Kohlberg, 1976, p,43; Colby et. al., in press, p.41-45). 
Apart from the problem of retrogression (See Part 
(I) of this section), the claim of an invariant develop-
- mental sequence appears to be the most promising one. 
However, since the Standard Issue Scoring has only been 
recently refined for publication, it may be argued that 
more researches using the new scoring method are needed 
in order to offer strong support of this claim. (See also 
Colby et. al., in press, p.52-56, for a brief review of 
four longitudinal studies using the Standard Issue Scoring) 
(2) The "Truth" of Kohlberg's stages 
According to Kohlberg (1976), the criteria for his 
stages to he "true" are two-fold. The first is that the 
definition of the stage structure is operational or 
empirical. 	 The second is that "the conceptual structure 
of the stages is not contingent on a specific psychological 
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theory.. They are, rather, matters of adequate logical 
analysis." (p.47). 	 In other words, "stage structure is 
not a hypothetical construct from which behavioural 
'signs' are deduced; it is an abstraction of structure 
from an interview which always embeds structure in 
content." (Colby, et. al., 1979 (I), p.9). However, 
Trainer (1977) argues that Kohlberg's stages are "imagin-
ative philosophical constructions deriving from sources 
other than empirical evidence". 
	
(p.46). Tomlinson (1979) 
also expresses his puzzlement about these stage structures. 
He writes, "using the Kohlberg manual, my students and I 
have often found ourselves asking: 'are things really so 
clean?'" (p.340) 
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Furthermore Kohlberg's theory has been criticised 
by philosophers such as Peters (1978) and Alston (1971) 
as inadequate and one-sided. 	 Peters (1978) argues that 
Kohlberg's system does not deal with the affective 
aspects of development . (p.150). It accounts neither 
for the development of positive motivations such as 
sympathy and consideration for others nor the development 
of negative ones such as shame and guilt. (p.153) 
Psychologist Wright (1971) also critises that Kohlberg's 
stages over-emphasise the structure of moral reasoning 
and, to a large extent, neglects the importance of moral 
content in the understanding of moral development. He 
writes: "it is not unreasonable to suppose that why a 
person thinks an action wrong is much less important than 
that he thinks it wrong." (p.173) 
Another method of testing the truth of Kohlberg's 
stages is to examine how good his stages are in the pre-
diction of moral action. Kohlberg (1976) argues that 
"to act in a morally high way requires a high stage of 
moral reasoning. 	 One can, however, reason in terms of 
such principles and not live up to them". (p.32). In 
addition, he claims that "moral stage is a good predictor 
of action in various experimental and naturalistic sett-
ings". (p.32). On the other hand, Mischel and Mischel 
(1976) arguethat, according to their analysis, they do 
not justify Kohlberg's above claim. They point out that 
the "predictive validity from moral reasoning to moral 
behaviour does not appear to be better than the modest, 
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albeit often statistically significant, personality co-
efficients (averaging 0.30) typically found in correla-
tional personality research linking measures across 
diverse response modes." (p.101) In addition, Kurtines 
and Greif (1974), ina review of Kohlberg's theory, conclude: 
"there is no clearly demonstrated connection between 
moral judgment, as measured by the Moral Judgment 
Scale, and moral action. Overall, predictive 
validity is minimal." (p.468). 
(3) Cultural Universal Assumption 
Kohlberg claims that his six stages are cultural-
universal. That is, the sequence is invariant for all 
persons and cultures. 	 He presents cross-cultural data 
collected in USA, Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey and Yucatan to 
support his claim (Kohlberg, 1969, 1971). In addition, 
according to Colby (in press, p.52-56), two cross-
cultural longitudinal studies using the Standard Issue 
Scoring also support their cultural universal claim. 
On the other hand, Simpson (1974) challenges Kohlberg's 
cross-cultural studies. 	 She argues that Kohlberg's 
interview employs analytic and theoretical modes of 
thought and language such as "justice, equality and 
reciprocity at a high level of abstraction" (p.94), 
which are not valued by many cultures. 
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As Lickona (1976b, p.10) points out, Kohlberg can 
resolve the above problem by asking: 
"(1) Can one logically test the universality of moral 
stages, defined in terms of value categories, 
without using the same value categories from one 
culture to another? (2) Can one logically require 
that all groups everywhere must demonstrate all 
levels in the moral hierarchy in order to establish 
its universality 	 2,? 
In an extensive review of cross-cultural studies 
of Kohlberg's stages, Edwards (1981) concludes that the 
first three moral stages "are found in a wide variety 
of cultural settings". (p.533) On the other hand, he 
argues that "the greatest problem arises with respect 
to Kohlberg's highest stages, which seem to be found much 
more commonly in complex than in simple societies". (p.523). 
Similarly, Bergling (1981), in an analysis of 12 cross-
cultural studied carried out in 9 countries (p.64) comes 
to the conclusion that Kohlberg's Stages 1-4 are empirically 
supported in western industrialized countries but "findings 
from the Bahamas and British Honduras fail to support 
even a Stage 4". (p.84) 
(4) Uniqueness and Scope of Kohlberg's Theory 
(a) Uniqueness 
Kohlberg (1976) claims that "anyone who interviewed 
children about moral dilemmas and who followed them 
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longitudinally in time would come to our six stages and 
no others." (p.47) On the other hand, Bull (1969, p.29-
35) presents an alternative scheme of moral judgment 
development with empirical support. 	 In addition, 
Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner (1976) also postulate a 
typological theory of socialization of moral judgment 
with three developmental levels. 
(b) Scope 
There are two major problems in the scope of 
Kohlberg's theory: 
(i) Philosophical basis of the six stages 
Simpson (1974) argues that there are biases in 
Kohlberg's moral principles which are based solely on 
western philosophy. 	 She thinks that it is inadequate to 
explain the concept of morality without reference to non- 
western philosophies. 
	
The present writer agrees with 
Simpson's point. 	 The elegant Chinese and Indian philo- 
sophies of morality have been influencing the behaviour 
of about one-half of the human population on earth; they 
should not be neglected. 
	
See Section 2.4 for an attempt 
to apply Chinese Tao Philosophy in the establishment of a 
basis of the ultimate stage of human development. 
(ii) Male-female differences 
Gilligan (1977) finds that the female structure of 
moral thinking is, in some aspects, different from 
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Kohlberg's structure which is derived mainly from longi- 
tudinal study of male subjects. 
	
For example, females 
emphasize responsibility more rather than rights and they 
are in general more affective and affiliative oriented 
than males. 
	
Similarly, Holstein (1976) also argues that 
there is some sex bias in Kohlberg's scoring standards. 
Flanagan (1982, p.508) regards the male-female differences 
as one of the major defects of Kohlberg's theory. 
(B) Empirical Issues 
In a critique of Kohlberg's theory and measurement, 
Kurtines and Greif (1974) argue that (1) the general 
meaningfulness of the six intuitively derived moral stages 
is not yet clear. 	 In addition, the administration and 
scoring of Kohlberg's measurement has not been standardized. 
(ii) The reliability of Kohlberg's test instrument is 
not convincing and needs to be demonstrated. 
	
(iii) The 
predictive validity from moral reasoning, as measured by 
Kohlberg's test, to moral action is minimal (iv) the actual 
construct validation for the test is small. 
On the other hand, Broughton (1978), in a defence 
of Kohlberg's theory, argues that Kurtines and Greif's 
"queries turn out to be generated not only by lack of 
familiarity with the literature, but also by a broad 
misunderstanding of Kohlberg's theory, which derives from 
a research paradigm and a conception of science and the 
human mind quite at odds with Kohlberg's" (p.81). He 
argues that it is conceptually wrong to regard Kohlberg's 
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measurement as a projective psychometric scale. 	 Further- 
more, "criticisms of Kohlberg's measurement procedure do 
not necessarily imply criticisms of Kohlberg's theory. 
The theory could be correct, and we (Broughton and his 
associates) could still debate the best way to bring a 
measure instrument to bear on it." (p.82) 
With the new Standard Issue Scoring, many of the 
defects of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument pointed 
out by Kurtines and Greif (1974) have been' eliminated or 
improved. 	 Nevertheless, the following remarks on 
the new scoring system should also be considered carefully: 
(i) The scope of the Criterion Judgments is far from 
exhausted. 	 In other words, guessing instead of 
matching i8 unavoidable in the scoring process 
(particularly in the scoring of cross-cultural data). 
It is doubtful that one can make an exhaustive list 
of all judgments given by subjects of all cultures 
in an open-ended interview on moral reasoning. In 
addition, no criterion judgment is given for stage 
6 in the manual. 
(ii) The process of matching the subject's judgment with 
the Criterion Judgment is sophisticated and subjec-
tive, especially in the case of marginal matching. 
(iii) It is obvious that those who understand Kohlberg's 
scheme quite well can always score, according to 
his scheme (say, by Intuitive Issue Scoring), with 
a high inter-rater reliability. 
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On the other hand, those who do not quite understand 
Kohlberg's theory and measurement and hope to increase 
their scoring reliability by sticking closely to 
the 1000+ page manual would be struggling in vain. 
In other words, as far as the scoring of Kohlberg's 
Moral Judgment Scale is concerned, experienced 
moral psychologists do not need to use the manual, 
while most inexperienced people may not be capable 
of using it. 
On the whole, the new scoring system should be 
praised on at least two major aspects: 
(i) It demonstrates how a complex open-ended psychological 
test instrument can be standardized in a fairly 
objective and scientific way. 
(ii) It offers other moral psychologists a set of opera-
tionally well-defined criterion judgment statements 
which are extremely valuable reference materials 
for constructing tests of moral and social development. 
In short, there is no doubt that the Standard 
Issue Scoring is a sigicantcontribution to the empirical 
study of moral judgment development. 
An Appraisal of Kohlberg's Contribution 
Many psychologists (e.g. Wright, 1971, p.167; 
Lickona, 1976a, p.240; Tomlinson, 1979, p.354; Hersh, 
et. al., 1979, p.44-45) regard Kohlberg as an outstanding 
pioneer in moral development research. Hersh et. al., 
(1979, p.45) write: 
"in a sense, Kohlberg has helped finish Piaget's 
unfinished work; but in the process, he has greatly 
expanded and revised Piaget's original findings." 
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2.3.4 Objective Assessment of Moral Judgment:  
Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT)  
1. The Theoretical Background of the DIT  
According to Rest (1975a; 1976b, p.76-86), there 
are two basic methods in the assessment of moral judgment: 
(a) A questionnaire or an interview format is prepared 
and the subject is asked to write or talk about his/ 
her moral thinking in a free-response manner. Subjects 
may be asked to write essays or to talk on abstract 
and philosophical topics such as "How do you define 
morality?" "What are rights and wrongs?" etc. Or 
subjects may be presented some hypothetical moral 
dilemmas and are asked to decide what should be done 
and why. Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument (MJI) 
is of this type. Another method originally used by 
Piaget (1932) is to present subjects two stories and 
ask them to compare the acts of the actors in the 
stories (See also Section 2.2). 
(b) A set of prototypic statements representing the 
scoring categories is prepared and the subject is 
asked to choose among them. Such stage prototypic 
statements may be written in two different ways: 
(i) The statements represent "arguments or justi- 
fications for a course of action". 	 (Rest, 1979b, p.84) 
For example, in Kohlberg's Heinz Story, statements 
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can be written to give reasons for 
stealing or not stealing the drug. 	 (ii) The state- 
ments represent or define the crucial issues in a 
moral dilemma. 	 That is, for example, 
"What is the most important question a subject thinks 
a person should ask himself or herself in making a 
decision in the Heinz story? Is the issue whether 
Heinz might get caught and sent to jail? Is the issue 
whether a loving husband would care so much for his 
wife that he'd stoop to do a dastardly deed? Is the 
issue how the law and order of a community are going 
to be maintained?" (Rest, 1979, p.84) 
Obviously, methods (i) and (ii) are closely related. 
However, method (i) is a more specific and concrete 
way of representing arguments for and against an action 
or decision in a moral dilemma while method (ii) is 
regarded as a more structural and general way of 
representing arguments in making a decision in a moral 
dilemma. 	 The DIT employs Method (ii) in its cons- 
truction. 	 The basic empirical assumption of the DIT 
is that "developmental stages of moral judgment involve 
distinctive ways of defining social-moral dilemmas and 
of evaluating the crucial issues in them". 
	 (Rest, 
1979b,p.85) On the other hand, the theoretical basis 
of the DIT is Kohlberg's six-stage theory. In short, 
Rest's (1975a) general assumptions in the use of pro-
totypic statements in the assessment of moral judgment 
consist of (1) Kohlberg's stage characteristics can be 
specified (2) Prototypic statements expressing clearly 
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the stage characteristics can be constructed ( 
"Subjects who are advanced enough in their own deve-
lopment can appropriately recognise stage characteris- 
tics in statements." (p.91) 	 (4) Subjects can meaning- 
fully rate or rank the statements. 
II. The Test Format and Specific Characteristics of the  
DIT statements 
A sample of the DIT is given in Appendix 5(E). In 
order to illustrate the test procedure and format, let us 
consider the story I: Heinz and the drug. The subject is 
first asked to read the dilemma story. Then she/he should 
make the decision whether Heinz should steal the drug or 
not. After that, she/he rates the importance of each of 
the twelve issue-statements. 	 That is, in making the de- 
cision on whether Heinz should steal the drug or not, how 
important are the issue-statements presented? Finally, the 
subject is asked to rank the four most important issue- 
statements in order of importance. 	 The scoring process 
can be done by computers. 
	 The original DIT consists of 
six stories, three of them are based on Kohlberg's Moral 
Judgment Instrument. 
In the writing up of the issue statements, the fol-
lowing points are taken into account: (Rest, 1975a, p. 
77-78; Rest, 1976, p.204-205; Rest, 1979b, Chapter 4). 
(1) "The underlying stage structure of each issue statement 
is emphasized so that higher-stage statements appear 
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stark and abstract and do not lend themselves to being 
interpreted as fancier ways of stating a lower-stage 
idea". (Rest, 1976, p.204). 
(2) Distractor items which are called meaningless state-
ments are included. 
(3) The word length, syntactic and semantic features of 
the issue sentences at various stages are carefully 
considered. 
(4) In each of the DITs, several items, with different 
stage orientations, of a stage are set to fit diff-
erent types of subjects. 
III. Methods of Scoring  
Four DIT indices are compared in Davison (1979), 
three of them are constructed by using the subject's 
ratings and one by rankings. Two of these four indices 
are elaborated as follows: 
(a) P-index 
Scores are calculated by the following scoring 
criterion for any of the Stage 5A, SB or 6 statements 
ranked as one of the top four most important statements 
in a moral dilemma: a score of 4,3,2,1 is given to a 
statement ranked as first, second, third and fourth most 
important respectively. The sum of all the scores gained 
by a subject in a DIT is called the P-score or raw P-score. 
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Dividing the raw P by the possible maximum P and multi-
plied by 100 gives the percentage P-score. 
(b) Simple Sum of Item Responses (SS)  
Define 	 5 = Most Importance Rating to 
1 = Least (i.e. No) Importance Rating, and 
DJK = Average rating of all the Stage k 
statements, where k = 2,3,4,5A,5B,6. 
The simple sum of item response is defined as 
SS = (DJSA + DJ5B + DJ6) - (DJ2 + DJ3 + DJ4) 
The other two DIT indices are constructed by (i) a 
theoretically weighted sum of item responses (TS) and (ii) 
an empirically weighted sum of item response (ES), which 
is also called Davison 'D' index. 	 It has been found that 
the ES index "provides the most desirable measure of 
overall development" (Davison, 1979, p.244). 
IV. The Psychometric Properties of the DIT  
The following discussion is based on Davison's 
article in Rest (1979b, p.223-245) and other DIT studies. 
(A) The Internal Structure of the DIT 
According to Davison (1979), it has been found that 
(i) the DIT stage score variables displays a simplex-like 
structure. 	 (ii) the principal component analysis of the 
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stage score variable correlations produces two factors 
with characteristic roots greater than one, and a set of 
factor loadings supporting the stage order predicted. 
(iii) the results of the metric multidimensional scaling 
analysis also support the predicted order of stages. 
In short, it is argued that the above findings 
support Kohlberg's six-stage sequence, except with a minor 
reversal of the Stage 5A and SB (Davison, 1979, p.232-234). 
(B) Reliability and Validity of the DIT 
The DIT is a fairly new test instrument, which was 
established in 1972. Since then, the reliability and va-
lidity of this test has been studied extensively by Rest 
and his associates (Rest, 1975a, 1975b, 1976, 1979b; Rest 
et. al., 1974; Rest etl. al., 1978;,Davison, 1979). The 
major findings consist of: 
(1) The test-retest reliabilities for the P and D indices 
are generally in the high 0.70s or 0.80s (Davison, 
1979, p.240). The internal consistency reliabilities 
for the P and D scores are 0.77 and 0.79 respectively 
for the DIT Six-story version (Davison, 1979, p.239). 
(2) In a review of a number of longitudinal studies, Rest 
claims that the DIT has high longitudinal validity (Rest, 
1979a, p.6.5; 1979b, Chapter 5). Cross-sectional 
studies indicate that "the correlation of age with DIT 
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(rate P) was 0.66, and with DIT (rank P) was 0.62" 
(rest, 1976, p.215) 
(3) The correlations of Kohlberg's measure of moral stage 
with the DIT score are around 0.70s for the hetero-
geneous samples and around 0.40s for the homogeneous 
samples. 	 The correlations of the DIT with other 
cognitive developmental measures range from 0.10s 
to 0.40s. 	 (Rest, 1979b, 153-154). 
(4) The correlations of achievement and IQ-type tests with 
DIT score are usually in Ahe range of 0.20s to 0.50s. 
(Rest, 1979b, p,146-153). 
In short, it is concluded that the DIT is a reliable 
test with good construct validity. 
V. A Critical Discussion 
In an argument against those people who think that 
it is too early to attempt an objective assessment of moral 
judgment, Rest (1975) replies: 
"those who argue that DIT research is premature either 
must claim that studies using prorotypic statements 
have also been premature or must show why having 
subjects rank statements is such a crucial extension 
of established precedents" (p.91). 
In the following paragraphs, a number of issues on 
the DIT research are discussed. 
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(A) A Comparison of the PIT With Kohlberg's MJI  
(1) Methodological advantages of the DIT 
As Rest (1975a, p.76) points out, the fundamental 
weak points of Kohlberg's measurement of moral judgment 
are: (i) The subjects' responses cannot, strictly speak- 
ing, be compared from subject to subject. 	 (ii) There are 
interviewer and scorer biases. 	 (iii) Subjects' differences 
in verbal expressiveness may influence stage scores (iv) 
The interview and the other scoring process is very time 
consuming. 	 A number of other weak points such as low 
test-retest and alternate form reliabilities mentioned by 
Rest (1975a) have been greatly improved with the estab-
lishment of the Standard Issue Scoring (See Section 2.3) 
On the other hand, Rest (1975a, p.77) claims the follow-
ing methodological advantages of the DIT: (i) The subjects' 
responses can be compared because of the highly structured 
test format. 	 (ii) The variance in stage scores due to the 
subjects' differences in verbal expressiveness can be 
minimized. 	 (iii) The DIT is scored objectively either by 
computers or by hand. 	 Hence it saves time and eliminates 
scorer bias. 	 (iv) Progressive refinement of the test can 
be done by item analysis. 
(2) Differences Between the MJI and DIT 
One empirical study by Froming and McColgan (1979) 
reports that the correlation of Kohlberg's MJI with DIT 
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score is 0.61. However, if the age variable is partialed 
out, the correlation falls to 0.31. This implies that 
(i) the age variable contributes largely to the observed 
MJI-DIT correlation (ii) the two approaches, MJI and DIT, 
may measure moral judgment development quite differently. 
While both Kohlberg's MJI and Rest's DIT are test 
instruments constructed within the domain of Cognitive 
Developmental Approach, they differs in two major aspects: 
(i) MJI: Simple Stage Model vs DIT: Complex Stage Model 
The basic rationale underlying these two Stge Models 
has been discussed in Section 2.3.1. 
(ii) MJI: Spontaneous Production of Moral Judgments vs 
DIT: Comprehension and Preference of Moral Judgments 
The MJI uses an open-ended interview format and 
attempts to assess spontaneous production of moral 
judgments, while the DIT uses a close-ended format and 
attempts to assess recognition, comprehension and prefer-
ence of a set of prototypic statements constructed by the 
test constructor. 
The above basic differences leads Kohlberg (1979) 
to conclude that the MJI (Harvard test) is better than the 
DIT (Minnesota test) 
"if one wishes to test implications of simple stage 
theory, since the test was constructed and valida-
ted according to the criterion of the simple stage 
construct. 
	
Insofar as one wishes to research the 
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implications of the general cognitive-developmental 
theory underlying both tests, there is no reason to 
claim the Harvard test is better." (p.xi) 
In addition, Colby et. al., (in press, p.76) argue 
that the development of moral judgment as a whole "may be 
too broad a scope for what Rest calls the "Simple Stage 
Model"". They also arguethat a full developmental account 
of an individual's moral judgment may require scores of 
other moral judgment tests such as the DIT in addition to 
Kohlberg's MJI score. 
(B) The Fakability of the DIT 
Psychological tests using hypothetical dilemmas 
are liable to faking responses. 	 In moral psychology, it 
is common that subjects tend to 'fake good' in their 
responses. 	 In a fakability study of the DIT, McGeorge 
(1975) found that subjects did not increase their P score 
significantly when instructed to 'fake good' but they did 
decrease their P score significantly when instructed to 
'fake bad'. 
In another study, Yussen (1976) asked his subjects 
to respond to the DIT three times, once for each of the 
social roles of self, average policeman and average 
philosopher. 
	 He found that the average P score in the 
case of an average philosopher is the highest in all age 
groups and that in the case of an average policeman is the 
lowest in the Grade 10, 12 and College groups. 
	
Though 
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the findings are likely to be due to the different type 
of test instructions and different social perspectives of 
others, they might well reflect some problems on the 
fakability of the DIT. 
In addition, Mischel and Mischel (1976) also argue 
that Kohlberg's measurement is not able to distinguish 
clearly the competence in moral reasoning from performance 
or preference. 	 They write: 
"One cannot be sure from the test, for example, whether 
a "Stage 3" subject who displays a dominant "good boy" 
orientation does not know more abstract principles 
which go beyond approval seeking, or whether he may 
"have" such concepts but prefer not to verbalize 
them when reasoning about moral dilemmas". 
(Mischel and Mischel, 1976, p.88) 
jite. bom 	 we /I ha leflia fa Ruf 1 Di T. 
(C) Cross-cultural Study of the DIT 
There is no mention of cross-cultural study in Rest 
(1979b). On the other hand, Ma (1980) found that the 
cross-cultural indices of the DIT P and D scores using 
English and Hong Kong Chinese samples are fairly low, 
0.30s for the F.4 subjects and 0.60s for the F.6 subjects. 
(For an explanation of the cross-cultural index, see 
Section 6.6) 	 This may indicate that the DIT may not be 
appropriate for cross-cultural studies in its present 
form. One of the main reason may be due to the culturally 
biased contents of some of the DIT stories ('Student 
Take-over', 'Webster' and Newspaper') which are 
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also highly politically oriented. 	 It is argued that the 
present DIT requires a basic modification in contents 
before it can be used for proper cross-cultural studies. 
An Appraisal of Rest's Contribution  
The DIT research has generated a lot of research on 
the objective assessment of moral judgment. 
	 Some of them 
use the DIT format or DIT methodology. For examples, the 
Moral Content Test (Boyce and Jensen, 1978) and the 
Environmental Issues Test (Iozzi and Paradise-Maul, 1980) 
both use the DIT format directly, and the Ethical Reasoning 
inventory (Bode and Page, 1980) employs similar DIT 
methodology. It is likely that more objective tests of 
moral and social development will be constructed under the 
influence of the DIT research. 
Rest's outstanding work can indeed be regarded as 
a milestone contribution to the empirical study of moral 
development. 
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2.4 Stage 7: The Ultimate Stage of Human Development  
For convenience and consistency with the system of no-
tation used in Chapter 3, Stage 7 is defined as the 
Ultimate Stage of Human Development encompassing all 
aspects of human development, for example, moral, social, 
cognitive, personality and psychosexual development. 
Stage 7 represents a unique stage at which the individual 
fuses himself/herself with Nature as a whole and thus 
transcends all things, whether emotion, cognition, desires 
or morality into one harmonioUs integrated whole. This 
does not mean that people who are young or at a lower 
stage of development do not act as integrated wholes. It 
simply means that these people are not able to 'comply 
with Nature naturally' and therefore do not act as a 
harmonious integrated whole. 
Since stage 7 is assumed to be the ultimate stage 
of all aspects of human development, it is possible, and 
more economical and more theoretically elegant to investi-
gate all the aspects as a whole, rather than separate them 
into different categroies, that is stage 7 morality, 
stage 7 cognition, stage 7 social development etc. It is 
only at the initial and final stages of human development 
that we can explore in this way without causing logical 
and theoretical inconsistency or problems. 
In section 2.4.1, some of the explorations beyond 
the Moral Stage 6 are briefly mentioned. The focus of this 
section is an attempt to investigate Stage 7 in terms of 
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Tao philosophy which is then described in Section 2.4.2. 
2.4.1. Towards Stage 7 
I.A.H. Maslow: Self-actualization, B-cognition, Meta-
motivation and Transcendence. 
Maslow's theory (1968, 1971) of self-actualization, 
B-cognition and Meta-motivation will be used in the next 
Chapter as a basis for Stage 6, one stage below the Ultimate 
Stage. In addition, part of Maslow's theory of Transcendence 
(1971, Chapter 21) can well be regarded as something beyond 
Stage 6. 	 (For example, paragraphs or points,l, 2, 3, 4, 8, 
9, 1.0, 25, 26, 27, 28 in Maslow, 1971, Chapter 21) 
	 As 
constantly mentioned by Maslow himself, a substantial 
part of his theory can be regarded as Taoistic. Never-
theless, Maslow's theory of Transcendence is not a completely 
Stage 7 one. For example, he distinguishes two types of 
self-actualizing people: transcending and non-transcending 
ones (1971, p.283). He argues that, "For the transcenders, 
peak experiences and plateau experiences become the most 
important things in their lives, the high spots, the 
validators of life, the most precious aspect of life". 
(1971, p.283). This can only be Stage 6 because a 
completely transcended (Stage 7) person treats everything 
and opinions as equally good and important so long as 
they are natural, or comply with Nature. (see Section 
2.4.2) 
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Maslow (1971) elaborates the concept of transcen-
dence by 35 features (p.281-292) and ends up with the 
following definition: 
"Transcendence refers to 
the very highest and most 
inclusive or holistic levels 
of human consciousness, 
behaving and relating, 
as ends rather than as means, 
to oneself to significant 
others, to human beings in 
general,to other species, 
to nature and to the cosmos.", 
(p.292) 
Further details of Maslow 's theory of Transcendence 
will not be entered into, instead, the elaboration of the 
co n4 
whole, in terms of Tao philosophy will be dealt with in 
Section 2.4.2. 
II. L. Kohlberg: Ultimate Faith 
In the discussion of moral development and faith, 
Kohlberg (1974) mentions a stage beyond his Stage 6 and 
he calls it Stage 7 (p.14). According to Kohlberg, the 
essential of Stage 7 "is the sense of being a part of the 
whole of life and the adoption of cosmic, as opposed to 
a universal humanistic '(Stage 6)' perspective" (p.15). 
The main difference between Stage 6 and Stage 7 is that 
the former one has a finite perspective while the latter 
one has an infinite and cosmic perspective (p.15). Such 
infinite or cosmic perspective is necessary in the 
resolution of, for example, the despair of facing death. 
For further details of Kohlberg's Stage 7, see Kohlberg, 
1981, p.344-372.. 
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In addition, Erikson's (1963) psycho-social Stage 
8: Ego Integrity vs Despair and Gilligan's (1976) concept 
of love relationships also touch some aspects which can 
be ragarded as at or beyond Stage 6 in our system. 
2.4.2. Tao Philosophy as a Basis of Stage 7  
In the following paragraphs, we attempt to explore 
a theoretical base for Stage 7 in terms of Tao Philosophy. 
A general background of Chinese Philosophy, especially 
Tao Philosophy is assumed. (for general introduction 
of Chinese Philosophy, see e.g. Fung, 1948, 1952, 1953; 
Lin, 1949; Chai and Chai, 1975; Suzuki, 1914; Creel, 
1929. For Tao Philosophy, see e.g. Fung, 1933; Ch'en, 
1977; Lin, 1958; Creel, 1970). 
Tao Philosophy is fundamentally simplistic naturalism 
(se e.g. Ch'en, 1977, p.34; *Chang, 1958, p.14-15) and 
there are two main characters in Tao Philosophy: 
1. Books written in Chinese are indicated by "*", e.g. 
*Chang, 1958. 
2. The following formats of quotation are used for quoting 
paragraphs from books by Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. 
(i) Lao Tzu (or Chuang Tzu) said, "..." (/Name of 
Translator etc., *i) (i=1, 2, 3, ... etc.) 
(ii) "..." (Lao Tzu or chuang Tzu/Name of Translator, *i) 
The original Chinese quotations and their sources are 
given in Appendix 2.4. and follows the numbering 
system *i. 
3. The translation of Lao Tzu: Tao Teh King (or Tao Te Ching) 
is difficult. According to *Wong (1979, p.551), more than 
100 versions in English translation have bee published. 
For all the quotations from Lao Tzu, two versions in 
English translation are given - one in the main text, 
the other in Appendix 2.4. The one by A.J. Bahm (1958) 
is a free translation. He interprets Tao as Nature and 
Teh as intelligence. The other by D.C.Lau (1963) is a 
direct translation. 
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Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. According to Lin (1949, p.23 and P. 
66),Lao Tzu was most probably born about 570 B.C. and 
Chuang Tzu fourth century B.C.. The discussion of Tao 
Philosophy in this section will be restricted to these 
two philosophers. 
In the following discussion, the author attempts 
to elaborate and interpret freely Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu's 
philosophy from a developmental psychological point of 
view. The interpretation is exploratory and subjective; 
it may distort the original meaning of Lao Tzu and Chuang 
Tzu's view. Some other ways of interpretation of Tao 
Philosophy can be found inthe references given above. 
Features of Stage 7: Tao Philosophy  
I. Great Intelligence 
According to Lao Tzu, two types of intelligence 
and wisdom can be identified: (i) Common intelligence 
and general wisdom, and (ii) Great Intelligence and 
Ultimate Wisdom. Lao Tzu condemns common intelligence 
because it often misleads us and makes life complicated 
and sophisticated. 
Lao Tzu Said, 
"When cleverness emerges, there 
is great hypocrisy" 
(Lau, 1963, p.74, *1) 
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and 	 "If we ignore intricate 
learning and knowledge 
of petty distinctions, 
we shall be many times 
better off." 
(/Bahm, 1958, p.25, *2) 
On the other hand, Lao Tzu praises Great intelligence, 
Ultimate and true wisdom - Intelligence that helps us to 
understand and comply with Nature; Intelligence that helps 
us to lead a simple, tranquil, natural and absolutely free 
life. 
'Great intelligent' people tend to understand 
everything in a simple and perhaps metaphysical way without 
the motive to disturb others and with the least dependence 
of external environment. Lao Tzu describes these great 
intelligent people in this way: 
"Without going out-of-doors, 
one can know all he needs 
to know. 
Without even looking out 
of his window, one can 
grasp the nature of 
everything. 
Without going beyond his 
own nature, one can achieve 
ultimate wisdom. 
Therefore the intelligent 
man knows all he needs to 
know without going away, 
And sees all he needs to 
see without looking elsewhere, 
And does all he needs to do 
without undue exertion." 
(/Bahm, 1958, p.46, *3) 
In other words, great intelligent people are self-
dependent, self-fulfilling and self-validating. 
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Another elaboration of great intelligent people can 
be found by looking at Lao Tzu's categorization of diff-
erent types of rulers or leaders. He writes, 
"The most intelligent leaders 
bring about results without 
making those controlled 
realize that they are being 
influenced. The less intel-
ligent seek to motivate 
others by appeals to loyalty 
honor, self-interest, and 
flattery. Those still less 
intelligent employ fear by 
making their followers think 
they will not receive their 
rewards. The worst try to 
force others to improve by 
condemning their conduct." 
(/Bahm, 1958, p.24, *4) 
Taoistic way of ruling gives ordinary people the 
highest degree of freedom and causes them the least 
disturbance. It rules in a way as though the government 
were not existing yet everyone in the society behaves 
themselves. 
Modern civilization of science and technology cannot 
be regarded as Great intelligence or Ultimate wisdom 
because it damages our peace and life as much as it 
benefits us. Religious and philosophical thought such as 
Buddhism can be regarded as true and ultimate wisdom and 
Buddha is certainly a Great Intelligent person. 	 In 
other words, Tao Philosophy condemns the progress of 
civilization along the complex, artificial/non-natural, 
conquering/aggressive, and materialistic-oriented 
direction. It emphasizes on civilization towards 
109 
simplicity and naturalness, that is, civilization that 
helps us to be in accord with Nature or to fuse with 
Nature as a whole. 
II. Few Desires 
As mentioned before, Maslow argues that self-
actualizing people tend to have additional needs and 
motivations. He calls these needs and motivations the 
metaneeds and metamotivations. 
	
Self-actualizing people 
tend to gratify both the basic and growth or metaneeds. 
However, this stage of metaneeds and metamotivation is 
not the ultimate stage of development. Beyond this 
stage, the person would have a "quantum drop" of needs 
and desires. He/she would now have one desire only: to 
live happily and freely with as few desires as possible. 
The supreme and ultimate stage of development is to 
transcend oneself so that one becomes desireless mentally. 
In short, one develops from few desires in infancy (or 
initial stage) to lots of desires in the stage of 
metamotivations, and finally transcends from lots of 
desires to very few desires again. Thus, the ultimate 
stage resembles the initial stage in many way except with 
a new perspective and life experience. 
The less one desires, the easier one achieve the 
psychological state of harmony. Lau Tzu said, 
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"If nothing appears to arouse 
envy, one will remain satis-
fied with things as they are." 
(/Bahm, 1958, p.13, *5) 
"Excessive devotion to chasing 
about and pursuing things 
agitates the mind with insane 
excitement. Greed for riches 
ensnares one's efforts to 
pursue his healthier motives." 
(/Bahm, 1958, p.19, *6) 
In other words, if one can transcend the overwhelming 
and greedy desires for lots of social and materialistic 
rewards into a minimal number of necessary needs, one 
would be able to achieve a peaceful and tranquil state 
of mind easily. 
III. Non-valuative Judgment 
While children cannot distinguish clearly right 
from wrong, Great Intelligent people do not classify 
things into right and wrong ones. In general, they 
accept and treat everything, every opinion and every 
habituation in their own rights or in their natural 
states as equally good and right. In other words, they 
interact with others and environment in a non-valuative 
way. Chuang Tzu elaborates, 
"If a man sleeps in a damp 
place, he gets lumbago and 
dies. But how about an 
eel? And living up in a 
tree is precarious and 
trying to the nerves. But 
how about monkeys? Of the 
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man, the eel, and the monkey, 
whose habitat is the right 
one, absolutely? Human 
beings feed on flesh, deer 
on grass, centipedes on 
little snakes, owls and 
crows on mice. Of these 
four, whose is the right 
taste, absolutely? ... 
In my opinion, the doctrines 
of humanity and justice and 
the paths of right and wrong 
are so confused that it is 
impossible to know their 
contentions." 
(/Lin, 1949, p.80-81, *7) 
The argument is that all kinds of rational values 
and judgments are problematic, sophisticated, biased, sub-
jective and confusing, and hence non-natural. The ultimate 
criterion governing our behaviour, whether it is moral or 
non-moral, is our unconscious emotion (see also Section 
2.5) and not the rational values. It is argued that the 
unconscious emotion is the least conditioned or affected 
by external environment and therefore is always in its 
most accord with Nature. That is to say, so long as the 
behaviour is natural or complies with Nature, it is totally 
acceptable and equally good or right. Following this 
argument, one may say that death is not worse than life; 
ugliness is not worse than beauty; loss is not worse than 
gain; bad luck is not worse than good luck; etc. Thus, 
"Let it be" and "Take it easy", one will be much more 
peaceful and tranquiller. 
IV. Simple Human Relationships. 
Tao Philosophy emphasizes on simple human relation-
ships and denies complex social interaction. The Taoistic 
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living should be simple, quiet and tranquil. This in 
some sense can easily be achieved in small intimate 
society. Lao Tzu writes, 
"The ideal state is a small 
intimate community where all 
the necessities of life are 
present in abundance. 
There everyone is satisfied 
to live and die without 
looking around for greener 
pastures. 
Even if they have cars or 
boats, they do not use them 
for travelling abroad. 
Even if they have police and 
fortifications, these are 
never put to use. 
Business transactions are 
simple enough to be calcula-
ted on one's fingers rather 
than requiring complicated 
bookkeeping. 
The people are satisfied 
with their food, 
Contented with their clothing, 
Comfortable in their dwellings, 
Even though neighboring 
communities are within sight, 
And the crowing of the neigh-
bor's cocks and barking of 
the neighbor's dogs are within 
hearing, 
They grow old and die without 
ever troubling themselves to 
go outside of their own 
communities." 
(/Bahm, 1958, p.68-69, *8) 
The Human relationships and social interaction in 
large and highly civilized societies are complicated and 
sophisticated. People are constrained by a complex sys-
tem of social norms to behave in some prescribed ways. 
They are not free to act as themselves. In contrary, they 
often have to act in the way what other people think what. 
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they should act. This very often damages one's naturalness, 
personal liberty and self-actualizing tendency. Lao Tzu 
suggests a method mentioned above to resolve this problem. 
However, it may be quite difficult to lead a taoistic 
life in a modern society which emphasizes on materialistic 
and social rewards. Some further research is necessary 
to interpret Tao philosophy in modern sense. 
V. Natural Characters 
As mentioned in III, one of the main themes in Tao 
Philosophy is naturalness and complete acceptance of every-
thing in its original and natural state. Thus, Taoistic 
characters are natural characters. Fung (1933) elaborates, 
'"Everything has its own Te, or virtue. Everything has its 
own proper nature. Everything is happy, if it is allowed 
to be in accordance with its own nature".(p.8) It is 
argued that sophisticated or unnatural characters which 
do not comply with Nature often give people painful suffer-
ing. Chuang Tzu said, 
"For duck's legs though 
short, cannot be lengthened 
without dismay to the duck, 
and a crane's legs, though 
long, cannot be shortened 
without misery to the 
crane. That which is long 
in nature must not be cut 
off, and that which is 
short in nature must not 
be lengthened. Thus will 
all sorrow be avoided." 
(/Lin, 1949, p.105, *9) 
114 
We breifly mention below three of the natural 
characters described in Tao Philosophy. 
(1) Child-hearted Character 
Nothing is more natural than those exhibited by 
a small child or nursing infant. Except not being in-
telligent, the heart of a child is true, natural and 
beautiful. Lao Tzu said, 
"He who is intelligent is 
like a little child." 
(/Bahm, 1958, p.51, *10) 
Similar description of this kind of child-hearted 
or natural character can also be found in Maslow (1970, 
p.157-159) or Section 2.1.2. 
(2) Softness 
According to Lao Tzu, softness and weakness imply 
living; hardness and toughness mean death. He said, 
"At birth, a man is soft 
and weak - yet capable 
of living the whole life 
ahead of him. 
At death, he is hard and 
tough - yet unable to 
live for even a minute 
longer. 
All things, whether plants 
or animals, while living, 
are soft and weak, 
But, when dead, are hard 
and tough. 
Thus hardness and toughness 
are allied with death, 
While softness and weakness 
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are interrelated with life". 
(/Bahm, 1958, p.65, *11) 
People at the Ultimate Stage of Development are 
those who tend to cause least disturbance or harm to 
others. To be strong, to win or to conquer is certainly 
one of the most harmful things one can do to others. In 
addition, the softer we are, the easier we would be able 
to get adapted in different environments and hence the 
easier we could comply with Nature. However, one may 
query that if we are soft and weak, is it likely that we 
would be easily conquered or destroyed by others, by 
environment or by Nature? The answer is negative, for the 
soft and weak in Lao Tzu's sense overcomes the strong. 
Lao Tzu argues, 
"Nothing is weaker than water; 
Yet, for attacking what is 
hard and tough, 
Nothing surpasses it, 
nothing equals it. 
The principle, that what is 
weak overcomes what is strong, 
And what is yielding conquers 
what is resistant, 
Is known to everyone. 
Yet few men utilize it 
profitably in practice." 
(/Bahm, 1958, p.66-67, *12) 
In other words, the soft and the weak in Lao Tzu's 
sense is the fittest for survival. Those who try to be 
strong, tough or aggressive are in contrary easily to be 
injured or destroyed. 
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(3) Tranquillity 
People with few desires tend to have a tranquil 
character. Tranquillity implies peace, harmony and least 
disturbance. Lao Tzu said, 
"Being without avarice through 
being tranquil, 
The world will be consolidated 
of its own accord." 
(/Ch'en, 1977, p.186, *13) 
Tranquillity means self-sufficiency and non-agitative; 
it does not mean inactive and .stagnant. According to 
Ch'en's (1977) interpretation, tranquillity means "waiting 
patiently for the course of natural development to bring 
the problem and the solution to light without initiating 
elaborate measures to deal with a non-existent difficulty". 
(p.29) That is to say, people with a tranquil character 
only act when everything is ready and prepared. 
VI. Complete Transcendence 
The ultimate stage of development is a stage of 
complete transcendence in which one entirely forgets one-
self, completely transcends oneself or fuses oneself with 
Nature to form one whole. At this stage, one becomes 
absolutely free - free to self-actualize oneself, free 
to do whatever one likes to do; free from illness, 
temptations, greedy desires, social pressures, despair 
of facing death, psychological dependance of others etc. 
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Chuang Tzu calls these people the perfect men, the divine 
man, the true Sages, the great supreme or simply the true 
men. Chuang Tzu elaborates the characteristics of these 
true men as follows: 
"The true men of old did not 
override the weak, did not 
attain their ends by brute 
strength, and did not gather 
around them counsellors. 
Thus, failing they had no 
cause for regret; succeeding, 
no cause for self-satisfaction:" 
(/Lin, 1949, p.96, *14) 
"The true men of old did 
not know what it was to love 
life or to hate death. 
They did not rejoice in 
birth, nor strive to put 
off dissolution. Unconcerned 
they came and unconcerned 
they went. That was all." 
(/Lin, 1949, p.96, *15) 
"Such men are free in mind 
and calm in demeanour, with 
high foreheads. Sometimes 
disconsolate like autum, 
and sometimes warm like 
spring, their joys and 
sorrows are in direct touch 
with the four seasons, in 
harmony with all creation, 
and none know the limit 
thereof." 
(/Lin, 1949, p.96, *16) 
"The true men of old appeared 
of towering stature and 
yet could not topple down. 
They behaved as though want-
ing in themselves, but 
without looking up to others 
Naturally independent of 
mind, they were not severe. 
Living in unconstrained 
freedom, yet they did not 
try to show off 	  
(/L,in, 1949, p.97, *17) 
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Chuang Tzu also said, 
"... thus it is said, "The 
perfect man ignores self; 
the divine man ignores 
achievement; the true sage 
ignores reputation." 
(/Lin, 1949, p.72, *18) 
It is concluded that in order to be absolutely free 
and to transcend oneself completely, one should have great 
intelligence, few desires, a non-valuative life philosophy 
and leads a simple and tranquil life. 
The introduction of Tao Philosophy as a basis of the 
Ultimate Stage of Human Development (Labelled as Stage 7) 
is primitive and limited in scope in the above brief 
discussion. The main objective here is to initiate an 
exploration of oriental thought in the study of moral 
development. 
	 It is hoped that future study on introducing 
Indian Philosophy, Buddhism and Western Philosophy as 
bases of Stage 7 will be carried out soon. 
It should be emphasized that though the above 
discussion of Tao Philosophy is believed to form a part of 
the universal structure of Stage 7, it does not, however, 
cover the all possible forms (structures) of Stage 7. It 
is likely that a more complete description of Stage 7 can 
only be constructed by exploring and integrating a number 
of major philosophies, Eastern and Western. 
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2.5. Moral Judgment and Decision: A Cybernetic Approach  
Pugh (1977) develops a value-driven decision model 
of the Human Decision System. His theory is rooted in 
Sociobiology, Cybernetics and Decision Science. 
According to Pugh, the function of a value-driven decision 
system is similar to that of a human brain. "It compares 
alternative courses of action and selects one that seems 
'best' in terms of a built-in system of values." (Pugh, 
1977, p.6; see also Appendix 2.5(A), No.1). 
The main purpose of this section is to sketch out 
the Moral Judgment and Decision System (MJDS) as a value-
driven decision system. The basic concepts come from 
Pugh (1977). 	 Since Pugh's classification of the built- 
in values is similar to Maslow's Hierarchy of Basic Needs, 
the structure of the built-in values in the following 
model is based on Maslow's Hierarchy (see Sectio 2.1) 
rather than Pugh's classification. For a review of 
Pugh's book (1977), see Marley (1978). 
In general, the input and output processes of the 
MJDS are described in terms of Boradbent's model (1958, 
1971). The Central Judgment and Decision Process is based 
on Pugh (1977) and Rest (in press). The model can be 
called the Cybernetic Approach of Moral Judgment and 
Decision. 
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2.5.1 Basic Concepts of a Value-Driven Decision System 
A basic assumption in Cybernetic is that "biological 
systems operate within the same laws of information theory 
and system design that apply to artificial systems". 
(Pugh, 1977, p.35) Artificial systems refer in general to 
any computerized decision systems. The designer of a 
machine is man and the design objective is to use the 
machine to carry out some specific tasks for us. Similarly, 
Pugh argues that the designer of biological decision sys-
tems is biological evolution and the evolutionary design 
objective is the survival of the species. 
There are two fundamental concepts in the Value-
Driven Decision Model: 
(1) Limited Capacity of Finite Decision Systems and  
Innate Human Values 
"All biological decision systems and all computerized 
decision systems are finite data-processing systems. They 
have limited capacity for data input, data storage, and 
data analysis." (Pugh, 1977, p.26) However, the external 
environment can be very complex and "may involve almost 
unlimited variability." (p.27) For a finite system of 
limited capacity to deal with an environment of infinite 
variability, it is unavoidable to introduce compromises in 
its design. Based on the evolutionary design objective 
(Survival of the Species), a set of quite complex and 
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variable innate human values is incorporated to biological 
decision systems as a design compromise. The innate 
human value structure "is not an ideal or perfect appro-
ximation to the evolutionary objective. It is simply 
the best compromise the evolutionary process has been 
able to produce" (p.31). These innate values can be regar-
ded as substitutes or "surrogates for the ultimate evolu- 
tionary objective".(p.34) 	 They are sometimes called 
Primary or 'Instinctive' Values. 
Some major features of Primary Values are: 
(a) The primary values are the biological decision system's 
"ultimate criteria for evaluating decisions" (Pugh, 
1977, p.7). They are the major determinants of human 
behaviour. 
(b) These values are "simply inherited decision criteria 
that were built into the human species during the pro-
cess of evolution".(p.29) They are part of the built-
in system hardware. 
(c) They include emotions, biological drives and valuative 
sensations, such as "tactile pleasure or pain, comfort 
or discomfort, joy or sorrow, and good or bad taste". 
(p.30) 
(d) They change with time and circumstances in accordance 
with some complex, built-in nonrational rules. For 
example, "the hunger sensation is an innate response 
to a deficiency in nourishment, pain is an innate 
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response to dangerous heat or physical pressure...." 
(p.31) 
In addition to primary values, human behaviour is 
also influenced by a set of secondary values, which are 
based on primary values. Some major features of Secondary 
Values are: 
(a) They are learned as a result of interaction with the 
environment. In other words, they are•"developed 
individually and culturally as an outgrowth of more 
basic innate human values:" (p.29). 
(b) They are developed as a practical aid to problem-
solving, they tend to simplify the decision-making 
process and hence "help the decision system to make 
decisions more efficiently or more reliably".(p.33) 
(c) The secondary values "can take the form of rules of 
thumb, wise proverbs, social conventions, moral or 
ethical principles, and even habit." (p.33) 
(d) They are usually developed as a result of rational 
thinking. 
Further details concerning the Primary and Secondary 
Values are given in Appendix 2.5(A), No.2. 
(2) The World Model  
The World Model is a conceptual representation of 
the external world in a biological decision system. The 
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innate values are incorporated as a natural part of the 
world model through the model-building and refinement 
process. "The 'models' may be as unsophisticated as a 
child's model of his mother, which he uses to predict 
her response, or as sophisticated as quantum mechanics 
or general relativity." (Pugh, 1977, p.104-105) In the 
judgment and decision process, the model is used to 
"identify possible courses of action and to predict the 
consequences of the possible action alternatives". (p.105) 
In general, the secondary values refer to some 
general moral principles or guidelines while the World 
Model is a conceptual representation for the environment. 
The World Model includes certain refined details of the 
environment and is based on the organism's primary and 
sometimes secondary values. 	 For example, when we inter- 
act with our parents, we use a conceptual model of them, 
rather than a set of secondary values regarding parents-
son/daughter interaction. That is, we know what they 
like and dislike, and that they love and care us. In 
other words, we can predict fairly accurately their reac- 
tion when we interact with them. 
	
On the other hand, 
when we interact with a stranger in a certain special 
situation, we always start with our secondary values as 
a guiding principle. It is obvious that the use of 
secondary values in decision-making requires more cyber-
netic resources than the use of the World Model unless 
some major model refinements are necessary, because in 
the former case, the system has to construct a model of 
the environment based on his/her secondary (and primary) 
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values, while in the latter case, the model has been 
constructed and is being stored in the Memory System. 
2.5.2. The Moral Judgment and Decision System (MJDS)  
(A) A Block Structure of the MJDS. 
Instantaneous Psychological State.(b) 
Figure 2.3. Moral Judgment & Descision System (MJDS): 
A Block Diagram 
The MJDS presented here is a hypothetical model 
based on current studies in Decision Science, and Pugh's 
Value-driven decision model. 	 It should be emphasized 
that the model is a heuristic one which has not strong 
empirical support and many of the refined details are 
not known. 
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There are two basic characteristics affecting the 
functions of the MJDS: 
(1) Built-in System Hardware 
The built-in system hardware is incorporated with a 
set of primary values as a result of biological evolution. 
The hardware is represented in Fig.23 by a net of black 
lines showing that the whole process leading to moral 
action is affected by the structure of this built-in sys-
tem hardware. In general, the system hardware of the 
MJDS refers to the inborn biological structure of the 
human brain and the nervous system. It determines the 
basic characteristics and functions of the MJDS. On the 
other hand, the proper and full function of the "built-in" 
or "genetically determined" system hardware is not com-
pletely inborn, it depends to a large extent on one's 
normal psychological development. (Pugh, 1977, p.103-104) 
In general, members of a species possess very similar or 
exactly the same structure of the built-in system hardware. 
(2) Instantaneous Physiological and Psychological State  
Physiological and psychological state (IP) refers to 
the state of basic needs and general condition of the 
organism. The classification of basic needs follows that 
of Maslow's Hierarchy of Basic Needs. (Maslow, 1970 (1954)). 
Instantaneous state is the state of the organism when the 
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input stimulus is being processed by the MJDS to give 
action. In other words, whether the organism is in 
healthy condition; in emoted state;or satisfied with food 
and water etc. during its functioning will affect its 
outcome. 
In the last section, the state of basic needs is 
related to the primary values described by Pugh (1977), 
therefore v is also dependent on the primary values. 
According to Pugh (1977, p.71-78) ,the primary values of 
an organism is time dependent, thus IP is also changing 
with time. In general, II) takes the form of a periodic 
function of time. For example, the need for food drops 
to a very low level after taking a meal and rises to a 
high level just before the time of next meal. 
(B) The Basic Functions of MJDS  
Broadbent (1958, 1971) attempts to analyse "human 
function in terms of the flow of information within 
the organism." (1971, p.7) He starts with the concept of 
information in telephone and radio engineering and formu-
lates a model based on "laboratory studies of simple 
functions such as the ability to detect a faint light 
occurring at unexpected times, or to remember a telephone 
number." (1971, p.3) Since his model is derived from 
empirical evidence, it lays a strong scientific foundation 
for further development. The input and output processes 
of our MJDS is based on Broadbent's model. 	 (For a brief 
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outline of Broadbent's Information Flow Model, see 
Appendix 2.5(B)). 
There are many models concerning the Central Judgment 
and Decision Process (See e.g., Kaplan and Schwartz (1975, 
1977), Hogarth (1980)), The basis of the present model 
comes from Rest (in press) and Pugh (1977). 
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Figure 2.4. The Basic Structure of MJDS 
The basic functions of the MJDS can be divided into 
three major parts: 
I. Input Process. 
Our senses act as the receptor of incoming data. 
Part of these data will be stored in a buffer or temporary 
store so that any excess incoming information not imme-
diately processed by the Central processor can be held for 
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a time not longer than a second. Because of the limited 
capacity of the system, it is necessary for it to focus 
its attention on some specific incoming information and 
to ignore all the others. 	 The selection of incoming 
information is done by the Selective filter based on some 
built-in rules. 
II. Central Judgment and Decision Process 
The Central Judgment and Decision Process (CJDP) is 
carried out by the Control System and Central Processor, 
which are incorporated with a Memory System. In Broadbent's 
Model, the Memory System is called the Store of Conditional 
probabilities of Past Events, while the Central Processor 
and Control System are represented by his "Limited Capacity 
Channel" and "System for Varying Output Until Some Input 
is Selected" (Broadbent, 1971, p.10). The functions of 
the Control System include: 
(i) "allocating the cybernetic resources of the system", 
(ii) assigning "tasks to be accomplished by other components", 
and 
(iii)controlling "the flow of information between compo- 
nents". 	 (Pugh, 1977, p.144) The Central Processor 
refers to the main parts of the Human Brain which processes 
the operation. Further details concerning the nature, and 
biological and mechanical functions of the Central Proces-
sor and Control System in human brain can be found in 
chapter 6 of Pugh (1977). 
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There are many theoretical models in Decision 
Science which describe the strategy in decision-making. 
We attempt to illustrate some aspects of the Central Judg-
ment and Decision Process by introducing a model proposed 
by Rest (in press) which concerns mainly the process of 
moral judgment and decision. 	 The details of the resear- 
ches cited in the following discussion will not be mentioned 
here. Many of them have been discussed in Chapters 1 and 
2. Further reviews of these researches can also be found 
in Rest (in press) and Staub (1978, 1979). 
The Central Judgment and Decision Process consists of: 
(1) Interpreting the Stimulus and Identifying the Problem 
The incoming information passing through the Selec-
tive filter are interpreted by the organism. The inter-
pretation may "include inferring the intentions, values, 
and needs of the people involved in the situation; the 
probable direction of their activities; and the effect of 
their activities on each other's welfare." (Rest, (in 
press) p.7). Researches on Bystander Reactions to 
Emergencies (Darley and Latane, 1968) and Empathy and 
Distress (Hoffman, 1975, 1976, 1979) are related to this 
process. A moral problem can only be raised if the actor 
realizes that "something he does would affect the welfare 
of someone else," (Rest, in press, p.7). 	 In this aspect, 
research on Social Cognition (See, e.g., Damon, 1978; 
Selman, 1976) is relevant. 
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(2) Formulating an Ideal Plan of Moral Action  
After the moral problem has been identified and 
structured, the next step is usually to formulate an ideal 
plan of action which satisfies one's moral ideals, or 
secondary values or World Model. Some researches in 
social psychology attempt to investigate how the social 
norms affect the formulation of a plan of moral action 
(See, e.g., Rest, in press, p.20-21). On the other hand, 
cognitive developmentalists are more interested in the 
study of the structures of moral judgment which act as a 
basis for an individual to formulate a plan of action. 
(3) Evaluating Alternatives and Making Decision  
Parallel to Step (2), the actor will identify and 
evaluate all possible alternatives. It is quite common 
that the first possible action an individual thinks of 
is not a moral one or an ideal one. 
	 The evaluation of 
alternativesnormally includes the assessment of the con-
sequences of each alternative action and the uncertainties 
involved in it. Very often, people choose not to act 
according to their ideal plan of moral action. It may 
be due to one or more of the following factors: one's 
primary values and instantaneous psychological state, the 
nature of the action, and one's secondary values. 
Relevant researches include: (a) Decision-making models 
(see e.g., reviews by Rapoport and Wallstan, 1972; Kaplan 
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and Schwartz, 1975, 1977; Hogarth, 1980) (b) The origin 
of Values: Sociobiological view (Wilson, 1975; Pugh, 1977; 
Cognitive Developmental view (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 
1969, 1971, 1976) and Socialization view (Durkheim, 1925). 
The last (i.e. the fourth) component of Rest's 
model: 'executing and implementing a moral plan' is incor-
porated as a part of the Output Process. 
III. Output Process  
According to Broadbent (1971, p.10), the output 
action is implemented by a set of effectors. It is obvious 
that the effect of the initial output action will be fed 
back into the organism in order to modify its further 
action. The reasons why people very often cannot imple-
ment a moral plan successfully is quite complicated; 
researches on ego strength, delay of gratification and 
self-regulation (See, e.g., Mischel and Mischel, 1976) 
are relevant. 
Apart from the emphasises on the formulation of an 
ideal plan of moral action, the main themes of Rest's 
model are similar to those of other decision-making models 
(See, e.g., Pugh, 1977, p.102-107: Hogarth, 1980, Chapter 
8). Obviously, the model is not a linear one. Rest 
(in press) writes: 
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"Although the four components 
have a logical order (inter-
pretation, then formulation 
of a moral course of action, 
then decision, then execution 
and implementation), the 
framework is not presented 
as a linear decision-making 
model, because there is ample 
evidence of interaction among 
the components...." (p.38) 
A detailed bibliography and more details of the 
above cybernetic model is given in Rest (i.n press) , Pugh 
(1977) and Broadbent (1971). 
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3. A Theoretical Model of Moral Development 
3.1. Introduction  
The model describes the fundamental nature of moral 
development and behaviour. It is postulated that moral 
development and behaviour depends on the following funda-
mental parameters: 
(1) Psychological Needs (N) 
The physiological and psychological needs (N) 
form an underlying fundamental factor which affects all 
human behaviour. It is hypothesized that the development 
of N forms a major component of moral development. In 
this aspect, the theoretical base is predominantly 
Humanistic Psychology. (See literature review in Section 
2.1) 
(2) Human Relationships (R) 
When two persons A and B interact with each other, 
the moral decision and action of A in any event depends 
largely on the relationship between A and B. 
The above simple idea will be elaborated in more 
refined details in a later section. This approach can 
be called "common-sense" approach or "naive" approach. 
(See literature review in Section 2.2) 
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(3) Structure of Moral Judgment (J) 
The development of moral judgment or reasoning is 
another fundamental factor of moral development. The 
cognitive developmental theory of morality established 
by Piaget and Kohlberg provides basic ideas for the 
theoretical model. 	 (See literature review in Section 2.3) 
The exposition of the theory is given mainly in 
mathematical terms. 
3.2. Psychological Needs: A Humanistic Approach. 
In this section, Maslow's Theory of Human Motivation 
(See Section 2.1) is extended to include the Needs for 
fusion with Nature (see Section 2.4.2,81)) It is postulated 
that Maslow's Hierarchy of Basic Needs and the Need for 
fusion with Nature form a single hierarchy as follows: 
N1 = Physiological Needs 
N2 = Safety Needs 
N3 = Belongingness and love needs 
N4 = Need for esteem from other people 
N5 = Non-transcending Self-actualization needs 
N6 = Transcending self-actualization needs 
N7 = Need for fusion with Nature 
A Hierarchy of Psychological Needs  
An important assumption in Maslow's theory can be 
put in this way: 
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If N1, N2 ...., N. 	 )Ni are "relatively well gratified", 
then N. 
	
emerges. 	 (3.2-1) 
Consider two examples: 
(i) If the physiological needs (N1) are relatively 
well gratified, then safety needs (N2) emerge. 
(Maslow, 1970, p.39). 
(ii)"If both the physiological (N1) the the safety 
(N2) needs are fairly well gratified, there will 
emerge the love and affection and belongingness 
needs (N_)...." 	 (p.43, the notations N1,  N 
and N, are ours) 
Consider a person of age = Tk years, the general 
state of psychological needs of the person is given by 
7 
N = 	 a N 1=1 ik (3.2-2a) 
where aik = psychological coefficient defining the 
degree of gratification or satis-
factionofN.by the person of age = 
Tk years. 
Without loss of generality, the range of ais are 
defined as: 
0 	 ik 	 < 1 for any k 
	 (3.2-2b) 
and 1 	 i 
where anc =OmeanscompletelydeficientofN.needs 
a
ik =1 means completely gratified of Ni  needs. 
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Itisassumedthat.k  is time-dependent, that is 
aik = aik(t) where the value of t is often small. It is 
of course always possible to express t in terms of the 
age variable Tk but since for some i, t may be very small 
- as small as 1 or 2 days or even a few hours, it is more 
convenient to refer t to a fixed frame of reference set 
by the observer. Consider, e.g., i = 1, in general, aik(t) 
becomes a large value when t = time just after a meal and 
a small value when t = time just before a proper meal. In 
this case, aik(t) may be said to be a certain periodic 
function of t. 
There are three types of gratification coefficients. 
(1) aik(t) = Instantaneous value of the coefficient of 
gratification of Ni  needs of a person of 
age Tk years at a time t in a frame of ref-
erence set by an observer. 
(2) a = ik 	 aik = Average value of aik(t) over a sufficiently 
large time to, which is equal to one period 
of time in caseai  . k  (t) is a periodic function. 
0 
(3) aik = 
(As an illustration, assume aik(t) is an integ- 
rable function for 0 	 t 	 to, then 
aik = aik =.10  aik(t)dt/t 
e • 
Threshold value of aik' It is the minimum 
average value above which Ni can be regarded 
as "relatively well gratified." 
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It is postulated that: 
(i) If aik 	 for n > i 	 1 
then a
n+1 k 	 0 	 (3.2.3) 
(ii)aik 
	
1 .a.+1 p, 	 for 6 > i 	 1 
(i.e., 
aik % a2k % a3k / 	 % a06k % a07k)  
(3.2.4) 
be 
(In order to consistent, the age variable Tk should 
be defined as the mean age over a sufficiently large 
time t, ) 
In addition, aik possesses two other basic charac-
teristics: 
(a) For the majority of people, as i increases beyond 
three,.k  decreases very rapidly to zero. ai 
(b) In general, the values of a°k are different for 
different individuals. The smaller the i is, the 
smaller the differences of the values of cik  are 
among different individuals. 
Equation (3.24) is consistent with Maslow's argument 
that "a more realistic description of the hierarchy would 
be in terms of decreasing percentages of satisfaction as 
we go up the hierarchy of prepotency" (Maslow, 1970, p.54). 
According to Maslow, the emergence of a new need is  not 
a sudden, saltatory phenomenon, but rather a gradual emer-
gence by slow degrees from nothingness." (p.54) In the 
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following figure, we try to sketch out the concept of 
emergence of a new need. The figure also serves to illus-
trate the development of N. 
Figure 3.1 A Develolomnetal Pattern of Psychological 
Needs(N) 
Magnitude of 
Perfect gratification 
Towards 
Self-actualization 
0 
Average grati-
fication coeffi-
cient of 	 04. 	 pes 
Notes: 
(1) The dotted line indicates a curve of Threshold 
values of 4r. 
(2) T1 < T2 < T3 4.T4 etc. 
The above figure is an illustration only. Each solid 
curve represents a possible and stable developmental pattern 
at age = Tk years. The dotted curve represents the thres- 
holdvaluesof. 
als.  
Mathematically, the general feature of the develop-
ment of N can be expressed as follows: 
7 
N = N(Tk) = 	
aik Ni 
	 (3.2-5a) 
With 0 
	 aik 	 1 for any k and 1 	 i 
and 
aik > U. , 1+1k 
139 
for 	 1 	 i < 6 	 (3.2-5b) 
For Tk+l > Tk' it is postulated that 
(i)  aik+1 >a  ik 
0 
all , a ln  >  
for 7 i 1 
for any age = Tn  
(iii) and in general 
either (a).ik 	 aik (for 7 	 > 2) %  
(3.2-5e) 
or 	 (b) there exists a number n such that 
kik > aik 	 for 	 1< i< n 
(3.2-5f) 
and 
0 
ai < i ak 	 k for 7 >i >n 
with a
nk>> an+lk
>> a
n+2
k,>> 
n+3 
	
.... etc. 
(In other words, for that part of the curve under-
neath the dotted curve, the aik s decrease rapidly as 
i increases). 
Though (3.2-5)(a to f) describes a general pattern 
of the development of N, in theory, for most people; 
it does not exclude other possible stable patterns. 
Three possible patterns not obeying (3.2-5) are 
illustrated as follows. 
Magnitude of 
c>!,' 
1  Coefficient of N 
(7 1 0‘/2 ce3 04. d5- C/6 c , 7 
Figure 3.2 Some Special Patterns of N 
3.3. Human Relationships : A Naive Approach 
Human interaction is defined as the total interaction 
between an actor and his/her environment, which may consist 
of other people, living things (e.g., a cat or a tree) 
and non-living things (e.g., a block of wood or a diamond 
ring). For simplicity and without loss of generality, 
the discussion is focussed on the interaction between an 
actor and other people, that is, social interaction. 
When an actor (A) interacts with another person (P) in a 
social situation, one major factor affecting A's course 
of action is the relationship between A and P. This rela-
tionship forms part of the world Model in the MJDS of 
the actor. 	 (See Section 2.5) In Pugh's (1977) terms, 
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the World Model of P conceptualized or constructed by A 
determines A's action. Since the World Model is dependent 
on the secondary and basically primary values, the Human 
Relationship also bears a direct relation with the second-
ary values (i.e. levels of moral judgment, Ji and coeffi-
cients ^Y.) and primary values (i.e. Psychological Needs, 
Ni and coefficients ais) Common Statements such as "Blood 
is thicker than water" (Kinship); "You-r scratch my back 
and I'll scratch yours" (Reciprocal altruism or Social 
Exchange); "Mind your own business" (Stranger-Stranger 
interaction) etc. are relevant. 
The relationship between an actor, A and a person, P 
is defined as the importance of P valued by A in an inter-
action. The assignment of the values of importance by A 
to different people is often emotional, rather than rational. 
It is argued that the assignment of these values of import-
ance has a genetic or biological origin (See Section 2.2). 
One method to express the values of importance or Human 
Relationship is to use the concept of altruism in psychology. 
Since there is no universally accepted definition of al-
truism in psychology, the common one provided by Bar-Tal 
(1976) based on the work of Berkowitz (1972) and Krebs 
(1970) is adopted here: "altruistic behaviour 1. Must be 
carried out voluntarily 2. Must aim to benefit another 
3. Must be carried out without expectation of a reward." 
(Bar-Tal, 1976, p.5) (See also Appendix 2.2(A)). 
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Based on consensus of opinions (See also Carter, 
1980), the following hierarchy of Human Relationship is 
therefore constructed: 
(R0 = Self) 
R1 = First kins; close relatives 
R = Best friends/intimates 
R3 = Neighbours, peer group, colleagues (e.g., club, 
political party, company or organization,school) 
R4 = People of your country 
R5  = People of other countries 
R6 = Someone you dislike or enemies 
R7 = Other living things (e.g. animals and plants) 
and non-living things. 
A Hierarchy of Human Relationships  
A few remarks about the above hierarchy are: 
(1) Based on the assumption that "Human life is more 
important than the life of any other things", the 
"other living things and non-living things" are 
grouped into R7, which is put at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. 
(2) The hierarchy is a general one, which exists in most 
rational people. 
(3) Each :Ri represents a domain of interaction for the 
actor. In general, the whole domain of interaction 
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7 
R. = R + R1 + 	 + 
of an actor = 	 1 	 0 	
R7 = RD 
(4) 	 The above division of the whole domain of interaction 
of an actor is arbitrary but the order of the 
hierarchy: Kins - friends - strangers - enemies - 
other living things - non-living things is invariant 
of the methods of division. It should be noted that 
the position of R0 = self in the hierarchy is not 
be 
defined at this stage. It will'discussed in further 
details in Section 3.3.5, 
(5)ForeachR.1, it is always. possible to subdivide it into 
a sub-hierarchy. For example: for R1, we may sub-
divide it into: 
R11 = parents; sons/daughters; husband/wife 
R12 = brothers/sisters 
R13 = first cousins. 
etc. 
However, the rationale underlying such sub-division 
is quite complex, and since the main interest is to estab-
lish the fundamental nature of Human Relationship, the 
refined sub-division of R.1s is left for possible future 
research. 
(6) 	 R1 
	 R2 	 R3 	 R4 	 R5 	 R6 	 R7 
Value of 
importance: Greatest < 	  increase < 
	
 Smallest 
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Mathematically, Human Relationship is expressed as: 
7 
R =4 1 1 R. 1  (3.3-1) 
Where 	 0 < Si  < 1 	 (for i = 1,2, ---, 6,7) 
$. = coefficient of Human Relationship between an actor (A) 
and a member ofR1  . (P) , 
As mentioned before, it is possible to define the 
values of importance of others given by an actor in terms 
oftheconceptofaltruism,therefore ig.is defined as the 
importance of a member of Ri (P) as valued by an actor (A) 
or the probability of carrying out altruistic act towards 
P by A. Hence 
‘3. = 1 implies that maximum altruism or minimum 
selfishness will be executed by A towards P. 
= 0 implies that minimum altruism or maximum 
selfishness will be executed by A towards P. 
In general 
or 
f3. 3 	 for 1 	 i 	 j 	 (3.3-2) 
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Degree of 
altruism 
Maximum 
Minimum 	 Coefficient of Human p7 Relationship 
Figure 3.3 Altruism and Human Relationship  
Theoretically speaking, (3.3-2) means that if P 
belongs to any Ri (i = 1,2,3, --- 7), and the same or 
equivalent social situations occur between the actor (A) 
and P, then the probability of carrying out an altruistic 
act by A t6wards P obeys 13i 	 for i < j. While the 
meaning of "the same and equivalent social situations" 
is theoretically acceptable, it may be difficult to define 
it in empirical studies, and individual researchers may 
have to construct specific operational definitions for 
their own purposes. 
Basically, the developmental pattern of Si is postu-
latedto.besimilartothatof di— The ultimate goal 
of development of R is to be altruistic to all others in 
the world; that is to develop universal love and friend.., 
ship. 
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Mathematically, the development of R can be expressed 
as follows: 
Consider a person of age = Tk, 
7 
R = R(Tk) 	 it  = 	 ISik 1 R. where f, ik = Coefficient of 
Human Relationships 
at age Tk. 
By (3.3-2), 
(3ik / > 1+1 k 
	 for 	 6 > i 	 1 
(This is same as: ik 	 k for 1 < i < j) j 
	
At age Tk+l > Tk, 
	
7 
R. R = R(Tk+1) = 	
a 	  1 ik+1  
and B 
	
- ik+1 % 5i+l k+1 for 	 6 > i 
Now, it is postulated that 
I3ik+1 	 hi aik=  
(3.3-3) 
with hi > 1 	 for i = 1,2,---7 
(or (Sik+, 
•
> ISik for 1 	 i 	 7) 
It should be noted that the derivation of (3.3-3) 
is similar to that of (3.2-7). 
Towards universal 
love & friendship 
Coefficient of R 
Magnitude of 
Figure 3.4. A Developmental Pattern of Human Relationship (R) 
Bxcluding R7, the ultimate goal of the development 
of Human Relationship: to be altruistic to all others is 
also consistent with the human ultimate evolutionary ob-
jective: survival of species because altruism, on the whole, 
favours group and species survival. (See Section 2.2). 
The theme underlying altruism towards members of R7 is 
philosophical, religious and idealistic. It will not be 
elaborated here. (See also Section 2.4.2) 
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3.4. Moral Judgment: A Cognitive Developmental Approach 
The structure of moral judgment is another major 
determinant of moral behaviour. Kohlberg's six-stage 
theory of moral development (See Section 2.3) and the 
Stage 7 described in Section 2.4 are combined to form a 
single theoretical hierarchy. 
J0  
J1 
J2 
= 
= 
= 
Stage 
Stage 
Stage 
0 
1 
2 
: 
: 
: 
Premoral Stage 
"Heteronomous Morality" 
"Individualism, Instrumental Purpose and 
Exchange" 
J3 = Stage 3 : 	 "Mutual 	 Interpersonal Expectations, Rela- 
tionships, 	 and Interpersonal 	 Conformity" 
J4 = Stage 4 : "Social System and Conscience" 
J
s 
= Stage 5 : "Social Contract or Utility and Individual 
Rights" 
J6 = Stage 6 : "Universal Ethical Principles" 
J7 = Stage 7 : Transhuman perspective 
A Hierarchy of Moral Judgment  
(For J1 to J6, see Kohlberg (1976, 1971, 1969) 
The stage of Moral Judgment of a person is given by: 
7 
J = i=0 Yi Ji 	 (3.4-1) 
Where 0 „< yi ,< 1 and yi = coefficient of moral 
judgment 
Magnitude of 
),Z 
0,5 
Ts  
70- 
Towards 
--7> universal 
justice 
Coefficient 
of J O 1 
	 t 
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As mentioned before, the stage of moral judgment 
of a person is seldom a pure and clear-cut one, therefore 
it is necessary to introduce a complex stage model in the 
following discussion (See also Section 2.3.1) 	 In general, 
the yi  expresses the percentage of the use of J. or the 
probability of usingJi by a person in his moral judgment 
or reasoning. 
The study of the development of J has been well estab-
lished by Piaget, Kohlberg, Rest and many others (See 
Section 2.3). The following figure is an illustration of 
the probabilistic model of J-development. (Not in proportion) 
Figure 3.5 A Developmental Pattern of Structure of Judgment  (J) 
1 SO 
Mathematically, the probablistic Model of 
J-development can be expressed as follows: 
Consider an actor of age = Tk 
7 
(Tk ) = 	 yikJi 
	 (3.4-2a) 
where yik = coefficient of Moral Judgment at age Tk. 
yik obeys the following two conditions: 
7 
(i)
-) 	 1.0 ilk 
	 1 	 (3.4-2b) 
(ii) yi 	 yi+.1 for 0 < i 	 m 
and yi 	 yi+l for i > m >, 7 
COndition (ii) implies: 
10 N 11 	 1m+1 
(3.4-2c) 
and 
im+1 % Ym+2 % 	 % 17 
That is, 
im+1 = Maximum of {Yo, yl, ---, 16, 171 
At age Tkl., > Tk 
7 
J = j(Tk+1)  = i=0 Yik+1 ji 
With 7 
1=0 Y 1+1 = 1 
(3.4-3a) 
(3.4-3b) 
and 
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< 	 < 
'Yik+1 < Yi+1 k+1 for 0 	 i 	 n  
> y
i 	
for i > n > 7 
Yik+1 	 +lk+1 
(3.4-3c) 
In general, n 	 m. 	 (3.4-4a) 
and it is postulated that (w;440,..i.  lvss 0-F cru2A1Z-Vi, eta4*4 74ke 
curivoir, 17t, 7-kw inb/ls--4- 	 414-/ ) 
yi k+, 	 di yik for ai < 1 	 (3.4-4b) 
	
and 0 	 i (m+1) 
(or yi k+, 	 yik for 0 < i 	 (m+1)) 
and 
Yi k+1 = bi Yik 	 forb->,1 
	 (.4-4c) 
and 	 i > (m+11 >7 
The values of ai  and b. (i=0 1,2,-71 may vary 
to a large extent among different individuals. 
	
More 
refined empirical studies are required in order to deve-
lop the theoretical relations underlying ais and bis. 
It has been found that the correlation between moral 
judgment and moral action is not very high (See Section 
2.3). Indeed, a person tends to reason about a moral 
issue or a dilemma situation at a much higher level when 
he/she is not directly involved in the particular situa-
tion. It is postulated that there are two levels of moral 
judgment in an individual: 
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J' = Optimal Level of moral judgment 
J = Ordinary Level of moral judgment 
J' refers to the maximum level of moral judgment achieved 
by a person of age (T). It is often used by the person 
to reason about hypothetical moral issues or social situa-
tions, particularly those third-personal and less emotional 
ones. The moral stages studied by most cognitive develop-
mentalists are obviously J's. On the other hand, J is 
used by a person to reason and make decisions for actions 
in real-life situations. The relation between J and J' is 
given by the following equations. 
Consider a person of age = Tk, 
7 
J = J(Tk) = 	 y ik  Ji 
with 
(i) yi 	 yi+, for 0 ,j i 	 m 
(ii) i i i yi+1 for i > m 	 7 
and 
7 
J' = J' (Tk) = 	 y ik Ji with 
(i) yik 	 Ci yik where Ci 	 1 and 0 	 i 	 (m+1) 
1 (or yik 	 yik for 0 < i < (m+1)) 
(ii) yik 	 di yikwhere di > 1 and i > (m+1) >,7 
(or yik 	 yik for i > (m+1) .7) 
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Further discussion on the differences between J 
and J' will be found in the next chapter. 
3.5. Fundamental Nature of Moral Development  
The basic postulates underlying the fundamental 
nature of Moral Development have been discussed in pre-
vious paragraphs. Thye are summarized as follows: 
Postulate 1 : Primary Postulates of Moral Development  
(A) The Development of Psychological Needs  
7 
If Nk = N(Tk) = i=1 a. (Tk ) Ni  
7 
aik Ni 
then (i) 0 < aik < 1 	 for any k 
and 1 	 i 7 
(ii) aik  > / a.1+1 k for 1 < i < 6 
	 (3.5-1c) 
(iii) For Tk+l > Tk, 
ai k+1 = ai aik with a. > 1 	 (3.5-1d) 
(or aik+ 1 % aik) 
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(B) The Development of Human Relationships  
7 
If Rk 
7 
	 R 	 R 
= R(Tk) = 	 $i(Tk) R. = i=1 "ik . 	 (3.5-2a) 
then 
(i) 0 	 $ik 	 1 for any k and 1 	 i 	 7(3.5-2b) 
(ii) $ik 	 $i+1 k for 1 	 i 	 6 	 (3.5-2c) 
(iii) For T,
K+ 
 > T 	 $.1 	 = b.1  $. 1 	 k' 	 k+1 	 1k (3.5-2d) 
with b. > 1 and 1 < i < 7 1 
(or $i k+1 	
13 1k )  
(C) The Development of Moral Judgment 
7 
If 7fk = J(Tk) = 	 1=0 lik ji 
	 (3.5-3a) 
then 
7 
l4) Yik = 1 	 (3.5-3b) 
(ii) There exists (at least) a number m such that 
Ilk 	 11+1 k for 0 < i < m 
	 (3.5-3c) 
and Ilk > Yi+1 k for i > m 	 7 
 
tolAbki" lbSs 	 ItniAALiy j ASS kbvLe *iv 
Cwlvto 
-r,„ 74, ;44-er stc.t a.* 	 ) 
yi 	 = 	
l 
	
C.1  y. 	 (or yi k+, 	 yik) k 	 for 
	
C. < 1 	 and 0 < i < (m+1) 
	 (3.5-3d) 
(iii) For Tk+l 
and 
'R 1 
R2 
• 
= 
• 
J7 
(D) Define 
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yi k+1 = di yik 
 (or Yi k+1 i Ilk) for  
d. > 1 
	 and i > (m+l) >.7  
--.' 
(3.5-3d) 
Mk = M(Tk) = The Stage of Moral Development 
(or in general Human Development) 
of a person of age, Tk. 
= Nk + Rk + Jk (3.5-4) 
For convenience, the matrix representation is used. 
{ jk} = (clik a2k (13k- - -  c47k) 
{3jk} = "lk 32k 33k 	 370 
{Yjk} = (YOk Ylk 12k 	 17k)  
Let 
r- 
▪ 
 = n = 
• 
N7 / 	 k R7 
Equations (3.5-la), (3.5-2a) and (3.5-3a) can be written 
as: 
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= {ajk} n  
Rk = {8jk r 
Jk = 
	 j 
Mlk = rik 
3 
-IT11
2k = Rk 	 =-. 	 Mk 	 i=1 	 ik 
M3k = 1 
A 
M1 = n 
A 
M
2 = 
M3 = 
and mlik 
 = 
m2jk 
m3jk 
= 
Let 
and 
r 
ajk  
I3jk 
'Yjk 
(3.5-Sa) 
(3.5-5b) 
(3.5-5c) 
(3.5-6) 
(3.5-7) 
(3.5-8) 
Combining (3.5-4) and (3.5-5a, b & c); we get 
Mk = {ajk} 
 nj/ 	 r 	 {yjk} j 
A 
	
= {ajk } M1 	 " ld i 	 M 2 	 {Yjk} r'11.3 
{m1jk 
	
} M1 	 {m2jk}  m2 + 1m3jkl m3 
by(3.5-7) 
by(3.5-8) 
• J o \ 
 
7 
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.._ 	
3 
E 	 A Mk =M. i=-1 Imijk -1 1 
N1  
• 
A 
Since M1 = n = 
N 7  
(3.5-9) 
= N. for 1 < j < 7 
Similarly M2 = r = 
• 
R7 
With 
M23 . = R. 	 for 1 3 
j 	 7 
A 
M3  = j = 
with 
= J. for 0< j< 7 M3i  
For simplicity and without loss of generality, J0 is 
absorbed in J1. 
 
and 
158 
3j  = J. for 1 	 j 	 7 3 
J 
M3  
J7 
Thus, 
3 
Mk = 	 {Mi } ‘4.jk 
 
 
	
3 	 7 
	
1 
Z 	 E 
j=1 mijk Mij (3.5-10) 
Though Equation (3.5-10) is mathemetically elegant, 
it may be less obvious for "non-mathematicians", therefore 
Eq. (3.5-1), (3.5-2) and (3.5-3) will used in the follow-
ing discussion. 
Since Nk, Rk and Jk are all age-dependent and hence 
time-dependent, we may write: 
Nk = f(T) ; Tk.  = g(T) ; Jk = h(T) 
. . 	 Mk  = M(Tk) = f(T) + g(T) + h(T) 	 (3.5-10) 
According to (3.5-11), N,R,J are developing in parallel. 
In order to study the interaction between J and 
R,N, we define: 
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N(Jk) = N 	 )3 	 = The Stage Pattern of N of a 
person in terms of his/her 
stage of moral 	 judgment, 
	 Jk 
Similarly, R(Jk) = R{j(Tk)3 
Also write: 
7 
N(Jk) = ai  (Jk) 	 Ni  (3.5-12a) 
7 
R(Jk) = i (Jk) 	 R. (3.5-12b) 
Postulate 2: Secondary Postulates of Moral Development  
(A) The Development of Psychological Needs in terms of  
Moral Judgment Development  
(i) 	 0 	 ai (Jk) 	 1 for any k 
and 1 	 i 	 7 	 (3.5-13a) 
ii) 	 For a fixed Jk' 
ai (Jk) > ai+, (Jk) for 1 < i < 6 	 (3.5-13b) 
(iii) 	 For a fixed i, ai (Jk) 	 ai (J10.1) with 
Jk = J(Tk) 
and Jk+, = J(Tk+l) ; k+l >Tk 
(B) The Development of Human Relationship in terms  
of Moral Judgment Development  
(I) 	 0 < ii (Jk) 	 1 for any k 
and 1 	 i 	 7 	 (3.5-14a) 
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(ii) For a fixed Jk, 
ei(Jk) > s i+l (Jk) for 1 < i < 6 	 (3.5-14b) 
(iii) For a fixed 	 and 1 	 i 	 7, 
3i(Jk) 	 f3i(Jk4.1) with Tk+l > Tk 	 (3.5-14c) 
Magnitude of 
cp 
 
    
   
- Coefficient of N & R 
    
oz 	 4 4 Di.g otT 
Fk, Pa 4 135 /34 /g7 
Figure 3.6 The Interaction of N, R and J 
In addition, it is always possible to establish 
similar relations for 13i(Nk) 
yi(Nk) 
and 
.ai(Rk) 
yi(Rk)] 
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From Equation (3.5-14c), a person exhibits more 
altruism in similar social situations as his/her J k 
increases. In other words, with a higher stage of 
moral judgment, one would show more altruism and higher 
degree of self-sacrifice to others. Thus, one would 
rate others more important than before. In this way, 
the position of RD = self in the Hierarchy of Human 
Relationships (R) tends to shift slowly from the top 
(maximum value of importance) downward. 
Let R
o 
(Jk) = position of self in the R-Hierarchy when 
the moral judgment stage of the person is 
J k. 
Jk - J(Tk) ; Tk+l > Tk 	 Jk+, " >" Jk in the sense 
stage 
that the dominant of Jk+1 is in 
general higher than or equal to 
that of Jk. 
R0  (J0  ) R0  (J1  ) R0/  (J20, ) R (J3  ) R (J4  ) 
	
. 	 ..' 
•ii 	 4/ i/ 	 /,/ 	  
R1 	 R2 	 R3 	 R4 	 R_b 	 R6 	 R_ / 
In order to elaborate the meaning of Ro(Jk), let us 
consider a person P with Ro(Jk) = Ri and without loss 
of generality, 
	 take i = 3, i.e., Ro(Jk) = R3. This 
ffieansthatthepersoriPandallmembersofR.,1 < i 
	 3 
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form a whole group or body. In general, P would treat all 
others in this group (Ri, 1 	 i 	 3) as equally important 
as or even more important than himself/herself, particular-
ly in emergency or dilemma situations. 
3.6 The Evolution of Human Morality  
According to Pugh (1977), the Primary Values, which 
are related to N1, N2 and part of N3; • R0  and R1, were 
built into our system hardware (structure of brain and 
nervous system) by evolutionary process. 	 (See Section 
2.5) It is our basic assumption that the direction of 
evolution is to produce humankind with built-in system 
hardware which are incorporated with large values (tending 
to say, 0.7, 0.8 or even one) of 	 and 13,i for 1 	 i < 7. 
Let 	 Gk = kth Generation of Evolution 
(Gk  is earlier than Gk+1) 
Gk  {a?} 
	
= a set of built-in values ao
' 
1 K i 
	 7 
in the kth Generation of Humankind. 
Gk(4) 	 = the built-in value, a° in the kth 
Generation of Humankind. 
Similarly, G08°} and Gk(3°) are defined. 
It is postulated that 
(i) 	 Gk(a7) for 1 < i < 6 
Gk(8i) 	 Gk(8i,i) 
fo 
04° 
P3 Ps- 
universal 
love 
Coeff. 
	 of N 
te° &R 7 
137 
10 
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ii) Gk(4.) GI(.4.1(a(1) 
for 1 	 i 	 7 
Gk(f3i) < GIc.4.1(3i) 
The following graph illustrates the above inequali- 
ties. 
Magnitude of 
(P;) 
Towards self-actualization, 
freedom and 
Figure 3.7. An Evolutionary Pattern of Human Morality  
The direction of human evolution is towards self-
actualization, freedom and universal love. 
3.7 General Remarks 
The whole chapter merely gives a primitive sketch 
of the fundamental nature of moral development. Most 
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of the refined details have yet to be discovered and 
elaborated. The behavioural aspects of moral development 
were not discussed explicitly in terms of the fundamen- 
tal parameters N, R and J. 
Generally speaking, the main objectives of our 
theoretical model are: (1) To study the development of 
human morality in an elegant scientific manner. (2) To 
incorporate some of the major psychological approaches 
in the model (3) To investigate the ultimate goal of human 
development. The following paragraphs attempt to elabo-
rate these objectives in further details. 
(1) Scientific Study of Moral Development 
The major tasks include: (1) To introduce a scheme 
of mathematical symbols and terminologies into the study 
of Moral Development. This will provide a basic frame-
work for further extension and elaboration. (ii) To estab-
lish a set 4- basic postulates (iii) To carry out deduc-
tions in a logically consistent manner. In this way, 
most of the deductions and equations are in the form of 
inequalities and summations at this stage. 	 However, this 
rule does not prevent the use of graphical figures and 
sophisticated mathematical expressions as illustrations  
of the arguments. (iv) To incorporate findings in Natural 
Science (e.g., Biology and Sociobiology) into the model. 
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(2) Incorporation of  Current Psychological Approaches 
As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, different 
current approaches are employed in the deduction of our 
model. Two major ones are: (i) Humanistic Psychology 
for the discussion of the development of Psychological 
Needs, and (ii) Cognitive Developmental Theory of Morality 
for the discussion of the development of moral judgment. 
In addition, Evolutionary Theory and Sociobiology form 
a base for the discussion of the concepts of Human 
Relationships and Evolutionary Development of morality. 
(3) Ultimate Goal of Development  
it has been emphasized that the ultimate goal of 
individual development is towards self-actualization, 
freedom, universal love, and universal justice. The 
fittest person for survival is the person with most free-
freedom - freedom to self-actualize, to be oneself, to 
satisfy all basic needs, to love and be loved etc. In 
short, the fittest is the freest. 
	 Similarly, the ulti- 
mate goal of human evolution is towards freedom and 
universal love. The fittest group for survival is the 
group with all or most people enjoying freedom, showing 
universal love and practising universal justice. 
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4. Fundamental Nature of Moral Development: An Objective 
Measure 
4.1. The Construction of a New Test of Moral Development. 
In order to test some of the essential hypotheses of 
the theory established in Chapter 3, an objective measure 
called the Moral Development Test (MDT) was constructed. 
The MDT consists of a number of hypothetical dilemma 
situations and two different forms of the MDT were prepared, 
with an extension of Form A (called Form A+) for adults 
(see Appendix 5(A)). 
Form A Form B 
1. A Lost 	 Bag 1. The Young Robber 
2. The Sinking Boat 2.  Freedom of Speech 
3.  A Doctor's Dilemma 3. Car Accident 
4. Car Accident 4. Bank Robbery 
5. The Criminal 5. Civil War 
TABLE 4.1. Two Different Forms of the MDT  
Notes on the different forms of the MDT: 
(1) The item "Car Accident" appears in both FormsA and 
B. 
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(2) The item "Civil War" has two versions. The one used 
in Form B is a shorter version. The longer version 
used in Form A+ includes 7 item responses instead of 6 
in Part I and 15 statements instead of 9 in Part II. 
(For details, see Appendix 5(A)). The longer version 
of the item "Civil War" is combined with the 5 items 
in Form A to form the MDT Form A+. 
The MDT Form A
+ 
 is intended for adult subjects 
who are likely to be able to cope with the more diffi-
cult situation described in the item "Civil War" (long 
version). Another reason for asking the adult subjects 
to answer one more item than the adolescents is that 
more information can be obtained from the adult group. 
(3) In common with other objective measures, the MDT can 
be scored and analysed by computer. 
4.2. General Features of the Moral Development Test (MDT)  
1. Hypothetical Dilemma Situations  
Each MDT item describes a hypothetical dilemma 
situation and the subject is asked to imagine himself/ 
herself in the situation. Most of these hypothetical 
situations are extreme and in general rarely occur in 
the daily-life of most people. However, all MDT situa-
tions were written based on the principle that such 
situations are definitely possible in real-life. 
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The use of hypothetical dilemma situations is a 
common technique in moral research (e.g. Kohlberg's 
Moral Dilemma Instrument; Rest's DIT and many others; 
See Section 2.3). On the other hand, it generates an im-
portant research issue, namely, is it meaningful to use 
hypothetical situations in moral research? Two relevant 
points can be made: 
(i) Two similar arguments criticizing the use of hypothe-
tical dilemmas are as follows: 
(a) It is often argued that since the test is based on 
hypothetical situations, it is little to do with moral 
behaviour in reality. 
.(b) A number of subjects told the researcher that 
what they answered on the questionnaire might not 
reflect exactly what they would act if they situa-
tion did really happen in their lives in the future 
because in such real-life situations, they would be 
much more emotional and might be completely irrational. 
In addition, real-life situations are more complicated 
than the hypothetical situations in the test. 
Both arguments are quite sound but the first one 
denies, in principle, the functions of all psycholo-
gical tests. It is true that hypothetical situations 
are different from real situations; controlled experi-
mental situations are different from natural ones. 
However, they are not unrelated; the stronger the 
relations between them, the better the test or expe-
riment is. The major objective of empirical data of 
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all sorts is not only to provide the very limited 
(but extremely important) support for the researcher's 
hypothesis, but to give some insights for inducing 
general laws or principles and to establish new 
theories. 
Thus the meaningfulness of using hypothetical 
dilemma situations in moral research depends on (a) 
whether there is a strong relation between the subject's 
responses to the test and their actual moral action and/ 
or (b) whether the empirical data collected by such 
hypothetical dilemmas help the researcher to induce 
and establish general laws of moral behaviour, which 
can then be tested by some other empirical methods. 
It should be noted that answering a questionn-
aire is also a real-life action and in so doing goes 
through the full process of the Moral Judgement and 
Decision System (See Section 2.5). A good hypotheti-
cal dilemma situation should catch a subject's 
attention, disturbs him/her emotionally and generate 
responses not very much different from those involved 
in similar real-life situations. 
(ii)The use of hypothetical dilemma situations is an eco-
nomic and practical way for the exploration of the 
whole pattern of moral development. It is so because 
(a) the data collection procedure does not require 
complicated or sophisticated research facilities. 
Hence, it is less expensive than many other methods 
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such as experimental or observation methods. 
(h) This form of data collection procedure in general 
does not cause the subjects too much trouble. 
2. Test Format. 
The test format of the MDT is based on Rest's (1979a) 
Defining Issues Test (DIT). 
The following paragraphs should be read in parallel 
with the sample copies of the MDT in Appendix 5(A). 
Each MDT item describes a hypothetical dilemma 
situation and is followed by sets of questions in two 
parts. Part I consists of a set of persons or a set of 
specified conditions denoted by X1, X2, X3 ... etc. 
Subjects are asked to rate each Xi on a 7-point scale 
(From "Definitely YES" to "Definitely NO") and to select 
thetopthreechoicesfromtheX.sand put them in order. 
Part II is similar to the DIT; it consists of a set of 9 
statements with the exception of the item "Civil War" 
(long version) which consists of 15 statements. Subjects 
are asked to rate on a 5-point scale (From "Very Great 
Importance" to "No Importance") how important each of the 
statements would be in deciding their answers in Part I. 
They are also asked to put their top three statements in 
order of importance. 
Further explanation of the details and rationale of 
this kind of Test Format is reviewed in Section 2.3.'. 
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3. Judgement and Decision. 
The Part I questions of the MDT tend to explore the 
emotional aspect of moral development by asking the sub-
jects to make decisions under certain specified conditions. 
Subjects are instructed to give the first answers that 
come into their mind. On the bther hand, the Part II 
questions tend to explore the rational- aspect of moral 
development, namely, the general structures of moral 
judgement. Subjects are asked to answer Part I questions 
before doing the Part II ones; Thus, subjects are asked 
to make decisions first and then to judge or rationalize 
what they have decided. However, as mentioned in Section 
2.5, most decision theories assert that people judge the 
situation before they decide on how to act. Is there a 
contradition between our test design and general decision 
theories? 
The answer is no. First of all, the MDT is designed 
primarily for investigating the general structures under-
lying both the rational and emotional aspects of moral 
development; it is not used to trace the actual process 
of the Moral Judgement and Decision System (MJDS). In 
other words, the present MDT design follows a research 
strategy which aims at the study of the Ordinary Level 
of Judgment and Emotional aspect of moral development. 
It starts with asking subjects to give their decisions 
first, which are supposed to be emotional and are sensitive 
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to external stimulus (i.e. easily changed or affected by 
external stimulus) before asking them to judge rationally 
the hypotehtical situations and their decisions. Thus, 
the emotional responses given in Part I are mainly direct 
projective ones ("gut" feeling type) and subjects are 
presented with minimal interaction with testing materials 
which may disturb or affect their own decisions. However, 
this does not mean that when subjects answer the Part I 
questions, they do not think and judge. Indeed, they go 
through the whole process of MJDS to arrive at a decision 
but the time used is usually short - a few seconds to a 
few minutes. After answering Part I questions, subjects 
are asked to judge or think rationally their decisions and 
answer Part II questions. This would of course mean that 
subjects' judgment in Part II may be greatly affected by 
their Part I responses. Such a design, it is hypothesized, 
will generate responses which are more closely related to 
actual moral action than any other current test designs in 
moral researches. In addition, it is found that the pre-
sent MDT design is a natural one, which most of the subjects 
find it - easy to follow and answer, except those who are at 
a cognitive level below that required for understanding the 
verbal meaning of the questionnaire. 
Now, an important p:-blem arises: To what extent the 
order of the Part I 
	 (emotional decision) and Part II 
(rational judgment) questions affects the subjects' responses? 
Most probably, changing the present order of Parts I 
and II will lead to slightly different response patterns 
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among similar samples of subjects. It is assumed that 
subjects answering Part II first tend to judge at a level 
which is a little bit higher than those answering Part 
II after Part I. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
using the present MDT with a change of the order of Parts 
I and II questions will generate responses which give 
the subjects' Optimal Level of Judgment because (i) MDT 
is designed so that there is an extensive and deep inter-
action between Parts I and II questions (ii) the design is 
a first-personal one and it allows in general subjects 
a high degree of free imagination and projection in giving 
their responses. For the study of the Optimal Level Of 
Judgment, Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument and Rest's 
Defining Issues Test are probably the best test instruments. 
In short, the effect of the order of, and the inter-
action between Parts I and II questions on the subjects' 
responses is one of the crucial topics in the future 
research of MDT. 
4. First Person View. 
Let FPV = a subject's moral judgment about a set of 
hypothetical dilemmas in First-Person View 
TPV = a subject's moral judgment about a set of 
hypothetical dilemmas in Third-Person View. 
Ma (1980) argues that there are differences between 
FPV and TPV. TPV is supposed to be "rational, objective 
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and less personal and affective" (p. 57-58). On the other 
hand, FPV is said to be "more concerned with the affective 
aspect of a person's morality and hence will predict 
better the moral action of the person" (p.58). 
In general, FPV is suitable for investigating the 
Ordinary Level of Moral Judgment while TPV is good for 
the Optimal Level. Hence, MDT is designed in First-Person 
View. 
5. Degree of Imagination  
In order to test effectively the emotional aspect of 
are 
moral development of a subject, the MDT situations cons-
tructed in a way so as to provide the subjects the highest 
degree of freedom in projecting and imagining themselves 
in the situations. 
The degree of imagination of a MDT item is defined 
as the degree of easiness the subjects can imagine them-
selves in the hypothetical situations or project them-
selves onto the hypothetical characters concerned in the 
situationsand-PartIchoices(i—e.X-s). 
Let f1 = degree of imagination of the hypothetical 
situation (described by paragraphs just 
before the Part I questions) 
f2 = degree of imagination of the choices of 
Part I 
f = f1 + f2* 
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(i) f1 is higher (denoted by f1 = *) if the personal 
details (e.g. sex, age, occupation, educational back-
ground etc) of the main character concerned in the 
hypothetical situation are not explicitly or impli-
citly described. Otherwise, fl is low and is denoted 
by f1 = O. 
(ii)f2 is high (denoted by f2 = *) if the Xis in Part I.  
are concerned only with general personal details (e.g. 
sex, age, occupation, relationships with the subject 
etc.) and do not involve any specific situational 
details like X. is near death from a rare disease or 1 
X. wants to buy a luxurious car. Otherwise f2 is low 
and is denoted by f2 = O. 
f1 	 , f2 f=f1 	 + 	 f2 
A Lost Bag * 0 * 
The Sinking Boat * * ** 
A Doctor's Dilemma 0 0 0 
Car Accident * *(1) ** 
The Criminal * 0(2)  * 
The Young Robber * * ** 
Freedom of Speech 0 0 0 
Bank Robbery * 0 * 
Civil War 0 0 0 
TABLE 4,2: Degree of  Imagination of the MDT items 
176 
Notes: (1) In "Car Accident'', 	 "X, = a medical 
doctor who is on emergency case" is quite 
situationally specific, therefore f2 of this 
item should in fact be a little bit smaller 
than "," . 
(2) It should be noted that the Xis of "The Criminal" 
are specified by five different sets of siuta-
tional details (Situations 1 to 5). Similarly, 
the Xis of "Bank Robbery" are specified by two 
situations. Therefore, the f2 of both items 
are low. 
6. Comparing MDT with Kohlberg's MJI and Rest's DIT. 
The following table summarizes the general features 
of MDT, Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument (MJI) and 
Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT). 
MDT MJI DIT 
1. Hypothetical Dilemma V V V 
Situations. 
2. Test Format Closed Open Closed 
3. First-Person View 	 (FPV) 
or Third-Person View 
TPV) 	 , FPV TPV TPV 
4. Degree of Imagination High Low Low 
5. Systematic Study of 
(a) Structures of (Ordinary (Optimal(Optifilal 
Moral Judgment 
(b) Human Relationships 
and Psychological 
needs 
Level) 
V 
Level) 
X 
Level) 
X 
Notes: "V" = Yes 	 "X" = No 
TABLE 4.3 Comparing MDT with MJI and DIT. 
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4.3. The Use of MDT as a Test of the Theory 
MDT is designed as an instrument for testing the 
theory established in Chapter 3. The MDT items are 
constructed in a way such that the Part I questions test 
the levels of N (Psychological Needs) and R (Human 
Relationships) and Part II statements generate responses 
which give the Ordinary level of J (Judgment) of the 
subject. The methodology and research problems underlying 
Parts I and II are different and therefore they will be 
described separately. 
In general, the paragraphs describing the hypotheti-
cal dilemma situation are referred to as the "hypothetical 
situation" or simply "the Situation" ; the X1, X2, X3 etc. 
inPartItohe"Itemresponses"or"X.s" or "Part I Choices" 
or "Part I questions". The statements in Part II are 
called "Part II statements" or "Part II questions". 
4.3.1. Part I Questions  
1. Central Theme Analysis of N. 
It is extremely difficult, if not entirely impossible, 
to construct situations and item responses (Xis) with 
a theme representing purely and uniquely a particular Ni  
only. Indeed, such situations may not exist in psycholo-
gical reality. 
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Moreover, it is true in principle that any particular 
situation of X. encounters all the Nis (i.e. N1 to N7) to 
some extent with some Nis emphasized more strongly than the 
others. 	 On the other hand, it is difficult and pro- 
bably impossible at this stage to account theoretically 
a hypothetical situation of a Xi in terms of all Nis 
(N1 to N7). Therefore, we would hypothesize a central 
themeNi foreachsituationandeachX—Or put it in 
other way, when the items were constructed, the writer 
attempted to express the central themes of each situation 
and X. as clearly and naturally as possible. However, it 
should be emphasized that these central themes are sub-
jectively set or assigned by the writer and may therefore 
be debatable in some cases. Nevertheless, subject's 
ratings will be interpreted in terms of these central 
themes. 
2. Relativistic Value. 
Let us consider a particular MDT item with the 
central theme of the situation denoted by Nk. In general, 
eachPartIquestionX.also has a (central) theme, say, 
N.. 	 The subject is usually asked to make a choice between 
Ni  and Nk and shows his/her extent of positiveness or 
negativeness for Ni with respect to Nk. 
In the construction of the theoretical hierarchies 
of N and R, the frame of reference or the baseline is 
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implicitly and obviously set on N1 and R
o 
respectively. 
Thus, the levels of NP and RP' (where P = 2, 3, --- 6, 7, 
and P' = 1, 2, 3, --- 6, 7) are clearly defined with res-
pect to N1 and Ro respectively. On the other hand, in the 
MDT items, the subjects are asked to make choices between, 
say Ni and Nk (or Ri and Rk), where Nk (or Rk) is not 
necessary N1 (or R0). Thus, their ratings are concerned 
with Ni (Ri) with respect to Nk (Rk) rather than Ni (Ri) 
with respect to N1 (Ro) 
Let 1. 	 = The evaluation of the importance of N. N  
with respect to Nk 
Ni(1)  = The evaluation of the importance of 
Ni with respect to N1  
The Ni used in Chapter 3 is the Ni(1)  defined above. 
It is obvious that 
Ni(k) # Ni (1) 	 for k 	 1. 
(Similarly for R, Ri(k) 	 Ri (0) 	 for k # o) 
Theoretically speaking, the base or reference level 
Nk of Ni(k) does not have any effect on the original order 
of the theoretical hierarchy. The base level is just like 
the zero-point ina temperature scale. Different tempera-
ture scales have different zero-points. For example, 
the freezing point of water in Centigrade Scale is 0°C but 
in Fahrenheit Scale is 32°F. 	 Nevertheless, the physical 
law underlying the concept of temperature is not affected 
at all by such differences in the temperature scale. 
180 
However, the comparisons of empirical data of N 
(or R) with reference to different base levels are diffi-
cult and problematic because (i) the subjective assignment 
ofthecentralthemestoasituationorX.may not be 
accurate and may oversimplify the situation. For example, 
a hypothetical situation or Xi may have two or more equally 
important central themes (ii) The psychological distances 
between Nis (R.$) have not been accurately worked out. 
Thus, it must be very careful to add or operate data 
across situations or X-s with different central themes. 
3. The Interaction between N and R. 
In reality, the fundamental parameters N, R and J 
are not completely orthogonal, that is, they are not 
strictly or mutually independent of each other. (See 
Section 3.5). One difficulty in the empirical study of 
N and R is that it is difficult to construct MDT items 
with N being kept constant for different Ris. For example, 
in the item "The Sinking Boat", the central theme of 
the hypothetical situation is obviously self-survival (N1) 
and all the item responses X. are in terms of persons. 
It seems that N is being kept constant at N3 for all 
Xis. 
	 However, the case is not so simple because as R 
varies, N usually varies too. Consider X4 = your brother 
or sister and X5  = someone you don't like or an enemy. 
In the X4 case, the theme is N3 (Belongingness and love 
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needs) while in X5, the theme may be said to be N5 or N6  
for subjects of high J. 
In short, subjects' ratings in Part I reflect both 
the parameters N and R in one setting. In addition, 
our theoretical categorization of the hierarchies of N and 
R often simplifies reality considerably, empirical data 
may throw some light on the refined subdivision of 
these hierarchies. 
4. The Central Themes of MDT Items. 
The following notations and notes are relevant to 
the discussion in this section: 
(i) R4 is tentatively subdivided into three sub-groups: 
R41 = The weakest, the youngest and the oldest strangers 
R42 = People of high social status or reputation, 
e.g. famous scientists. 
R43 = All other types of strangers. 
i)We also define, 
N3(R41) = a need for helping and showing affection or 
sympathy to people in R41. 
Thus 
ct3(841)  is particularly good for the study of 
empathy and altruism. 
(iii) For each MDT item, a theoretical hierarchy of the 
ratings of Xis is postulated. 
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Assuming Definitely YES = 1 to Definitely NO = 7, 
X.<X.meansthattheratingofX.1  is predicted 1 	 3  
to be smaller than that of X.. 
3 
{Xi, Xj, Xk} means that the ratings of Xi, Xj or Xk 
are predicted to be equal. 
(iv)The assignments of central themes (deonted by T) to 
the situations and X.s of MDT items are based on the 1 
theory established and empirical data collected in the 
Pilot Study. These assignments are subjective and 
provisional; they are subjected to future revision 
when more researches have been done. 
(v) In the following discussion, we would constantly refer 
to subjects of two different types: (1) Subjects of 
high N (i.e. ais are generally high even for i>4) 
(2) subjects of low N (i.e. ais are high only for 
i<3 and low for i>4). Subjects of high N are potential 
self-actualizing person. 
(1) A Lost Bag. 
(a) The Situation : T = N4 
The central theme is whether the social laws that 
"one must not steal" should be upheld or not. Thus it 
concerns with social recognition or esteem from others. 
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(b) Part I (only some of the Xis are elaborated) 
Xi: T = N:4+ N4 , N4  
It is supposed that both the self-actualization or 
the fulfilment of ones potential and social recognition or 
social status are the central themes. However, N4 is 
slightly predominant over N 3i because of the illegal action, 
therefore, T is set to be N4. 
X • T 	 N4=N+= N4  S 	 4 
It concerns with one's self-esteem and esteem from 
one's best friend. The promise is not a legal one but a 
kind of social contract - thus it is at a level higher, or 
a little bit higher than N4 but still lower than Ns. 
X6' • T = Nx 
For subjects of high N, there is no such need for 
desire to do X6 (denoted by Nx) because it is a meaningless, 
childish or harmful (both to oneself or others) act. Hence, 
it should be valued as the least importance. On the other 
hand, for subjects of low N, it is concerned with mainly 
a need for "showing off" or a need for esteem from others. 
(c) Theoretical Hierarchy of Ratings (T.H.R.). 
For subjects of High 	 N: X 	 4<Xs<X,<X6 (4-1) 
For subjects of Low N : {X3'  X2} < {X4, XS' X1, X6} 
(4-2) 
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For subjects of high N, it is argued that one would 
act altruistically and rates X3 slightly important than X2. 
For subjects of low N, the discrimination is not so 
refined as those of high N, it is hypothesized that two 
clusters will be formed: {X3'  X2} and {X4' XS' X1, X6}. 
(2) The Sinking Boat  
(a) The Situation: T = N1  
(b) Part I. 
X7: For subjects of particularly high N, e.g. self-
actualizing persons, the dilemma is concerned 
with a N5  or N6 level of self-actualization and 
universal love. For other subjects, X7 will be 
treated as an antagonistic person and it is 
"socially right" not to sacrifice for or help 
people like X7. It is obvious that, apart from 
N4(R7), N4(R6) (e.g. X7) is supposed to have the 
least positiveness given by a subject in the N4  
level. 
(c) T.H.R. 
All subjects: {X4, X9} < K5<X8<X2<X3< {X1, X}<X_ 
(4-3) 
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(3) A Doctor's Dilemma  
(a) The Situation: T = N5 (or N6) 
For high N subjects, the theme is self-actualization, 
that is, the fulfilment of one's ideal and potential to 
help people in underdeveloped countries. For low N sub-
jects, the situation may, however, be interpreted as a 
socially recognized "right or good" act. 
(b) Part I. 
X1 • T = N., — N
s 
	 (Negative sign means negation 
of the needs concerned) 
The theme is both love and self-esteem needs. However, fbrsenP.Iel 
-N5 may be a little bit dominate over N3 in this case 
because Peter's action hurts Susan's self-esteem and 
damages her process of self-actualization. Though both 
X, and X2 involve, to a large extent, N3 needs; X2 is sup- 
posed to have a strong theme of N3(R1) but X1, a weak 
N3(R1). It is so because Peter is supposed to be the very 
person who understands and loves Susan. That is to say, 
Peter is expected to help Susan to achieve the State of 
Self-actualization. On the other hand, Susan's mother's 
request in this case is most probably regarded as "normal 
and reasonable". Young subjects may think that mother is 
a person who loves them and therefore should be loved; 
but she is not the person who is expected to understand 
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them thoroughly especially in matters of ideal like this 
case. Therefore, Susan's mother's act is not supposed to 
hurt Susan at all. 
(c) T.H.R. 
The test stimulus (the contents of the situation 
and Xis) may exert a greater effect on the subjects' 
ratings or responses in this case because the item offers 
subjects a low degree of freedom in projecting or 
imagining themselves in the situation. In addition, the 
theme of being altruistic and nice to deprived people may 
also tempt the subjects to show a higher degree of altruism 
in their ratings. 
For all subjects: X2 <{X5,  X3, X4, X6}< X1 	 (4-4) 
The basis for this theoretical hierarchy is quite 
complex. Let us consider the N & R of each Xi: 
X, = N. (R1) --A.15.(R)) 	 X2 = N3(R1) 
X3 = N5(R3) 	 X4 = N2(Ro) 
X5  = N5(R5) 	 X6 = N4(R4) 
Based on the N.(R.) levels, the predicted hierarchy 
is likely to be: 
X <X1‹{X3'  X5, X6} 
	
(4-5) 
(X4 : floating, highly dependent on subjects' 
degree of altruism and J level) 
187 
(A very rough general guide to establish the pre-
dicted hierarchy is to add the level numbers, i.e. 
i & j of N.(Rj  ). The smaller the sum, the more 
positive the ratings should be. However, this method 
is not supposed to be a theoretically elegant one 
at the present stage because we have not established 
thenecessaryrefineddetailsofN.&R,. Furthermore, 
the J level is not also considered in this case). 
In principle, X4 should be in a position near or even 
above (i.e. smaller than or "<") X2. HoweVer, in this case, 
subjects tend to undervalue the safety needs with respect 
to the self-actualization needs. In other words, subjects 
tend to show a much higher degree of altruism or self-
sacrifice if the situation involved is a clear-cut "moral 
or right or good or ideal" act. 
	 The position of X, is 
predicted to be at the bottom of the hierarchy in (4-4) 
instead of second to X2 in (4-5) mainly because of the 
emotional disturbance aroused by Peter's "selfish" act. 
The difficulty in constructing the theoretical 
hierarchy in this item is due to the fact that the ranges 
of Ni and Rj 
 levels are particularly large; N is from N2  
to N, and R is from R
o 
to R 
(4) Car Accident. 
(a) The Situation: T = N4 
The situation looks apparently to be a simple one 
but the underlying theme of the dilemma is sharp and 
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and extreme. The first stranger rescued is used as a 
testing person to see whom the subjects would rate higher 
and whom lower. However, the situation is complicated by 
one variable, namely, justice or fairness in treating the 
first stranger whom the subject is supposed to rescue in 
the first place. 
(b) T.H.R. 
For all subjects: X1<X6<{X7<X4)<{X9, X8}<{X2, X3}<X5  
(4-6) 
(5) The Criminal  
(a) The Situation: T = N4 
The general central theme underlying the 5 situations 
is N4. In addition, there is also a different secondary 
central theme underlying each situation: 
Situation 1 : This is a testing situation; it is concerned 
predominantly with N4. The ratings of this 
situation can be used as a baseline to see 
what additional needs would make a subject 
rate 	 the situation higher or lower than this 
one. 
Situation 2 : It emphasizes on the role of a police officer, 
which is supposed to defend social law. 
Situation 3 : The secondary theme here is N3(R41). 
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Situation 4: The additional theme is N1(Ro) - self survival. 
Situation 5 : Again the secondary theme is N3 (R41  ) but the 
number of people involved is a few thousand 
in this case while only 1 person is involved 
in Situation 3. On the other hand, the per-
son concerned in S3 is a son of Xi, thus 
bears some relation with the subject, but 
the people involved in Situation 5 are 
assumed to have no close_ relationship with 
the subject. 
For all subjects: S2<Sl< {S3, S5}<S4. 	 (4-7) 
The exact order of Xi's is left for empirical 
exploration. 
(6) The Young Robber. 
(a) The Situation: T = N2 + N42' 
The central theme is concerned with one's safety (N2) 
and the social norm of responsibility (N4) or mutual help 
in face of criminal events. It is assumed that for Low N 
subjects, N2 dominates, while for high N subjects, N4 is 
more desired; this difference will be shown in the ratings 
.of X1.s 
	 Nevertheless, the theme of the situation is 
supposed to be dominated by N2. 
(b) T.H.R. 
For all subjects: {X3, X8}<X4<X2<X3<{X1, X7}<X6 	 (4-8) 
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(7) Freedom of Speech  
/NA for low N subjects 
(a) The Situation: T = N + N_ 	 -I 4 	 5/6 	 N5/6 for high N subjects 
For high N subjects, Mr. Young's act may be inter-
preted as something concerned with human right, democracy 
and universal justice. Btt low N subjects tend to regard 
Mr. Yong's act as a socially right or moral one. 
(b) Part I 
X3  : T = N3 + N4 	 N4 
X4 • •T=N3 +N4  -N - N4 
X5 : T = N3 + N4 -N  N3 
The themes underlying X3, X4 and X5 are both the 
affection for one's family and one's esteem from others. 
However, for X3 and X4, N4 is assumed to be a little bit 
predominant over N3; while for X5, the theme emphasized 
is N3 rather than N4. 
(c) T.H.R. 
For all subjects: {X1,  X2}<X6<{X3, X4, X5} 	 (4-9) 
One special feature of this item is worthwhile for 
discussion here. The hypothetical situation and X:s are 
likely to stir up the emotion of particularly young or 
low N subjects who would then tend to focus on emotional 
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"retaliation" rather than the underlying theme of the 
situation, namely, Freedom of Speech. The ratings of these 
subjects will in general be dependent on the amount of 
loss described by Xi. The larger the loss, the more 
desperate one would be and therefore the stronger is 
one's motivation to fight against the government. Consider 
the following example: X1(T = N2) and X4(T = N4), it is 
supposed in (4-9) that the ratings on Xi should be more 
positive than those of X4  but subjects may feel very 
emotional about the paralysis of the two legs in Xi and 
insist on opposing the government, hence they would rate the 
strongly or Definitely No for X1. On the other hand, 
cases like X4 are less emotional or disturbing and the 
ratings may be less extreme and are most probably around 
the middle. Thus, the outcoming response appears to be 
X4 more positive than X1 which seems to contradict our 
theoretical prediction. Actually, the situation is com-
plicated by two other factors: (i) The J level of the 
subjects, which may influence their ratings, has not been 
considered in the construction of (4-9). It should be 
noted that any situation is dependent on three fundamental 
parameters, N, R & J. In cases involving high N, the J 
factor may be more crucial. For example, in this case, 
7' subjects of low J may tend to emphasize physical loss or 
harm. 	 (ii) The theoretical prediction given in (4-9) 
is based on the average values aik or aik. For situations 
involving extreme desperation and emotion of "retaliation", 
the instantaneous values . (t) defined in Section 3.2 may 
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be more appropriate for explaining the decision and 
action. It is understandable that occa sionally the pattern 
of instantaneous values aik (t) deviates considerably, for 
a short episode, from the average pattern of aik due to 
emotional variables. 
(8) Bank Robbery. 
(a) The Situation: T = N4 
For X1 to X4, the theme is mainly the defense of 
social law, For X5 
	
. 
to X8, subjects of high N would still 
maintain that the theme is N4  with perhaps a deep groan 
of hard luck; on the other hand, subjects of low N may 
blame on Xis for damaging his/her safety needs and tend to 
react angrily to them by "revenge" - to report them to 
police. 
) T.H.R. 
Subjects of High N 	 {X4, X8}<{X3, X7}<{X2, X6}<{X1, Xs} 
(4-10) 
Subjects of Low N ; 	 X8<X7<{X3,  X4,  X5, X6}<X2<X1 
(4-11) 
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(9) Civil War 
(a) The Situation: T = N1 ;Ro + R1) + N3(R1) a. Nl(Ro + R1) 
= N1 (R0) 
The general theme is the survival of self and the 
family. It also concerns with one's affection for one's 
family. 
(b) Part I. 
In this particular item, it is better to add the 
central theme of the situation to that of each X. in 1 
the following discussion because of the complexity of the 
item. It is assumed that positive ratings implies a 
favour of needs with positive signs and a negation of 
needs with negative signs, and vice versa. 
Xl: T = N1 (R0 + R1) + N3  (R1)- N5 (R0) 
To force one's daughter to marry someone she dislikes 
is supposed to damage one's self-esteem (N5). 
X2: T = N/(Ro + R/) + N5(R1) - N4 (R0) 
Mr A is supposed to take care of his family by all 
means. 
	
"To do nothing but to - " is assumed to negate 
slightly this norm of responsibility in this case. 
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The act in X3 is supposed to be a self-actualizing one. 
It saves one's family at the expense of one's safety, 
comfort and esteem. 
X4: T = -N1 (R0) 
To commit suicide is regarded as an act highly nega-
ting one's N1 needs. 
Xs: T = Nl(R0 + R1) + N3(R1) - N4 (R0) 
To rob others' food in this case is also against 
social norm. It is regarded as a slightly selfish and 
immoral act. 
X6: ,T = NI (%) - N3(R1) - N4 (R0) 
To forsake one's family in this case is a selfish 
act which is both negative to N3(R1) and N4. 
X7: T = N1(R0 + R1) + N3(R1) - N4(R0) 
The theme is concerned with social norm (N4) which 
forbids us to eat human flesh. It also involves a mixed 
feeling of affection for one's family and the dead body. 
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N1(120) N1 (R1) N3  (R1) N4 (R0) Other Ni * * T . H . R. 
+ + + -N5 (Ro) -N5(Ro) 2 
X2 + + + - -N4(Ro) 3.5 
X3 - + + * 	 • +N$/6(R°) 1 
X4 - -N1 (Ro) 7 
X5 + + + - -N4(Ro) 3.5 
X6 + - - -N3(R1) 6 
X7 + + + - -N4 (Ro) 5 
* = N5/6(R0) - N2(R0) 
**The major theme of Xi, assuming the theme of the situation 
is Nl(Ro + R1) and N5(R1) 
TABLE 4,4 The Central  Theme of the Item Responses  
of "Civil War" 
(c) T.H.R.: 
X3<X1‹{X2' X5}<X7<X6<X4 
	 (4-12) 
Table 4.5 summarizes the central themes of all MDT 
items in terms of N and R. 
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TABLE 4.5: The Central Themes of MDT Items  
The 
Situation 
X1 X3 n X6  
(1) A Lost 
Bag N4 (Ro) T4  T 13 N4 N4 Nx 
(+) Ro Ro R1 Ro R2 Ro 
(2) The Sink-
ing Boat Ni (Ro) N4 N3  N4 N3  N3 N4 N5/6  N3 
(+) R43 R41 R42 R43 R6 R41  
(3) A 
Doctor 's 
Dilemma 5/6(Ro)  N3  N3  N2
 
N4  N5  
(+) Rl R1 R5 Ro R5 R4  
(4) Car 
Accident N4 (Ro) N4 N4 N3 N4 N3 N4 N4 N4 
 
(+) R1 R43 R43 R41 R42 R42 R4 2  
(5) The 
Criminal 
Situa- 
N4 (Ro)(-) X1 X2 X3  X4 X5 X6 X7  X8 X9 X10 
tion No . 
1. N4 (Ro) 
'4 
3 
N3  
R2 
N3  
R1 
N4 
R43 
N4 
R3 
N3  
R2 
N3  
R1 
N4 
R43  
N4 , 
2. N4 (Ro) 
3. N3 (R41) X11 X12 X13 x14 X15 X16 X17 X18 X19  
4. Nl (Ro) 
5. N3 (R41) - 
Rl  
N4 
4 _ 
N., 
.) 
R 2 
N 
R1 
'4 
R43  
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(6)The 
Young 
Robber 
(7)Freedom 
of 
Speech 
(8)Bank 
Robbery 
(9)Civil 
WarT 
N2 (Ro) 
(+) 
N5/00) 
(+) 
N4(R0) 
(--) 
N1(Ro) 
N4 
R43 
N2  
R
o 
N3 
R1 
-N5  
R
o 
N3 
R41 
N3  
R1 
N3 
R2 
-N4 
R
o 
N3 
R1 
N4  
R
o 
N4 
R3 
IN/6  , 
R
o 
N3 
R2 
N4  
R
o 
N4 
R4 
-N1  
R
o 
N4 
R42 
N3  
R1 
N3 
R1 
-N4  
R
o 
N5/6 
R6 
N2  2 
R
o 
N3 
R2 
-N3  
R1 
N4 
R43 
N4 
R3 
-N4  
R
o 
N3 
R1 
R4 
Notes: 
(1) For details of this item, see main text and Table 4.4. 
(2) (+) means that positive rating in general favours or 
values X. needs rather than the theme of the Situation, 
and negative rating values Situation theme rather than 
X. theme. 
(-) : opposite meaning of (+). 
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4.3.2. Part II. Questions  
The Part II Questions of MDT are constructed based 
on Rest's (1979a) Defining Issues Test (DIT). One major 
difference between MDT and DIT is that MDT tends to inves-
tigate the Ordinary Level of Judgment while DIT explores 
Optimal Level. 
The dominant J themes of most MDT Part II Statements 
are clearly expressed. In the following paragraphs, 
only a small number of statements are elaborated because 
of their complexity or apparently ambiguous meaning. 
Notation used: JD = Dominant J Level of the Statement 
S = Statement Number 
M = "Meaningless" Statement. 
(1) A Lost Bag. 
S9 : JD = M 
The statement is regarded as meaningless because if 
one took away the bag of money, one in some sense stole 
money from others, whether it is from the firm or from 
the Insurance company. 
(2) The  Sinking  Boat. 
S5 : JD = M 
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The main issue in this item is: who is going to 
sacrifice, that is, one of the two persons in the boat 
is going to die. Thus, the statement that everyone should 
protect life by all means is not relevant in this case. 
However, it turns out that many of the subjects in the 
Pilot Study rate this item as quite or very important, 
probably because they did not carefully link the statement 
with the central issue of the hypothetical situation. 
S6 and S8 : JD = 
The right to decide whether to be rescued at the 
expense of other's life and the right to decide whether or 
not to sacrifice for someone else in this case are basically 
human rights (rights for life, liberty and dignity), which 
should be respected by everyone in the society. Though 
social norm may presuppose or reinforce certain action in 
this case, the above basic human right is above the social 
norm or majority's opinion. 
(3) A Doctor's Dilemma 
S4 : JD = SB 
The statement is concerned with one's attitude or 
value in dealing with such important life dilemma. It 
emphasizes on one's consistency of decision and action 
with one's moral belief or philosophy or value or attitude 
toward life and human interaction. 
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(4) Car Accident 
S3 and S6 : JD = 4(5);7'i 4 
The right of the first stranger and that of "I" in 
this case is regarded as the social right. It is slightly 
different from the basic human right involved in S6 and S8 
in "The Sinking Boat". In other words, the right to 
decide whether to rescue someone or not without causing 
danger to one's life is slightly different from the right 
to decide whether or not to sacrifice oneself for others. 
The former one emphasizes more on social and legal right, 
while the latter one on basic human right. 
The argument for S9 in "The Young Robber" is similar. 
(5) Bank Robbery.  
S6, S7 and S8 : JD = 2 
All these three statements emphasizes on one's per-
sonal interests and benefits. 
The X5  to X8 (second half of the item) is construc-
ted mainly to differentiate low J subjects from high J ones. 
It is supposed that high J subjects tend to give similar 
responses in both the 1st (X1 to X4) and 2nd (X5 to X8) 
halves. Low subjects tend to give more positive ratings 
in the 2nd half. 
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(6) Civil War  
S7 : JD = 4/5 
While the right for life is clearly a fundamental 
one, which is above the social law; the right for death 
is more complicated, it concerns with the social law, 
social responsibility and personal liberty. In this 
case, the emphasis is on Mr. A's personal right to decide 
on whether to commit suicide or not. It is argued that 
the statement expresses a judgment involved both social 
responsibility (J4) , and social contract, personal liberty 
and dignity (Js). 
The following table summarizes the dominant J level 
of all MDT Part II Statements. 
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TABLE 4.6. The Dominant J Level of MDT Part II Statements. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
A Lost Bag 2 4 4 5 6 3 4 3 M 
The Sinking Boat 2 4 3 6 M 5 3 5 4 
A Doctor's Dilemma 3 4 6 5B 3 2 4 5 5 
Car Accident 4 2 4 5 3 4 6 5B 3 
The Criminal 4 M 3 SB 4 2- 5 3 5 
The Young Robber 3 3 4 M 5 2 5 4 4 
Freedom of Speech 4 M S 4 5 2 3 3 6 
Bank Robbery 3 4 5 4 5 2 2 2 6 
Civil War Sl* S2* S3 S4* S5 S6* S7* S8 S9* 
4 NI 5 6 4 2 5 4 4 
S10* S11* S12* S13* S14 S15* 
3 3 5 4 5B 4 
Notes: 1, S = Statement Number 
M = Meaningless Statement 
2. Civil War (Short Version) includes the following 
statements in the above list : Sl, S2, S4, S6, S7, 
S9, S10, Sll and S12. 
	 (All marked with "*"). 
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TABLE 4.7: A Distribution of Part II Statements by J Levels 
Total 
No.of 
State-
ments 
Dominent 	 J 	 Level 
M 2 3 4 5 	 & 	 6 
No No . o No . No. 
Form A 
Form B 
From A 
45 
45 
60 
3 
3 
4 
6.7 
6.7 
6.7 
5 
6 
11.1 
15.6 
10.0 
10 
9 
12 
22.2 
20.0 
20.0 
12 
12 
18 
26.7 
26.7 
30.0 
15 
14 
20 
33.3 
31.1 
33.3 
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4.4. Methods of Scoring and Analysis  
The empirical data collected in this study not only 
provide a direct test of the theory established in Chapter 
3, but also generate a set of scores which can be used for 
the study of individual differences in Moral Development. 
Two major theoretical or heuristic methods of 
scoring are adopted: (i) Relevant ratings are added, with 
or without weightings, to give a set of scores or indices. 
(ii) Criteria based on the theory established are used for 
scoring part of the subjects' ratings and rankings. In 
addition, Inductive or Empirical Methods of scoring can 
also be designed after the data have been computed and 
analysed for example, a set of scores can be generated 
by the factor analysis of the data. 
The methods of scoring and analysis are very primitive 
and crude at this stage. As mentioned in Section 4.3.1., 
the addition of ratings is sometimes problematic. Our 
strategy is to generate as many as possible of the theoretical 
indices or scores. These scores would then be cross-
validated by empirical data. The result is probably that 
some of these scores may have to be discarded or modified 
later on. 
4.4.1. Part I. 
1. Direct Addition of Ratihgs. 
In order to simplify the follwing discussion, a set 
of notation is introduced in Table 4.8. 
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TABLE 4 .8 . Ratings and Rankings of the MDT: 
Notations of the Variables. 
PART 	 I PART 	 II 
RATINGS RANKINGS RATINGS RANKINGS 
VAR- 
I ABLE 
NOTA- 
TI ON 
VAR- 
IABLE 
NOTA- 
TI ON 
VAR- 
IABLE 
NOTA- 
TATIOII 
VAR- 
IABLE 
NOTA-
TI ON 
(A) A Lost 
Bag 
(B) The 
• Sinking 
Boat 
(C) A Doc- 
tor ' s 
D i 1 emma 
(D) Car Ac- 
cident 
(E) The 
Criminal 
X1  
To 
X 6 
X1  
To 
X9 
X1  
To 
X 6 
Xi  
To 
X 9 
X1 
To 
X19 
AA01 
To 
AA06 
BA01 
To 
BA09  
CA01 
To 
CA06 
DA01 
To 
DA09 
EA01 
To 
EA19 
1st C 
To 
3rd C 
1st C 
To 
4th C 
1st C 
To 
3rd C 
1st C 
To 
4th C 
1st C 
To 
5th C 
ABO1 
To 
ABO3 
BB01 
To 
BB04 
CB01 
To 
CB03 
DB01 
To 
DB04 
EB01 
To 
EB05 
S1 	 . 
To 
S9 
S1 
To 
S9 
S1 
To 
S9 
S1 
To 
S9 
S1 
To 
S9 
ACO1 
To 
AC09 
BC01 
To 
BC09 
CCO1 
To 
CCO9 
DCO1 
To 
DC09 
ECO1 
To 
ECO9 
1st I .S. 
To 
3rd I .6 . 
1st I .S. 
To 
3rd I .S. 
1st I .S.CD01 
To 
3rd I .S 
1st I .S. 
To 
3rd I .S , 
1st I .S, 
To 
3rd I .S 
ADO1 
To 
ADO3 
BDO1 
To 
BDO3 
To 
CD03 
DD01 
To 
DD03 
ED01 
To 
EDO3 
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TABLE 4.8(Continued) 
PART I PART 	 II 
RATINGS RANKINGS RATINGS RANKINGS 
VAR - 
I ABLE 
NOTA- 
TION 
VARI - 
ABLE 
NOTA- 
TION 
VARI -n 
ABLE 
NOTA- 
TION 
VARI- 
ABLE 
NOTA-
TION 
(F) The 
Young 
Robber 
(G) Freedom 
of 
Speech 
(H) Bank 
Robbery 
(K) Civil 
War 
X1 
To 
X8 
X, 
To 
X6 
X1 
To 
X8 
X1  
To 
X7 
FA01 
To 
FA08 
GA01 
To 
GA06 
HAO1 
To 
HAO8 
KA01 
To 
KAO7 
1st C 
To 
3rd C 
1st C 
To 
3rd C 
1st C 
To 
3rd C 
1st C 
To 
3rd C 
F1301 
To 
FB03 
GBO1 
To 
GB03 
HBO1 
To 
HBO3 
KB01 
To 
KB03 
S1 
To 
S9 
S1 
To 
S9 
S1 
To 
S9 
S1 
To 
S9 
FC01 
To 
FC09 
GC01 
To 
GC09 
HCO1 
To 
HC09 
KCO1 
To 
KC15 
1st I .S 
To 
3rdI.S 
lstI.S 
Tc 
3rdI.S 
1st I.S 
To 
3rdI.S 
lstI.S 
To 
3rdI.S 
FD01 
To 
FD03 
GDO1 
To 
GDO3 
HDO1 
To 
HDO3 
KDO1 
To 
KDOS 
Notes: 
(1) C = Choice; 
	 S = Statement; I.S. = Most Important 
Statement 
(2) K instead of I or J is used for "Civil War" in order 
to avoid confusion. 
207 
I.1. Central Theme (CT) Scores. 
As discussed in Section 4.3., each MDT item has a 
central theme of N, the average of all the ratings in a 
MDT item is called the Central Theme (CT) Score. 
CT EQUATION 
	
EQUATION 
NIMBER 
A Lost Bag CTA = (AA01+AA02+AA03+AA04+AAO5+ 
o6 
AA06)/6 = ZAAp/6 
P=o1 
o9 
The Sinking 	 CTB = zBA /9 
Boat 
c6 
CTC = 	 CA /6 A Doctor's 
P=o1 Dilemma 
o9 
Car Accident 	 CTD = E DA /9 
19 
The Criminal 	 CTE = E EA /19 
J J1 
o8 
The Young 
	 CTF = E FA /8 
Robber 	 Fol 
4-13 
4-14 
4-15 
4-16 
4-17 
4-18 
Freedom of 
Speech 
o6 
CTG = Z 	 GA
P 
 /6 4-19 
o8 
Bank Robbery 
	 CTH = E HA /8 
Pal 
Civil War 
(Short Version) CTK1= (KA01+KA02+(8-KA03)+(8-KA04) 
4-20 
+KA05+KA06)/6 	 4-21 
Civil War 
(Long Version) CTK2= (6*CTK1+KA07)/7 
	 4-22 
TABLE 4.9: Central Theme (CT) Scores  
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The interpretation of these CT-scores is as follows: 
(i) If the sign of the item is positive, i.e. (+), then 
small CT-score would in general imply a negation of 
the central theme of the situation. On the other 
hand, large CT, positive for the central theme. 
(ii)If the sign of the item is (-), 
then 	 Small CT 	 for the Central- theme of the 
Situation. 
Large CT =4 against the central theme of the 
Situation. 
(iii)In the "Civil War" item, the ratings of X3 and X4  
have to be reversed in order to be consistent with 
other. X.s. 1 
1.2. N(R) indices. 
A few general remarks about the N(R) indices are 
noted as follows: 
(i) N(R) indices are formed by averaging the subject's 
ratings of the relevant item responses in each MDT. 
Ni(Rj) index indicates the degree of positiveness 
towards one's Ni needs when Rj people are concerned. 
For example, N3(R1) index shows the extent of a subject's 
positive evaluation of his/her N3 needs in the inter-
action with people in R1 category, that is,first order 
kin or close relatives. 
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(ii) The value of a N.(Rj) index is given by the relevant 
coefficient oc.(3.3). 	 In other words, N1(R.3) index is 
coefficient D.(B.3) calculated based on the subject's 
ratings in a MDT. 
(iii)Different forms of MDT (i.e. A, B, and A) generate 
different sets of indices. 
(iv) N(R) indices calculated from a subject's ratings 
are called Case or Person Indices, while those calcula-
ted by averaging all the subjects' ratings in a sample 
or group are called Group Indices. 
(v) Some ratings are neededto be converted before they can 
' be added consistantly. The conversion formula is 
*Y = 8 - Y Where Y = original rating 
and *Y = converted or new rating. 
In principle, each item response Xi can appear 
in two different ways in a set of N(R) indices, one 
with a positive sign, the other with a negative sign 
(i.e. with a "*" sign). 
(vi) The range of each Ni(Rj) index is from 1 (Definitely 
YES or definitely for N.(R.3) needs) 	 to 7 (Definitely 
No or definitely against Ni(Rj) needs). 
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1.2. N.(R.) Indices. 1 	 3 
1.2.1. MDT Form A. 
The following notes apply to Table 4.10: 
(1) Most of the indices in Table 4.10 will be studied 
empirically. The appropriate computer codes are 
inserted for reference. 
(2) For convenience of discussion, N3(R.3) and N4 
are further subdivided: 
N31(Rj) : The affection for Rj when Rj faces a 
heavy deficiency in N1 or N2 needs. 
N32(Rj) : General affection for Rj excluding 
cases described by N31(Rj) 
N41 	 : A need for defending or obeying social 
law, rules and regulations 
N42 	 : A need for esteem or positive reinforce- 
ment from others. It emphasizes on the 
Norms of Giving and Norms of Patriotism. 
(3) The item response BA09 is not included in any of 
the indices because most of our subjects are not 
married. 
(4) The item responses BA01 and BA06 are not included 
in 
a42(S43)  because not many people think that 
one should sacrifice oneself for a stranger. 
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TABLE 4.10  
N. R. Indices of MDT (A) 
INDEX COMPUTE. 
CODE N(R) EQUATION EQ. NO.t  
N1 (R1+R2) N11 al(1314-132) 	 = (*BA04 + BA05)/2 
4-23 
N1(R41) N12 al(di) = (*BA02 + *BA08)/2 4-24 
N1 (R424  +R. 	 ) N13 a1(13427E1343)  = (*BA01 + *BA03 + BA06)/3 
4-25 
N (R ) 1 	 6  N14 al (86) 7 *BA07 
4-26 
Ni(R0) N15 al (80) = *AA0208  4-27 
N1  N16 al = (*AA02 + E 	 BAS,) /9 
P'31  
4-28 
N31(R1) N31 a31(81)= (AA03 + BAN + DA01)/3 
4-29 
N31 (R2  ) N32 a31(2) = (BA05 + DA06)/2 
4-30 
N31(R41) N33 
N34 
a31(1341) = (BAN + BA08 + DA04)/3 
a32(131) = (CAO2 + *EA03 4 *EA07 + *EA11 
4-31 
+ *EA15 + *EA18)/6 4-32 
N31 N35-  a31 = 	 (3a31(131) 	 4- 2 31(132)  + 
3a1 (841 4-33 
N3  N36 a3 = (8a31 + 6a32(81))/14 4-34 
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TABLE 4 .10 (Continued) 
INDEX CONFUTE 
CODE 
N(R) EQUATION EQ.NO. 
N41(R0) N421 a41 (130) = (*AA01 + *AA02 + *AA04 + 
*AA06)/4 4-35 
N41(R1) N428 a41(131) = (*JVCG + EA03 + EA07 + EAll + 
EA15 + EA18)/6 4-36 
N41(R2) N429 a41 (132) = (*AA05 + EA02 + EA06 + EA10 + 
EA14 + EA17)/6 4-37 
N41 (R3  ) N426 a41(83) = (EA01 + EA05 + EA09 + EA13 + 
EA16)/5 4-38 
N41(R43) N427 a41(1343) = (EA04 + EA08 + EA12 + 
EA19)/4 4-39 
N42(R42+R43) N414 a42 (542 +1343) = (BA03 + CA06 + DA07 + 
DA08 + DA09)/5 4-40 
N41 N413 a41 = 	 (4a41(130) 	 + 6q41(S1) 	 +.6a41 	 (132)  
+ 	 5a41(83)  + 4a41(843))/25 
= (6*CTA + 19CTE)/25 4-41 
N4 N415 a4 = (25a41  .,a + 5-42 (S-42 + I343))/30 4-42 
N 5  N51 as = (BA07 + 6*CTC)/7 4-43 
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1.2.2. MDT Form A 
For simplicity, only the N(R) equation for the item 
"Civil War" (Long Version) is established here. 	 The N(R) 
equation for the whole MDT(A+) can easily be derived by 
combining the following equations with those in Table 4.10. 
Civil War (Long Version) 
N1(120) Index: 
(11(80) = (KA01+KA02+KA03+KA05+KA06+KA07)/7 
(4-44) 
N31(R1) Index: 
  
a
31 ((31) = (KA03+ KA05+*KA06+KA07)5 
N41(R1) Index: 
a41(81) = KA05 
N
s 
Index: 
(4-45) 
(4-46) 
a
5 
 = KA03 
1.2.3. MDT Form B 
 
(4-47) 
    
In the following derivations, the item response 
FA08 is not included because most of the subjects are not 
married. Thus , 
7 
CTF = Z FA /7 
P=1 
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TABLE 4 . 11 
N. (R.3) Indices of MDT(B)  
INDEX COMPUTER 
CODE N(R) EQUATION EQ. NO. 
N1 BN15 a1 = 
	
(KA01 + KA02 + kKA03 + 
KA05 + KA06)/5 4-48 
N2  BN29 a,L  = (FA01 + FA02 + FA03 + FA04 + 
FA05 + FA06 + FA07 + GA01 + 
GA06)/9 4-49 
N31(R1) BN31 a31(131) = (Dg001 + FA03 + GA02 + GA05 , 
+KA03 + KAO5 + *KA06)/7 4-50 
N31(R2) BN32 a31(82) = (DA06 + FA04)/2 4-51 
N31(R41) BN33 a31(IS41) = (DA04 + FA02)/2 4-52 
N32(R1) BN34 a32(81) = (*HAO1 + *HAO5)/2 4-53 
N32(R2) BN35 a32(2) = (*HAO2 + *HA06)/2 4-54 
N31 BN36 a31 = 	 (7a31(S1) 	 + 2a31(I32) 	 + 
2a31 	 4 	(.1  ))/11 4-55 
N32 BN37 a32 = (2a32(81) 	 + 2a32(82))/4 4-56 
N3 BN38 a3 = (Han + 4a32)/15 4-57 
N41(R0) BN41 a41(80) = (*KA05 + 7CTF)/8 4-58 
N41(R1) BN42 a41(81) = (HAO1 + HA05)/2 4-59 
N41(R2) BN43 a41(82) = (HAO2 + HA06)/2 4-60 
N41(R3) BN44 a41(83) = (HAO3 + HA07)/2 4-61 
N42(R42) BN45 a42(42) = (DA07 + DA08 + DAO9)/3 4-62 
N41 BN46 a41 = (8a41(130)  + 2a41(Y + 
2a41(82) 	 + 2a41 (83J ))/14 4-63 
N4 BN47 a4  = (14a41 + 3a42)/17 4-64 
N5 
 
BN51 a5 = (FA06 + 6*CTG + KA03)/8 4-65 
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II. Direct Addition of Ratings with Weightings.  
This method attempts to widen the psychological 
distances between the first three or four choices ranked 
by the subjects by introducing a formula to adjust the 
ratings of the 	 first three or four item responses ranked 
before the above N(R) equations are operated. The under-
lying idea of this method is that, very often, some of 
or all of the ratings of the first three or four choices 
get tied and it becomes necessary to adopt a consistent 
method to discriminate them. 
Consider a MDT item asking subjects to rank their 
_ 
first three choices: 
1st Choice = Xh with rating Yh 
2nd Choice = Xi with rating Yi  
3rd Choice = X. with rating Y.  
These ratings are adjusted by the following formula: 
New ratings = Yh = Y, - 0.75 
Y.1  = Y. - 0.50 1 
Y. = Y. - 0.25 
(4-66a) 
The general adjusting formula is: 
- New rating = Old rating - (r 
r+1
S+1) 
 
= Old rating - (1 - FiT) 	 (4-66b) 
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where 	 r = no. of ranks asked 
S = rank of the choice. 
Take an example: 
An item of 6 Xis, all are rated as strongly YES 
with 1st Choice = X 	 2nd Choice = X2' 3rd Choice = X53'  
Original 
2 
Rating 	 New Rating 
2 
X2 	 2 
2 - 	 0.50 = 1.50 
X3 	 2 
2 - 	 0.75 = 1.25 
X4 	 2 2 
x
s 	
2 2 - 	 0.25 = 1.75 
X6 	 2 2 
The new ratings are obviously more discriminative and 
they are generated based on the subject's own responses. 
For MDT item with 4 ranks: 
1st Choice = Xh with rating Yj  
	
2nd Choice = X. 	 Y 	 Y. 
	
1 	 1 
	
3rd Choice = X. 	 Y. 
	
J 	 J 
	
4th Choice = Xk 	
.. 	 1 	 Yk 
New ratings are: Yh
, 
= Yh - (1 - 4+1) - Yh - 0.80 
Y.' = Y. - 0.60 
1 	 1 
Y.' = Y. - 0.40 
J 	 J 
Yk' = Yk - 0.20 
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III. Ranking Scoring Method  
The first 3 or 4 ranks of each MDT item, hypothesized 
by the theory established, are used as criteria for scoring 
the ranking data. 
TABLE 4.12: First 3 of 4 Ranks of the T.H.R. of MDT Items. 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
A Lost Bag X3 X2 X4 
The Sinking Boat {X4 = X*9} X5  X8 X2 
A Doctor's Dilemma X2 {X3 	 = X4 = X5} 
Car Accident X1 X6 {X4 = X7} 
The Criminal S2 S1 {S3 = S5} S4 
The Young Robber {X3 = X*8} X4 X2 X5  
Freedom of Speech {X1 = X2} X6 
Bank Robbery {X4 = X8} {X3 = X7} 
Civil War X3 X1 {X2 = X5} 
Notes: 1, Xis marked with an asterisk are for married sub-
jects only. For unmarried subjects (who are sup-
posed to leave these Xis blank), these Xis are 
not counted. 
2. If -rx1  . 	
X. 
	 then 	 1 then X." or "X. then X." is 
3 	 3 	 1 
regarded as correct. In other words, the rank 
orders of the Xis in the bracket{ 
	
} are regarded 
as equal. 
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For the item "the Criminal", the test instruction of 
the ranking section in Part I has been proved to be too 
complicated for a large number of subjects. A lot of incon-
sistent ranking data in this item has been found. It is 
therefore decided that the rating instead of the ranking 
are used for scoring. Let S1 to S5 denote the Situations 
1 to 5 respectively, define: 
S1 = X1 + X2 + X3 
S2 = X5 + X6 + X7 
S3 = X9  + X10 +X11 	 (4-68) 
S4 = X13 + X14 	 X15 
Si = X16 + X17 + X18 
S6 = (S2 + S1) /2 	 (4-69) 
S7 = (S3 + S5)/2 
In Eq. (4-7), it is hypothesized that 
S2 < S1 < {S3, S5} < S4 
S6 < S7 < S4 	 (4-70) 
Three ratings (acquaintance, best friend, brother or 
sister) instead of one (Best friend) in each situation one 
used to order to give better discriminative effect. 
The Ranking Scoring Method consists of the following 
steps: 
(1) Disregardingtheorderoftheranks,eachX.correctly 
ranked as one of the 1st 3(or 4) ranks is given a 
score of 1. 
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(ii) For 3-choices MDT item, a "bonus" score of 1 is given if 
the first 2 ranks are correctly placed in order. 
(iii) For 4-choices item: 
1st 3 ranks correctly placed in order, additional 
score = 2 
1st 2 ranks correctly placed in order, additional 
score = 1 
(iv) A special scoring criterion is used for the item "The 
Criminal": 
S6 < S7 < S4 	 Score = 3 
S6 < {S7 = S4} 	 Score = 2 	 (Le. S6<S7, S6< S4 & S7
-S4) 
S6 < S4 < S7 	 Score = 1 
All other combinations Score = 0 
The sum of all the ranking scores in a MDT will 
give a new score called Consistency (C) Score. C-Score 
expresses the degree of consistency of the subject's 
rankings/ratings with our T.H.R. Since our T.H.R. is 
constructed from the perspective of a high N subject, 
high C-Scores may be interpreted as high N people. 
4.4.2. Part II. 
(a) J-Score generated by Ranking Data  
Let Ji = Hypothetical Moral Judgment level of Part II 
statements where i = 2, 3, 4, 5/6. 
RANK 
1 (Most Important) 
2 (2nd Most Important 
3 (3rd Most Important) 
SCORE 
3 
1 
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Without loss of gclerality, we write J5 to denote J5/6  
(i.e. J5  or J6 in its original meaning). 
A criterion for scoring: 
For"Civil War" (Long Version): 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 
Score 5 4 3 2 1 
(i) Define: 
Si = Sum of scores of all J. statements ranked as 
one of the top 3 important choices (for "Civil 
War" (Long Version) : top 5 Choices). 
In this case, the S5  score is identical to the "P" 
score (Principled Morality Score) in Rest's DIT (see Rest's 
1979a). 
(ii) Define 
S = 2S2 + 3S3 + 4S4 + 5S5 	 (4-71) 
The "S" score is the Moral Judgment stage score 
generated by ranking data. 
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Let R' = Possible Minimum of S 
RI' = Possible Maximum of S, 
Approximate  
Moral Judgment  
Stage 1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5/6 
R' 	 (R'+R")/2 	 R" 
 
(B) J-Score generated by Rating Data. 
y i = Coefficient of J- 1 
= The Mean of the subject's ratings of all ji  
statements, 
where i = 2, 3, 4, 5/6. 
(Note: J5 is defined to include both J5  & J6 
in this case) 
A subject's J-level is given by: 
J 	 (12, Y3, 14, 15) 
Though the above expression gives more details 
about the J-level of a subject, it is sometimes more 
convenient to assign a simplif:ed dominating stage of J 
to a subject. The following discussion illustrates a 
simple method for assigning dominating J-stage to a 
subject. 
Assume y2 is the largest, a new set of yi is 
calculated by the following formula: 
- 11  
11 	 12  
= 100 
x 100 
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13  
yl3 = - X 100 
Y2 
14 x 100 4 = 
12 
Yi 
In other words, - 	  x 100 for i = 2, 3, 4, & 5 
I 	 11( 
and yk = the largest of all Xis. 
TABLE 4.13: Dominating J-Stage  
2 2(3) 2(1) 2/3 2/1 2(1,3) 
( Y'2-11) k1  k1  k2 k2 k3 k2 
(1'2-V k1  k2 k1  k3 k2 k2 
(1'2-14) k1  k1  k1  k2 k2 k1  
Notes: 
(i) k1 > k2 » k3' 
k1, 
 k2 & k3 are to be fixed or determined empirically. 
(For purpose of illustration, say, k1 = 50, k2 = 25, k3= 10). 
(ii)2(1,3) means that the dominating stage 2 is not clearly 
defined in this case; there are two sub-stages, namely 
1 & 3. 
(iii)The cut-off values, (k1, k2, k3) should be chosen such 
that most of the subjects can be assigned a dominating 
J-stage by this method. 
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4.5. Simple MDT Scores 
A set of simple MDT scores is contructed based on the 
subjects ratings 
I. Part I Ratings. 
Define NR scores as: 
a$01 = (a4 + a5) - (a, + a3) 
a$02 = (a4 + 1.5 a5) - (al + 1.5 a3) 
a$03 = (a4 + 2a5) - (a, + 2a3) 
a$11 = (a4 + as) / (a/ + a3) 
a$12 = (a4 + 1.5 a5) / (al + 1.5 a3) 
a$13 = (a4 + 2a5) / (al + 2a3) 
(4-72a) 
(4-72b) 
(4-72c) 
(4-72d) 
(4-72e) 
(4-72f) 
The reason for putting weightings on a3 and a5 
is that a3 is anticipated to be the least discriminative 
index, therefore a weighting on a3 is necessary in order 
to increase the discriminative power of NR scores. In order 
to balance the weighting assigned to a3, an equal weight-
ing must be put on either a4 or a5. The a5 is chosen to 
be weighted so that symmetry in the above equations can 
be restored. 
For MDT Form B, the mean of a1 and a,, is taken to 
be a1 in the above calculation. 
The computer code for a$01 to a$13 is NR01 to NR13. 
More details on the computer code of the MDT indices can 
be found in Appendix 5(F) or Tables 4.10 and 4.11. 
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II. Part II. Ratings  
Define Jl, J2, J3, J4 and J5 to be the average ratings 
of the relevant Part II statements. 	 (See Table 4.6) All 
statements with Dominant J level at 5, 5B and 6 are used 
to generate the average rating J5. 
Define J-scores as: 
101 
102 
= 
= 
(J4+J5) 	 - 	 (J2+J3) 
(J4+1.5J5) 	 - 	 (J2 
	 t 	 1.5J3) 
(4-73a) 
(4-73b) 
103 = (J4+2J5) -(J2+2J3) (4-73c) 
111 = (J4+J5) / 	 (J2+J3) (4-73d) 
112 = (J4+1.5,75) 	 / 	 (J2+1.5J3) (4-73e) 
113 = (J4+2J5) / 	 (J2+2J3) (4-73f) 
The computer code for 101 to 113 is 
RJ01 TO RJ13. 
III. Parts I and II as a whole  
The following indices are defined by simply adding 
the NR and RJ indices with appropriate weightings. 
NRRJ01 = NR01 + RJ01 
NRRJ02 = NR02 + RJ02 
NRRJ03 = NR03 + RJ03 
WNRRJO3 = NR01 + 	 1.5*RJ01 
WNRRJ02 = NR02 + 	 1.5*RJ02 
WNRRJ03 = NR03 + 	 1.5*RJ03 
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The indices NRRJ11 TO NRRJ13 and WNRRJ11 TO WNRRJ13 
are similarly defined. 	 A straightforward derivation of 
the NRRJ01 and WNRRJ01 indices is illustrated in Appendix 
4. 
The above indices express a subject's responses to 
the MDT Parts I and II as a whole. 
Finally, it should be noted that not all the scoring 
methods mentioned in this chapter will be used in the 
empirical part of this study. 
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5. The  Present Study  
The major aim of this research project is to explore 
a new approach in the study of Moral Development. A 
theory of Moral Development (hereafter labelled as *TMD) 
is established in Chapter 3. A new psychological test 
called the Moral Development Test (MDT) has been cons-
tructed and described in Chapter 4. 
Broadly speaking, the basic objectives of the 
present empirical study are as follows: 
(1) (a) To validate the test MDT, and 
(b) To test the major theoretical hypotheses of 'IND. 
(2) To investigate the characteristics of the MDT in its 
own right, that is, to investigate the specific 
features of MDT which are not explicitly described by 
*TMD. 
(3) To perform a cross-cultural study of MDT in two or 
three countries. 
Because of the financial problem and the difficulty 
in getting subjects, the research strategy was to validate 
the MDT in London by the author himself. A cross-
cultural study was subsequently performed in Hong Kong and 
Malaysia with the help of his colleagues. 
The difficulty in getting subjects to answer a long 
and personal questionnaire not only made the randomization 
of the samples impossible but also damaged the original 
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experimental design considerably. This means that special 
care must be taken with the generalization of the results 
and findings reported here at this stage. It should be 
emphasized that further research is required to substan-
tiate or modify the findings here. 
5.1. Hypotheses  
I. The Test of Theoretical Hypotheses. 
Based on *TMD, a set of' hypotheses is proposed. 
The hypotheses are operationalized in terms of the item 
responses of MDT form A wherever appropriate in the fol-
lowing discussion. A similar argument can be developed 
for item responses for the MDT form B. 
1 (A). The Hierarchical Structure of Psychological Needs  
(N) and Human Relationships (R) 
The operational hypotheses can be set in terms of: 
(i) "N only" (Testing theoretical hierarchy in 
Section 3.2). 
(ii)"R only" (Testing theoretical hierarchy in 
Section 3.3). 
(iii) N(R) 	 (See Section 4.3). 
Since all the item responses in Part I of the MDT 
and all real situations are more satisfactorily analysed 
in terms of N(R) structures rather than the "N only" or 
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"R only" structures, the major analysis here concentrates 
on N(R) structures. 
H.1.1. The Xis in each MDT item when arranged in the order 
postulated in Section 4.3 show a fixed hierarchical 
sequence as predicted. 
The X.-patterns of the items "The Sinking Boat" 
and "Car Accident" can be used to study the R-Hierarchy 
over a range of Nis. On the other hand, relevant Xis of 
the item "The Criminal" test the N-Hierarchy at certain 
fixed Ri. 	 For example, (X3, X7,  X11, X15, X18) tests the 
N-Hierarchy (in this case, the N varies across different 
sub-situations (1 to 5) with Ri being fixed at R1 (brother/ 
sister). 
H.1.2. The ai($j) indices of Ni(Rj) constructed in Section 
4.4 obey a fixed hierarchical sequence as hypothe-
sized. 
In this case, the position ofal(y in the sequence 
is not theoretically predicted because of the complex 
interaction between empathy, altruism and survival needs 
(See Section 3.5). 
It should be emphasized that the hierarchies des-
cribed in H.1.1. and H.1.2. are internally structured as 
discussed in Section 3.2 and 3.3. They are postulated 
to be true for persons of all ages. 
1(B). The Hierarchical Structure of Moral Judgment (J) 
It should be noted that the J described here is 
defined as the Ordinary Level of Judgment while Kohlberg's 
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J is referred to as the Optimal Level of Judgment. For 
their differences, see Section 3.4. Nevertheless, their 
internal structure is postulated to be similar. As 
mentioned in section 2.3.3. 	 (See also Kohlberg, 1971, 
1976; Colby et. al., in press), this internal structure 
can only be adequately investigated by longitudinal study; 
since the present study is a cross-sectional one, no hypo-
thesis regarding the J-structure is made here. 
2. The Structure-wholeness  of N(R) and J 
H.2.1. The N(R)-J structures form 	 structured wholes. 
H.2.2. The N(R) structures form 	 structured wholes. 
Two methods will be used for testing the above 
hypotheses: 
(i) Internal Consistency Reliability 
Support of the above hypotheses would require the 
internal consistency reliability of all the major indices 
of a (N) , S (R) , a(s) (N(R)) and y (J) to be reasonably 
high. 
(ii) Factor Analysis 
The results of the factor analysis of the above-
mentioned major indices should give a consistent picture 
showing structured-wholeness of N(R) and J. 
Another method testing the above hypotheses is the 
Alternate Form Reliability. However, as the MDT Forms A 
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and B are not alternate forms, this method cannot be 
used here (See Section 5.4). 
3. The Developmental Nature of N(R) and J. 
H.3.1. Individuals develop N(R) according to the pattern 
postulated in Section 3.2 and 3.3. 
H.3.2. Individuals develop J according to the pattern 
postulated in Section 3.4. 
This means that the major a i(y indices and Y 
scores (for example, the S score mentioned in Section 
4.4.2) correlate positively and significantly with age, 
or show significant trend in the direction of increasing 
-age. 
4. The Relationship Between N(R) and J.  
H.4. There is a significant positive relation between 
N(R) and J. 
This would mean that the correlation between the major 
indices of N(R) and the Y-scores should be significant and 
positive. 
5. The Universality of N(R) and J.  
H.S. The above hypotheses (H.1.1., H.1.2., H.2.1., H.2.2., 
H.3.1., H.3.2. and H.4) are true in all cultures. 
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II. Other Empirical Hypothesis  
H.6. There is a positive relation between the major 
indicesefN-(RiandJ.measured by the MDT and the 
scores generated by Kohlberg's MJI and/or Rest's 
DIT. 
It is expected that the MDT 1-scores bear a stronger 
positive relation with the MMS or DIT scores than the major 
indices of N.(R.). 	 It is argued that a.(S.3) indices are 
emotion (or affection) oriented, 1-scores emotion-
rationalization oriented and MMS and DIT scores rational-
ization oriented. Thus, the correlations are probably: 
cxi(-) 
I 
MMS/DIT 
a.1  CS-) 	 Y MMS/DIT 
— 	 HIGH 
-- 
LOW 
MEDIUM 
-- 
At this stage, there is no hypothesis regarding the 
effects of sex, intellectual development, personality etc. 
on the values of ot.(;j) or y indices. These effects are 
to be found empirically. 
4.2. Instrumentation and Methods of Scoring  
I. Moral Development Test  
The details of the MDT construction and its 
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scoring system are discussed in details in Chapter 4. 
(A) English Version 
Two forms and four versions of the MDT have been 
used in the Main Study: 
(1) (a) Form A (IS) 
(b) Form A 
(c) Form A+ 
(2) Form B 
The details of MDT Forms A, A+ and B are given in 
Section 4.1. A copy of the MDT Forms A, B and the item 
"Civil War" (long version) is given in Appendix 5(A). 
The MDT Form A(IS) was used only for English Form six 
subjects. It differs from Form A in a small number of 
item responses. For details, see Appendix 5(B). 
In the data analysis, the sample using Form A(IS) 
is combined with the samples using Form A with the fol-
lowing arrangement: 
(i) Part I item responses. 
The X9 in "The Sinking Boat" of both Forms A(IS) 
and A is deleted from the analysis. The original X2 (a 
highly respected religious leader) in the "Car Accident" 
of Form A(IS) is also deleted and replaced by X10 = a  
postman. 
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(ii) Part II statements 
The following five statements of Form A(IS) are 
deleted from analysis: AC03, AC04, BCO2, BC05 and DC06. 
Only Form A was used extensively in the Main study. 
Very few work has been done on Form B. 	 The research 
strategy is to study Form A thoroughly and uses Form B 
for studying special topics, for example, the study of 
a2 (N2) and extremely emotional situations (second portion 
of "Bank Robbery", and "Civil War"). 
(B) Chinese Version. 
When the main study in London was nearly completed, 
the MDT Form A was translated into Chinese by the author. 
The translation was checked and refined by two colleagues 
in London and one in Hong Kong. All of them completed their 
postgraduate studies in England. They are fluent in both 
English and Chinese. The Chinese MDT was then used in 
five:Hong Kong (Chinese) samples. 	 Because of a mistake 
in the printing and the stapling of the Chinese MDT by 
the author's colleagues in Hong Kong, the first three 
samples used a Chinese MDT (labelled as FormA(4)*) which 
is different from the one used by the fourth and fifth 
samples (labelled as FolmA(S)*) in the following aspects: 
(i) The order of the items in Form A(4) is exactly 
the reverse of that in Form A(S). In other 
words, the order of the items in Form A(4) is: 
* The number in the bracket refers to the Computer code 
of the different MDT versions. 
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"The Criminal", "Car Accident", "A Doctor's 
Dilemma", "The Sinking boat" and finally "A 
Lost Bag". 
(ii)The ranking section of Part I of the item "A 
Doctor's Dilemma" was missed in Form A(4) but 
not in Form A(5). 
The contents of all items in Forms A(4) and A(S) 
are the same. 
In addition, the contents and test format of the 
Chinese MDT Form A(5) are exactly the same as that of the 
English MDT Form A except that both the Chinese MDT Forms 
A(4) and A(S) do not include the ranking section of Part 
I of the item "The Criminal". The reason for dropping 
this ranking section in the Chinese MDT is due to the fact 
that a lot of young English subjects found particular 
difficulty in answering this ranking section. 
In the data analysis, it is assumed that the order 
of the items in the MDT does not affect the subject's 
responses. 
A copy of the Chinese MDT Form A(S) is given in 
Appendix 5(c). 
II. Test Instruments Used in the Validity  Study. 
1. Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument (MJI) 
Form A of Kohlberg's MJI (Colby et. al., 1979) 
was used. Instead of interviewing subjects, a written 
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form of the MJI was used. Subjects were asked to write 
down their answers in their own words. A copy of the 
MJI is given in Appendix 5(D). Further details about 
the characteristics of this test and its scoring method 
can be found in Section 2.3.3. 
	
See also Colby et. al. 
(1979) and Ma (1980, Appendix B.3). 
2. Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT) 
Four stories of Rest's DIT (Rest, 1971a) were used. 
A copy of the test used is given in Appendix 5(E). The 
general feature, scoring system and psychometric properties 
etc. of the DIT are discussed in detail in Section 2.3.5. 
It should be noted that the D score is calculated 
by using a set of empirical weightings which are derived 
from a Standardized American Sample (Rest, 1979a, p.4.2- 
4.5). Thus, it has to assume that this set of empirical 
weightings can be applied to our English sample if the D 
score is to be calculated. Such assumption is problema-
tic to some extent. The P score will be used more fre-
quently in the discussion. 
3. Science Reasoning Tasks (SRT) 
The Science Reasoning Tasks are Cognitive Development 
tests which were "developed by the team 'Concepts in 
Secondary Maths and Science' at Chelsea College, University 
of London in the period 1973/78 in order to investigate 
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the relationship between the optimum Piagetian Level at 
which a pupil can function and the understanding of 
Science which he or she can achieve." (Kuchemann, 1979, 
Task III, p.1) 
	
According to the General Guide (Wylam 
and Shayer, p.8-11), there are seven such tasks. Each 
task forms a test. 	 Task III: "The Pendulum" of the SRT 
was used in our study. 
In general, a series of short experiments using a 
simple pendulum were performed in front of the subjects 
with the help of one or two of the students. The subjects 
were asked to answer a number of questions after each 
experiment. All answers were to be written on the test 
booklet provided. 	 Further details about the test and 
its scoring system can be found in Kuchemann (1979) and 
Wylam and Shayer (1980). 
4. Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices (RPM)  and 
Junior Eysenck Personality Test (JEPI) 
Since both RPM and JEPI are popular psychological 
tests, their details will not be given here. For a full 
description of these two tests, see Raven et. al (1978) and 
S.B.G. Eysenck (1978). 
5. Bergling's Thinking Test (TT)  
Bergling's Thinking Test is a short multiple choice 
test constructed based on Piaget's theory. The test 
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attempts to measure a subject's level of logical thinking 
(pre-operational thinking, concrete operational thinking, 
formal operational thinking). It consists of 7 items 
and each item has 5 choices. Subjects were asked to choose 
one of the 5 choices in each item as their answers. They 
ususally took about 15 to 20 minutes to complete the test. 
Several scoring methods have been studied by Bergling. 
The one used here is called the Reasoning Level Test Score. 
For further details about the test, see Bergling (1974). 
It is remarked here that Bergling (1974) studied 
the psychometric properties of his test by using a sample 
of primary school children, aged 10 years 0 month to 10 
years 11 months. It may be difficult to demonstrate the 
developmental property of the test by using a sample of 
such narrow age range. Nevertheless, Bergling's study 
shows that the test is good for investigating young 
children's science thinking ability. In addition, the 
test is easy to administer. 
5.3. 	 Sample  
I. English (London) Sample  
All the secondary school subjects used in this 
study were drawn from one single school labelled as 
School E. The School E had kindly consented to let all 
its F.2, F.4 and Lower F.6 pupils participate in our Pilot 
or Main Studies. They also provided us some F.3 and a 
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few Upper F.6 students. 
School E is a mixed comprehensive school in London. 
It has about one thousand and six hundred pupils, aged 
11-18. 
On the other hand, our adult sampls in the Main 
Study was composed of subjects from different sources: 
(i) 29 PGCE (Postgraduate Certificate in Education) 
and 4 M.A. (Ed.) students from the Institute of 
Education. 
(ii) 8 PGCE or undergraduate students from a College 
of Education in London. 
.(iii) 4 M.A. (Medical Sociology) and 6 Undergraduate 
students from University of London. 
(iv) 3 other persons: a housewife, a clerk and a 
secondary school teacher. 
All subjects mentioned in this section are 
native English or immigrants, unless indicated by an 
asterisk ",". 
The details of the sample used are given as follows: 
(AT Pilot Study  
CLASS 1 	 ADULTS 
Non- 
SEX F.2 F.4 F.6 English 	 English* 
MALE 20 38 14 8 	 10 90 
FEMALE 8 10 9 8 	 7 42 
28 48 23 16 	 17 132 
TABLE 5.1. Sample Used in Pilot Study  
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F.2 (Form Two) and F.4 (Form Four) refer to the 
Second and Fourth Year Classes respectively in the se-
condary school. Generally speaking, Lower F.6 and Upper 
F.6 are approximately equivalent to the Grade 12 and 
grade 13 (or First Year Undergraduate) respectively in 
the American Educational System. 
17 non-English adults from over 10 countries were 
added in order to increase the size of the adult sample 
in the Pilot Study. A total of 132 subjects, 115 of them 
were English, participated in the Pilot Study. 
(B) Main Study  
1. Subjects Taking MDT Forms A A /A(IS) 
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The following remarks should be noted: 
(i) The F.6 (Lower Form Six in this case) subjects 
took MDT Form A(IS). For difference between 
Forms A(IS) and A, see Section 5.2. 
(ii) Most of the English adults (N=50) took Form A; 
only 4 of them took Form A. 
(iii) Three groups of F.2 subjects and 4 F.3/4 subjects 
took both Forms A and B. 23 of them (22 F.2 
and one F.4 subjects) took Form A after complet-
ing Form B; they are not included in the above 
sample. 
All analyses of MDT (A) are based on the sample 
described in Table 5.2. 
2. Subjects Taking MDT Form B  
A total of 94 subjects completed MDT Form B.Table 
5.4.1 shows the analysis of the sample. 57 out of the 
94 subjects took Form B only or Form B before taking Form 
A; the details are tabulated in Table 5.4.2. The remain-
ing 37 subjects took Form B after completing Form A, 
their details are given in Table 5.4.3. 
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CLASS 
SEX F.2 F.3 F.4 
MALE 36 1 23 60 
FEMALE 28 0 6 34 
64 1 29 94 
TABLE 5.4.1. Subjects Taking Form B  
CLASS 
SEX F.2 F.3 F.4 
MALE 18 0 20 38 
FEMALE 13 0 6 19 
31 0 26 57 
TABLE 5.4.2 Subjects Taking Form B only OR Form B Before  
Form A. 
CLASS 
SEX F.2 F.3 F.4 
MALE 18 1 3 22 
FEMALE 15 0 0 15 
33 1 3 37 
TABLE 5.4.3. Subjects Taking Form B After Form A. 
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3. Subjects Taking Both Forms A and B. 
A then B B then A 
F.2 33 22 55 
F.3 1 0 1 
F.4 3 1 4 
37 23 60 
TABLE S.S. Subjects Taking Both Forms A & B  
The 55 F.2 subjects taking both Forms A and B are 
used in the study of inter-relation between the two dif-
ferent forms of MDT. 
Since the item "Car Acciderit" appears in both Forms 
A and B, subjects were normally asked to respond to this 
item in their first MDT. 
(II) Chinese (Hong Kong) Sample  
The Chinese subjects were drawn from 5 institutions 
labelled as Cl, C2, C3, C4 and CS. 
Schools Cl, C2 and C3 are co-education secondary 
schools. Cl has about S60 pupils and C3 about 1200. 
The student population of C2 is not known. The academic 
standard of these three schools is regarded as average. 
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C4 is classified as a post-secondary college in 
Hong Kong. It offers courses similar to the university 
courses in U.K. and America. It has about 3300 students. 
C5 is a Catholic secondary school. It admits girls 
only. The academic standard of the students is regarded 
as average. The student population of C5 is about one 
thousand. 
CLASS 
SCHOOL F.4 F.5 F.6 ADULT TOTAL 
Cl 0 75 0 0 75 
'C2 0 97 0 0 97 
C3 31 0 40 0 71 
C4 0 0 0 26 26 
C5 43 0 0 0 43 
74 172 40 26 312 
TABLE 5.6. Chinese (H.K.) Sample  
Subjects from Cl, C2 and C3 took the Chinese MDT 
Form A(4) while subjects from C4 and C5 took Form A(5). 
Since C5 sample consists of subjects from a girl 
school, it is decided to excluded it from the major ana-
lyses so that the sample used would not be heavily 
biased with respect to sex. However, this sample is used 
for studying special topics, for example, the effect of 
sex on various MDT indices. 
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Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show further details of the 
Chinese Sample which consists of subjects from Schools 
Cl, C2, C3 and C4. 
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(III) Malaysian Sample 
This sample is included here merely for reference 
purposes. It is a heavily biased sample which 
consists of students from the top stream. 	 The sample 
was drawn from three secondary schools in Malaysia, two 
of them run by Malaysia Government and one by a Catholic 
Church. Each of the schools has about 1500 to 2000 
pupils. Great difficulty was experienced'in obtaining 
subjects in this country. 
This is the only sample used here which did not 
take MDT in their mother language. All subjects in this 
sample answered the English MDT Form A. All the results 
and findings concerning this sample will be put in the 
Appendix 6.6 , except some of the cross-cultural findings 
which will be put in parallel with the English and Chinese 
ones in Appendix 6.7. 
AGE (Yrs 
SEX 17+-18 18+-19 19+-20 20+-21 
MALE 5 22 19 1 47 
FEMALE 8 33 6 0 47 
13 55 25 1 94 
TABLE 5.9. Malaysian Sample 
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All subjects are either fourth formers or sixth 
formers. No information regarding the exact form or class 
of the subjects was provided. 	 In addition, five 
Malaysian adults also took the MDT Form A, their data 
will be grouped with the 14 non-English adults subjects 
who participated in our study in London to form a small 
sample for cross-cultural comparison. 
MDT Forms Secondary 
School 
Subjects 
Adult 
Subjects 
LONDON 
, 
Pilot Study 
Main+Study 
(A/A 	 /A(IS)) 
Main Study(B) 
99 
408 
57 
16 
54 
0 
115 
462 
57 
Sub-total 564 70 634 
HONG KONG A(4) 	 / 	 A(5) 286 26 312 
MALAYSIA A 94 5 99 
OTHER Pilot Study 
Main Study (A/A+) 
0 
10 
17 
14 
17 
24 
TOTAL 954 132 1086 
TABLE 5.10. Summary of the Samples 
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Two school children in the Pilot Study were iden-
tified as immigrants to London but they were included 
in our Pilot analysis. 
However, since it is not known at this stage whether 
thereis a cultural effect on the MDT indices or not, we 
attempt to use samples of the same or similar cultural 
background in our main study. Thus, subjects who emig-
rated recently to London are not included in the main 
analysis. 	 There are 10 such new immigrants (3 in F.2, 
2 in F.3 and 5 in F.4 classes). In general, these subjects 
showed some difficulty in understanding the English-
written questionnaire. 
5.4. Pilot Study  
Generally speaking, there are three phases in the 
production of a MDT: 
Phase I: Design of the Test and Item Construction. 
A very vague idea of the theoretical model was 
developed first. 
The ideas for some of the items (e.g., "The Sinking 
Boat", "A Lost Bag" and part of "The Criminal") were 
formed in the Spring of 1979. With the ideas of these 
items in mind, different types of test design and test 
format were considered. As the theory developed, it was 
decided that the questions for eaChitem should be split 
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into two parts: the first part asked for decisions or 
choices and the second part tested judgment. The DIT 
format was found to be most suitable for the Part II 
questions. As for Part I, the present format with the 
use of an algebraic symbol "X" was considered to be the 
most effective and the least ambiguous; though it was 
anticipated that subjects at very low stage of cognitive 
development might require additional explanation or help 
in the understanding of the test instructions. 
When the test format was fixed, more items were then 
constructed. 
	
The presentation of the MDT Part II state- 
ments was heavily influenced by Rest's DIT prototypic 
'statements and the Criterion Judgment statements in 
Colby et. al. (1979). 
Phase II: Consulting Subjects  
An interview format for each of the potential MDT 
items was drafted and many people were invited to talk 
in a free style with the author on some of these items. 
Eight of them, all postgraduate students at the Institute 
of Education, were interviewed for at least one hour. 
They were chosen as the Consulting Subjects, who offered 
valuable help in the construction of MDT. They discussed 
with the author their own choices and judgment. In addi-
tion, they also gave opinions on the design and contents 
of the test. On average, each of them spent about 11 to 
2 hours with the author. 
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On the whole, their discussion was very helpful, 
for examples, the sub-situation 5 : 'Earthquake' of the 
item "The Criminal" was constructed from a suggestion by 
a female subject, and Part I questions of the item "A 
Doctor's Dilemma" were greatly modified after listening 
to the opinions of some of the Consulting Subjects. 
Eight items were finally constructed and three 
Pilot forms of the MDT (labelled as PA, PB and PC)were 
composed, each of them consists of 5 items. An addi-
tional item "Civil War" (Long, version) was constructed 
later on; it was added to each of the MDT for adult sub-
jects only. 
PA PB PC 
Car Accident 
The Young Robber 
The Sinking Boat 
A Lost Bag 
(Civil War)* 
The Criminal 
Car Accident 
The Young Robber 
The Sinking Boat 
A Doctor's Dilemma 
(Civil War)* 
The Criminal 
Car Accident 
The Young Robber 
Freedom of Speech 
The Sinking Boat 
Bank Robbery 
(Civil 	 War)* 
* For adult subjects only. 
TABLES 5.11 Pilot Forms of the MDT 
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At that time, it was thought that each of the Pilot 
forms of the MDT could act as a complete test by itself. 
three items: "Car Accident", "The Young Robber" and 
"The Sinking Boat" were regarded as crucial ones; they 
were supposed to he part of a final MDT. (It turned out 
to be not) 
Phase III: Pilot Study of the MDT  
The above three pilot forms of the MDT were tested 
by 125 subjects . 	 (For details of the sample, see Section 
5.3) 	 Another 7 adult subjects, one English and 6 non- 
English, were tested with Form A(IS) in the latest stage 
of the Pilot Study. Therefore, the total number of sub-
jects used in the whole Pilot study should be 132. 
Pilot Form 
Class PA PB PC 
F.2 28 0 0 28 
F.4 10 15 23 48 
Lower and 
Upper 	 F.6 11 12 0 23 
Adult* 8 11 7 26 
57 38 30 125 
* Another 7 adults took Form A(IS) 
TABLE 5.12. Pilot Study of the MDT 
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All subjects were invited to give their opinion on 
the design and contents of the test. Only a few adults 
gave comments but about half of the school-children did 
write a few lines commenting on the test design or re-
counting their feeling about the testing. In addition, 
small groups of pupils in each class were requested to 
give their opinions and comments on the test in a short 
interview with the author. 
The data were then computed and a preliminary anal-
ysis was carried out. After reviewing the whole situa-
tion, some item responses in Parts I and II were deleted 
or modified. Five items were chosen to form a proper MDT 
(i.e. Form A(IS) /A) with the item "Civil War" (Long 
Version) being added for adult subjects only. It was felt 
strongly that it would be a pity to drop the other three 
items from the present study. Finally, this dilemma was 
resolved by composing a second form of the MDT (Note: 
not an alternate form) by using the further three items, 
a short version of the item "Civil War" and the item 
"Car Accident" from Form A. The second form is called 
Form B. It was decided that Form B would be studied 
with less than 100 school-children. 
5.5. Main Study  
I. London Study 
Owing to a request from School E, the lower F.6 
subjects in the main study had to be tested at a time 
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about six weeks before the expected date, it was thus ne-
cessary to construct an Intermediate Form of the MDT (i.e 
A(IS) for this particular group of subjects because 
there was not sufficient time to go through 
all the analyses of the Pilot data. The differences 
between the Intermediate and Final Forms of the MDT (A) 
are described in Section 5.2. Some analyses of the data 
of these F.6 subjects were carried out before the final 
form was completely constructed, thus the findings of 
this sample also contributed to the development of the 
final form. 
(A) Experimental Design  
The original experimental design was constructed 
with the purpose to study: 
tl) Test-retest reliability of MDT (A) 
(2) The relation between the Scores of MDT and those of 
(a) MJI 
(b) DIT 
(c) Science Reasoning Task 
(d) Standard Progressive Matrices 
(e) JEPI 
The design also attempted to "randomise" the test 
order effect. 
However, the following practical problems prevent 
the full accomplishment of the whole experimental design 
satisfactorily: 
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(1) Some subjects in one F.3 and two or three F.4 
classes were on a study trip to Germany during 
the first period of the testing sessions. 
(2) Classes were not of approximately equal size 
and the attendance rates of different classes 
sometimes varied considerably. 
(3) Subjects in a few classes were not willing to 
take the tests. 
Nevertheless, the actual experiments did cover a 
substantial part of the original design. 
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TABLE 5.13 Experimental Design of London Study  
Class/ 1st Test 2nd Test 3rd Test 
Group 
Code Code N Code N Code N 
21 A 24 MJI 15 A 20 
22 A 30 RPM 23 A 18 
23 A 24 SRT 24 
24 A 13 B 10 
25 A 15 
26 RPM 10 A 15 
27 SRT 23 A 14 B 23 
28 MJI 30 B 31 A 22 
31 A 25 MJI 15 
32 A 24 RPM 10 
33 MJI 9 A 16 
41 SRT 28 A 28 
42 A 32 A 18 
43 A 13 SRT 7 
44 A 12 MJI 8 
45 RPM 13 A 15 
46 DIT 8 A 14 
47 A 8 RPM 6 
48 A 10 
49 B 17 RPM 11 
40 MJI 4 B 9 
60 A(IS) 67 DIT 26 
81 A-A+ 4-28 DIT 2-25 
82 DIT 22 A+ 22 
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The following notes apply to Table 5.13: 
(1) All the symbols and notations used are explained in 
Appendix 5(F). For easy reference, the details of 
the Class/Group Code are listed as follows: 
Class/Group Code Meaning 
21 to 28 F.2 	 Classes 
31 to 33 F.3 	 Classes 
40 to 49 F:4 	 Classes 
60 F.6 	 Class 
81-82 Adult Sample 
(2) "1st Test" means the first test taken by the subjects. 
It usually lasted for one and a half class period 
(1 class period = 35 minutes). Those who did not 
appear in the first testing period but appeared in 
the second and third (or fourth for some F.2 classes) 
periods were asked to join the group for the 2nd/3rd 
tests only. Therefore, it is possible that the N for 
the 2nd or 3rd test in some classes are larger than 
the N for the 1st test. 
(3) Though most of the data described in Table 5.13 
are good for analysis, a few of them have to be dis-
carded because of large amount of missing data. The 
actual N being analysed will be given alongside with 
the results and findings. 
TABLE 5.14. Validity Study using the London Sample described  
in Table 5.2 
CLASS 
TES 
CODE F.2 F.3 F.4 F.6 Adult 
Mai 15 24 8 0 0 47 
DIT 0 11 46 26 49 132 
SRT 31 0 35 0 0 66 
RPM 28 10 19 0 0 57 
JEPI 66 31 56 0 0 153 
TT 7 0 22 0 0 29 
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(B) Experimental Procedures 
B.1.. School E 
(1) Four classes of F.2 (21, 22, 27 and 28) were given 
two Double periods (1 period = 35 minutes), the whole 
F.6 group was given one Double period and all the 
rest were given three periods (either one Double 
plus one Single, or three Single perdods). The 
time interval between two successive testing periods 
was normally one week. 
(2) Before the testing, the class teachers were con-
sulted. Information on the characteristics and 
general academic standard of the class was provided. 
The class teachers were given a copy of the test 
and were told how the test would be administered. 
(3) The teacher introduced the author or his colleague 
to the class at the start of the testing and read 
the following introduction; 
"A group of researchers from the University 
of London Institute of Education are trying 
to find out what opinions young people have 
about some social situations. That is, how 
you would act or do things when you have 
decisions to make where other people are 
concerned. 
You may wonder why they are doing a study 
like this. One reason is to compare replies 
from young people from different countries 
(Britain, Hong Kong and Malaysia); young 
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people who may have quite different back-
grounds from you. 
They want to carry out this study quite 
confidentially so that you can feel quite 
free in giving your replies." 
The teacher and the researcher also answered 
any questions asked by the students. Then the teacher 
went through the whole test instructions with the class 
in detail.-  
(4) Subjects were not compelled to complete the tests. 
On the whole, less than 10% of them showed reluctance 
to complete the tests. 
(5) In general, there was no strict time limit for 
completing any of the tests. 	 A few of them who did 
not complete the major parts of the tests are dropped 
from the sample. 
(6) Some of the subjects in Class 33 and all the F.6 
subjects were allowed to take the tests home for 
completion. F.6 subjects only took DIT home. All 
other subjects in School E completed the tests during 
their class periods. 
(7) F.2, F.3 and F.4 subjects were given the JEPI or TT 
if they finished the assigned tests before the end 
of the time allocated. Similarly, some of the F.3 
and F.4 subjects were given the DIT if there were 
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plenty of time left. 
(8) Classes 21, 22 and 42 were used for studying test-
retest reliability. 
B.2. Adult Subjects  
It was found that it was extremely difficult to ask 
adults to fill in such a long and personal questionnaire. 
Only a small number of them were willing to do so. 
Subjects were given a written introduction and two 
tests (MDT Form A+/A and DIT) with clear instructions 
for completing which test first. Except eight subjects, 
all of them took the tests home, completed them and re-
turned to us. The return rate was estimated to be about 
25%. 
(C) Practical Problems  
(1) Classes 25 (N = 15) and 47 (N = 8) were described by 
their teachers as classes of very low academic ability. 
Some of them could not read properly. They were given 
additional help in the understanding of the test ins-
tructions and the meaning of the test contents. 
These two classes were asked to answer only Part I 
of the MDT. Since their number is so small, they are 
also included in the major sample. 
(2) While most of the subjects exhibited a high degree 
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of good conduct and co-operation, a few of them did 
show disciplinary problems. It should be emphasized 
that many of these unwilling subjects showed reluc-
tance only in the last testing period, most probably 
because they felt bored at being tested for such a 
long time. According to the testing record, the 
testing atmosphere of the following testing sessions 
was rated as bad: 
Class . 	 Test 
21 Retesting of MDT (A) 
25 MDT 	 (A) 
32 RPM 
48 MDT 	 (A) 
40 MJI 	 and MDT 	 (B) 
The above data were anticipated to have much more 
noise than the rest and thus some of these data may have 
to be discarded completely. 
